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Foreword
ix
Traditional innovation and extension sys-tems seem to have become less effective, and new approaches and instruments are
needed. To develop these instruments, all actors
in agricultural innovation systems have to build
up their innovation capabilities. The analysis of 
these capabilities, both in individuals and orga-
nizations, has received a great deal of attention 
outside agriculture. Innovation capabilities 
within agriculture, however, have barely been 
explored. Equally unexplored is the issue of how 
to strengthen innovation capabilities in non-
profit organizations that seek to alleviate pov-
erty. This study contributes to these hitherto 
underdeveloped research areas by building a 
novel conceptual framework to analyze the 
dynamics of innovation capabilities in an orga-
nization that supports agricultural research, 
extension, and innovation in Mexico. Derived 
from a case study, the report’s conclusions are 
relevant to a wide range of organizations both 
in developed and developing countries.
 The results show that an organization’s inno-
vation capabilities depend on the interactions 
among committed, capable individuals; on the 
organization’s culture and governance mecha-
nisms; and on the enabling environment, all of 
which are conditioned by the organization’s his-
tory. Building innovation capabilities is a com-
plex process, and there are no simple formulas 
for accomplishing it; all successful organizations 
will face difficulties when adapting to a new 
situation. However, the authors conclude that 
three factors are essential in helping organiza-
tions to innovate: (1) they must have in their 
ranks at least a few committed, inventive indi-
viduals; (2) those individuals must be given 
latitude, within the framework of the organiza-
tion’s goals, to experiment with new or different 
approaches; and (3) funding institutions (wheth-
er international donors or public offices) have to 
allow innovative organizations to explore new 
instruments to achieve the institutional goals.
 The people and leadership factors seem to 
remain undervalued and understudied as key 
forces for innovation and agricultural develop-
ment in general.
Joachim von Braun
Director General, IFPRI
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Summary
Since the 1980s, developing countries’ agriculture has become more complex and diversified. In general the public 
research and extension institutions in these 
countries were criticized for not participating 
in the emergence of the most dynamic agri-
cultural markets. In recent years many of these 
institutions have struggled to adapt to the new 
environment, but they could not overcome 
the hurdles posed by organizational rigidities, 
strict public regulations, deteriorating human 
capital, shrinking budgets, and a model of 
science that hampered their integration into 
dynamic innovation processes.
 In general developing countries applied 
similar agricultural research policies: sepa-
ration of financing and implementation of 
research, reductions in direct budgetary allo-
cations to research and extension institu-
tions, elimination or major reduction of public 
extension, and introduction of competitive 
grants programs to induce a transformation 
of research organizations. Strong anecdotal 
information suggests that these policies had 
limited impact on the quality and pertinence of 
research and on the performance of the public 
research institutions.
 Using a different set of instruments, the 
Mexican Produce Foundations (PFs) had major
and diverse impacts on the agricultural inno-
vation and research systems. These impacts 
resulted mostly from activities the PFs intro-
duced as they learned to manage funds for 
research and extension, and to a lesser extent 
from the activities they were created for (that 
is, to manage funds for agricultural research 
and extension). The PFs were able to introduce 
these activities because they developed strong 
learning abilities, including identifying knowl-
edge gaps and defining strategies to fill them.
 The questions this report seeks to answer are 
how an organization that manages public funds 
for research and extension could sustain organi-
zational innovations over extended periods and 
how it could learn and adapt to maximize its 
impact on the agricultural innovation system. 
Previous studies found that human resources, 
organizational cultures, and governance struc-
tures are three of the most important factors 
influencing institutional change and innovative 
capabilities. Despite their importance, these fac-
tors have been largely neglected in the literature 
on agricultural research and extension policies. 
This report analyzes what role these factors 
played in the Mexican experience.
What Are the PFs?
The PFs are civil society organizations man-
aged by farmers. They were created to manage 
public funds for research and extension. The PFs
were an institutional innovation of great impor-
tance in the Mexican innovation system and its
agriculture. In the 2000s the PFs became an im-
portant stakeholder in the agricultural sector, 
influencing the design and implementation of 
agricultural policies, including scientific, techno-
logical, and innovation policies, as well as the 
transformation of public research institutions.
New channels of communication were also 
opened between federal and state authorities on
the one hand, and associations of commercial 
farmers on the other. These effects did not ori-
ginate in the activities the PFs were created for 
but rather in activities the PFs themselves devel-
oped as they evolved.
xiii
 The PFs were created at a critical moment 
in Mexico’s history. In 1982 the country started 
a process of gradual economic and political lib-
eralization. This process created new opportuni-
ties and threats for agricultural producers, who, 
in turn, started to look for advanced technologies 
to compete in the new economic environment. 
When public research institutions were not able 
to provide these technologies, producers and 
other actors in the innovation system imported 
or developed them.
 It was in this context that 32 PFs (one in
each state) were created to improve the inter-
action between the National Institute for 
Forestry, Agricultural, and Livestock Research 
(INIFAP) and farmers, as well as to boost its 
funding. Initially the federal and state govern-
ments controlled the boards of the PFs. A few 
farmers sought, and eventually achieved, a
more independent role. Eventually this in-
dependence spread to all PFs. Subsequently 
the PFs realized that a set of isolated founda-
tions was too atomized and created a national 
coordinating office (National Coordinator for 
the Produce Foundations, or COFUPRO).
 Despite their greater independence, cur-
rently the PFs interact assiduously with the 
federal and state governments, and they influ-
ence sectoral and science policies. The PFs 
have also influenced the agricultural research 
system, especially by opening channels of com-
munication between producers and researchers 
and by influencing research priorities. The PFs 
are a Mexican phenomenon in which foreign 
donors and multilateral institutions have had a 
very limited influence.
Conceptual Framework for the 
Analysis of Institutional Innovation
The PFs evolved in ways that were not totally 
intended or foreseen by any of the actors 
that participated in the process; even today, 
the impacts of their actions cannot be totally 
assessed. Such processes can be analyzed by 
combining complexity theories, an innovation 
systems framework, and the literature on orga-
nizational cultures and governance.
Complex Processes
The complex systems relevant to this study 
are made up of many interacting agents, each 
with his or her own goals and constraints. The 
set of agents self-organizes. This organization 
enables the emergence of structures and behav-
iors at higher levels of aggregation that are not 
possessed by any of the individual agents.
 Complex systems evolve through the com-
bination of initial conditions, multiple interac-
tions, long-run trends, and random variations in 
the individual agents as well as in their interac-
tions. Self-organization and randomness prevent 
individual agents from predicting or controlling 
the system’s evolution. For this reason, policies 
in a complex system do not seek to direct the 
process but rather to raise the probability of
desired outcomes while lowering that of un-
desired results, suggest new questions, examine 
new actions, and identify situations in which 
small interventions can have large impacts.
 One of the most important instruments 
for operating on complex systems is to influ-
ence variation and selection. For example, a 
plant breeder makes crosses that do not occur 
naturally (an increase in variation). He or she 
then selects those plants with the best results 
according to his or her objective, regardless of 
reproductive efficiency (a change in the selec-
tion criterion). This mechanism differs fun-
damentally from the engineering approach to 
finding solutions. In complexity theory, many 
alternative solutions are tested to see which 
works, without fully understanding the under-
lying processes. In the engineering approach, 
a detailed model of the process is first created 
and then a solution is designed. The directed 
search converges to the optimum solution at 
least as quickly as the engineering solution; 
when the system is not easily characterized, a 
directed search is more efficient.
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Organizational Innovative Capabilities: 
The Role of Learning
An organization’s learning capacity stems from 
the interaction among resources (individuals 
and fixed capital), processes (how things are 
done), and values (including the organizational 
culture and mission). In new organizations, 
skills reside in resources, especially its human 
resources. In time, the skills in successful 
organizations are transferred to processes and 
values. Learning skills are specific to each 
organization and context—they are developed 
with idiosyncratic investments and processes 
that other organizations cannot easily imitate 
or buy. Skills that confer an advantage in one 
context may become a liability in another.
 To be robust, a learning strategy should 
(1) include both operational and strategic com-
ponents, (2) define what needs to be learned, 
(3) identify the sources of learning, (4) specify 
who learns and in which areas of the organiza-
tion learning should occur, and (5) identify 
learning mechanisms.
Organizational Culture
An organizational culture is a set of basic assump-
tions discovered or developed by a group in the 
process of learning how to deal with problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration. 
These assumptions are considered to be valid 
because they have functioned adequately and 
are taught to new members of the organization. 
This definition highlights that a culture (1) is a 
matter of basic assumptions rather than values or 
behaviors; (2) is created by a group that devises, 
discovers, or develops these assumptions; (3) 
originates in the organization’s initial needs to 
solve specific problems; and (4) is rooted in the 
mechanisms used to integrate workers. Cultures 
resist change because they generate great loyalty 
among their followers.
Governance
Organizations are currently recognized as 
spaces for collective action. Collective action 
depends as much on individual mental models 
as it does on organizational practices, such as 
the work environment and incentives offered 
to individuals. The analysis of governance in 
organizations has three dimensions: structure 
(distribution of functions and coordination), 
process (communication, coordination, leader-
ship, learning policies, and operating process-
es), and strategic axis (mission, shared vision, 
strategic focus, and action plans).
Main Lessons Derived from 
the Study of the PFs
The study of the PFs yielded six important les-
sons for the management of research and inno-
vation in developing countries. First, because 
of the complexity of innovation processes, sci-
ence, extension, and innovation policies should 
be flexible and evolve as new information 
becomes available and new capabilities are 
acquired. The flexibility should be implement-
ed at all levels: that of policymakers, research 
administrators, and researchers themselves.
 Second, the development of innovative 
capabilities depends on a strong and sustained 
commitment from the authorities.
 Third, research and innovation policies 
should not be left to evolve randomly but 
instead managed by balancing exploration of 
new instruments with the exploitation of those 
that have shown their efficacy. Balancing these 
two strategies requires an effective search 
mechanism that should combine decentralized 
exploration with centralized learning. Over-
reliance on centralized exploration can miss 
important opportunities, whereas decentralized 
learning alone hampers the sharing of useful 
information. Decentralized exploration can be 
complemented with directed searches when 
the opportunities or needs are clear. The direct-
ed searches should not attempt to establish 
major programs from the start but rather use 
pilot projects to test the assumptions under-
lying the program design. The pilot programs 
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should be scaled up only after they have shown 
their effectiveness. Action research to test 
different types of interactions in the innova-
tion networks should be the basic approach 
to pilot programs. The exploration should not 
be restricted to financing instruments and tra-
ditional research but should also include new 
ways to foster the emergence of innovation 
networks and involve new actors in innovation 
processes.
 Another important element in the search 
strategy is a monitoring system to guide the 
exploration. The two most important factors 
that determine the system’s efficacy are the 
flexibility of the monitoring system and the set 
of indicators to be monitored. A key feature 
of complex systems is that interventions often 
have unexpected results. A monitoring system 
that constrains itself to a predetermined set of 
indicators would miss those results.
 Fourth, individuals play a major role in the 
success or failure of innovation processes and 
policies. Traditionally, policymakers have paid 
a great deal of attention to the design of the 
organizations that will implement the programs 
and the rules they must follow. The selection 
of capable individuals to run the organizations, 
however, has received less attention.
 Fifth, innovation programs should have 
effective governance structures in which inno-
vators can influence decisions.
 Sixth, innovation is more than just applied 
research. To effectively participate in innova-
tion processes, public research and extension 
institutions must adopt a new conceptual frame-
work in which they recognize that they are not 
the central actors but play an important support-
ing role. Adoption of this new framework leads 
to new operational routines in which researchers 
integrate into innovation networks.
 These lessons have particular relevance for 
poverty alleviation. Poverty and development 
are complex processes whose dynamics have 
changed in response to globalization, migra-
tion, and technical change. To operate success-
fully in such an environment, policymakers 
and practitioners need to develop effective 
exploration and selection mechanisms, create
learning routines, and allow institutional change
to foster adaptation to emergent problems. In 
addition, the institutions should be managed 
by individuals with a strong sense of duty and 
commitment to poverty alleviation.
 As poverty alleviation was not among the
original goals of the PFs, most of their actions
were directed toward traditional research and 
extension activities. For this reason, the impacts 
of the PFs on rural poverty were never direct-
ly assessed. As they realized the limitations of
traditional competitive funds, some PFs suc-
cessfully implemented a few projects directed 
toward small farmers. Over the years, several
PFs declared poverty alleviation an explicit 
institutional goal and devoted more resources 
to facilitate the access of small farmers to com-
mercial value chains. There are also indications 
that the PFs contributed to poverty alleviation 
by supporting the expansion of commercial 
agriculture and fostering the creation of employ-
ment in rural areas. The impact of the PFs on 
research institutions and commercial farmers is 
currently being evaluated.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
 After the Green Revolution, agricultural 
research was seen as an instrument in poverty-
alleviation strategies. Since then, however, the 
perception of the role formal research can play 
has undergone shifts. Changes in perception 
were in part the consequence of the realization 
of the central role of growth in reducing pover-
ty (World Bank 2005) and of the participation 
of different actors in the expansion of the most 
dynamic agricultural markets in developing 
countries. Private firms and service providers 
became important new sources of market and 
technical information, usually without gov-
ernment support, whereas the public research 
institutions continued to work on their tra-
ditional lines of research, especially staples, 
livestock, dairy, and a few traditional export 
products (Byerlee, Alex, and Echeverría 2002; 
see also the case studies in Weatherspoon and 
Reardon 2003; Gabre-Madhin and Haggblade 
2004; and Pardey, Alston, and Piggott 2006).
 The contrasting contributions of the private 
and public sectors led many stakeholders in 
the agricultural sector (including international 
donors) to question the usefulness of public 
research and extension institutions (Echeverría 
and Elliot 2002). This critique was part of a 
more general trend where policymakers began 
to expect greater direct usefulness from pub-
licly funded research (Lundvall and Borrás 
2005; Pavitt 2005).
 Many public agricultural research and 
extension systems in developing countries have 
struggled to adapt to the new environment, but 
they could not overcome the hurdles posed by 
organizational rigidities, strict public regula-
tions, deteriorating human capital, shrinking 
budgets, and a model of science that hampered 
their integration into dynamic innovation pro-
cesses. Most of these factors also weakened 
policymakers’ ability to transform the public 
institutions. In general, developing countries 
1
1In this report the term agricultural refers to livestock, forestry, fishing, and agriculture itself. Agriculture is used for brevity.
Since the 1980s, agriculture in developing countries has become more complex because of globalization, urbanization, the emergence of high-value agriculture, the deterioration of natural resources, migration, and changes in the livelihood strategies of rural households 
(Reardon 2005; World Bank 2006a, 2007).1 These events have changed the dynamics of poverty, 
reducing the effectiveness of traditional approaches to poverty alleviation and creating the oppor-
tunity to use new instruments (see Section 3.4). Because of the complex nature of poverty, these 
instruments have to be designed using an evolutionary approach based on experimentation and 
learning (see Chapters 2 and 3).
applied a uniform recipe with little adaptation: 
separation of financing and implementation 
of research, reductions in direct budgetary 
allocations to research and extension institu-
tions, elimination or major reduction of pub-
lic extension, and introduction of competitive 
grants programs to induce a transformation of 
research organizations (see the cases described 
in Rivera and Alex 2004 and in Pardey, Alston, 
and Piggott 2006). Strong anecdotal informa-
tion suggests that, in general, these policies had 
limited impact.
 Using a different set of instruments, the 
PFs had major and diverse impacts on the 
agricultural innovation and research systems.2
These effects resulted mostly from activities 
the PFs introduced as they learned to man-
age funds for research and extension, and to 
a lesser extent from the activities they were 
created for: to manage a competitive fund for 
agricultural research and extension.
 The questions this report seeks to answer 
are how an organization that manages public 
funds for research and extension can sustain 
organizational innovation over extended peri-
ods, and how it can learn and adapt to maxi-
mize its impact on the agricultural innovation 
system. Studies of private firms have found 
that most organizations eventually lose their 
creativity and seldom regain it (see Chapter 
3 for an analysis of the literature). The PFs, 
however, have managed to learn and adapt. 
Understanding the factors that enabled such 
unusual behavior will help to improve the 
design and implementation of research and 
innovation programs in developing countries.
 Additional lessons can be obtained from 
new insights on the dynamics of innovative 
organizations and how they relate to innova-
tive capabilities. Using a theoretical framework 
that combines the literature on innovation sys-
tems, complexity theories, and organizational 
cultures and governance, this study analyzes 
the factors that allowed the PFs to develop 
strong innovative capabilities and studies how 
these capabilities were affected by changes in 
the interactions among regulatory frameworks, 
organizational structures, creative individuals, 
and the history of the processes.
 Previous studies found that human resourc-
es, organizational cultures, and governance 
structures are three of the most important fac-
tors influencing institutional change and inno-
vative capabilities; moreover, it has been found 
that these factors evolve slowly, conditioned 
by the environment in which the organization 
operates (see Chapter 3). Despite their impor-
tance, these factors have been largely neglect-
ed in the literature on agricultural research and 
extension policies, which has mainly focused 
on estimating rates of return, developing for-
mal methods for priority setting, and measur-
ing inputs, especially public investments and 
numbers of professionals (for example, Alston, 
Norton, and Pardey 1995; Pardey, Alston, and 
Piggott 2006; and the Agricultural Science 
and Technology Indicators publications of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
[IFPRI]).
1.1 Why Study the PFs?
The PFs were an institutional innovation of 
great importance in the Mexican innovation 
system and its agriculture. Until the 1990s agri-
cultural research and extension policies gravi-
tated around INIFAP, but in the 2000s the 
PFs became one of the most important stake-
holders in the agricultural sector and a de facto 
coordinator of several research and extension 
activities. The PFs influenced the design and 
implementation of agricultural policies, includ-
2   CHAPTER 1
2The Spanish for PF is “Fundación Produce”; this term does not translate easily into English, meaning roughly, “Foundation 
Go Farm.” The impacts were identified with rapid assessment methods in a previous evaluation of the PF (Ekboir 2004); a 
more thorough assessment of these impacts is currently under way.
ing science, technology, and innovation (STI) 
policies, as well as the transformation of public 
research institutions. New channels of commu-
nication were also opened between federal and 
state authorities on the one hand and associa-
tions of commercial farmers on the other. On 
the whole, these effects did not originate in 
the activities the PFs were created for (that is, 
to manage funds for agricultural research and 
extension), but rather in activities the PFs them-
selves developed as they evolved. Despite their 
focus on commercial farmers, some PFs have 
implemented a few innovative projects that 
targeted poor farmers; moreover, as time pro-
gressed, helping small farmers to access profit-
able markets and developing value chains that 
include poor households has become increas-
ingly important for the most innovative PFs.
 The PFs were created at a particular moment 
in Mexico’s history. In 1982, the country suf-
fered a major economic crisis, after which the 
government started a gradual economic and 
political liberalization.3 The deregulation of 
the economy created new opportunities and 
threats for agricultural producers, who, in turn, 
started to look for advanced technologies to 
compete in the new economic environment. 
When public research institutions were unable 
to provide these technologies, producers and 
other actors in the innovation system imported 
or developed them (Ekboir et al. 2003). This 
lack of response from the public research and 
development institutions led society to ques-
tion their validity.
 It was in this context that 32 foundations 
(one in each state) were created to improve 
the interaction between INIFAP and farmers, 
as well as to boost funding for public research 
institutions. Initially the federal and state gov-
ernments controlled the foundations’ boards. 
Soon a few farmers sought, and eventually 
achieved, a more independent role. This inde-
pendence gradually spread to most foundations. 
Before long the PFs realized that a set of iso-
lated foundations was too atomized and created 
a national coordinating office (COFUPRO).
 Despite their greater independence, the PFs 
interact assiduously with the federal and state 
governments. Most funding (82 percent) still 
comes from the federal government (Muñoz 
2005), and the federal Secretary of Agriculture, 
Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries, and 
Food (SAGARPA) consults frequently with the 
PFs about their activities and the transformation 
of the public research system. In adition, the PFs 
generate information and ideas that federal and 
state officials use to formulate agricultural poli-
cies, and the governments value the flexibility 
and administrative capacity of the PFs.
 The PFs also influenced the agricultur-
al research system. On the one hand, they 
introduced new concepts for the analysis and 
design of scientific and technological policies
—especially the concepts of innovation and 
innovation networks. On the other hand, they 
also influenced research activities by opening 
channels of communication between producers 
and researchers and by defining new research 
priorities. The impacts on extension, though, 
do not appear to be substantial, mainly because 
there are no federal or state extension institu-
tions with whom the PFs can interact.4 In the 
face of this deficiency, several foundations cre-
ated their own extension programs.
 The PFs are a Mexican phenomenon. They 
were part of an international wave of creation 
of competitive funds for agricultural research 
and extension in developing countries, but 
beyond the intellectual input, foreign donors 
and multilateral institutions did not participate 
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3The nature of the crisis and how it influenced development policies is explained in Section 5.1.
4Public extension services were closed in 1996 and were replaced by a program intended to induce the creation of a market 
for technical services. Section 5.1 describes this process in detail.
in the creation of the PFs and contributed very 
little to their evolution.5
1.2 Motivation for This Study 
and Its Intended Audience
In 2005 the PFs thought they were losing 
their innovative drive and requested IFPRI to 
conduct an institutional assessment to identify 
actions to develop new capabilities. The PFs 
also thought that, as some of the founding 
members were leaving, it was necessary to 
document their experiences. The document 
submitted to the PFs is the basis of the pres-
ent report and was modified to highlight those 
lessons that may be useful to an international 
audience of managers and funders of agri-
cultural research and extension in developing 
countries (in particular, policymakers, research 
managers, public and private donors, and  multi-
lateral organizations) and the development 
specialists that advise them. These decision-
makers are faced with the fact that traditional 
policies have lost much of their effectiveness 
in today’s more complex rural environments. 
Thus they need new insights that help them 
(1) understand the role research and extension 
could play in growth and poverty alleviation 
in a globalized economy and (2) develop more 
effective instruments to design and implement 
research and innovation programs.
 This report will also be useful for scholars 
who study development, innovation systems, 
research and extension policies, and manage-
ment of innovative organizations, because 
it will help them identify issues for further 
research and new policy options that are both 
feasible and effective.
1.3 Outline of This Report
This report analyzes the institutional dynam-
ics of a learning organization with the goal of 
helping policymakers in developing countries 
and multilateral organizations to improve the 
design and implementation of STI policies tar-
geted at the agricultural sector in general, and 
at small, poor farmers in particular. For this 
reason, Chapters 2 and 3 contain a thorough 
review of a literature that is usually overlooked 
by economists and policymakers and can con-
tribute to the identification of new instruments
to foster rural innovations and improve poverty-
alleviation programs. The main topics analyzed
are complexity theories and the design of 
policies to operate on complex processes; the 
nature of innovation processes; STI policies; 
innovative capabilities; institutional learning; 
organizational cultures; governance structures; 
and how innovative capabilities influence poor 
households’ livelihood strategies and their 
responses to poverty-alleviation programs.
 Chapter 4 synthesizes the most important 
theoretical concepts used in the empirical 
analysis and describes the qualitative method-
ology used. Because qualitative methods are 
not commonly used by economists—and 
also because many social scientists and policy-
makers believe that quantitative methods 
are always more reliable than qualitative 
approaches—this chapter also explains under 
which conditions one methodology should be 
chosen over another.
 Chapter 5 describes in detail the creation 
and evolution of the PFs, in particular, the 
interaction among individuals, institutional set-
tings, policies, the sociopolitical environment in 
which the PFs operated, and the process’s own 
history. Three reasons justify the detail with 
which the process is described. First, it high-
lights the complex interactions among factors 
that are seldom considered in policy design and 
implementation; crucial among these factors 
are institutional cultures and the role of indi-
viduals and of overseeing institutions. Under-
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5Similar programs have been identified in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, the Central American 
region, and several African and Asian countries.
standing the roles of these factors and the 
complexity of socioeconomic processes yields 
policy recommendations substantially different 
from those derived from simpler, mechanistic 
analyses. Second, it shows how qualitative 
methods can be used to analyze the multiple and 
unintended impacts of socioeconomic policies. 
Finally, the report seeks to contribute to the cre-
ation of the institutional memory of the PFs.
 Chapter 6 studies three important factors 
that influenced the evolution of the PFs: their 
institutional culture, governance structures, 
and learning mechanisms. These factors and 
their interactions are the main determinants of 
an organization’s innovative potential, because 
they determine the exploration strategies and 
the ability to adapt and to influence the envi-
ronment. This chapter also briefly explores 
some impacts the PFs had on the research and 
extension systems. Chapter 7 concludes and 
contains the main lessons learned from the 
analysis, and Chapter 8 describes the main 
actions the PFs implemented in response to the 
recommendations made in the original report 
finished in 2006.
 The original report contained a detailed list 
of recommendations that could be implement-
ed to strengthen the innovative capabilities 
of the PFs. Although many of the suggestions 
are quite specific to the PFs, they are included 
in Appendix C, because no other publication 
that detailed instruments for strengthening 
research managing institutions could be found 
in the literature.
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CHAPTER 2
Innovation and Research Systems 
in Developing Countries
2.1 Operating in a Complex World
2.1.1 What Is a Complex System?
The study of complexity theories is relatively 
recent (Nicolis and Prigogine 1989; Kauffman 
1995, 2000; Axelrod and Cohen 1999; Watts 
1999; Buchanan 2002; Crutchfield and Schuster 
2003) and covers different areas of knowledge, 
including the social sciences, business man-
agement, physics, chemistry, ecology, biology, 
and mathematics.
 There are different definitions of complex-
ity; in this study, a complex system is defined 
as one whose properties cannot be understood 
from the separate analysis of its parts (Galla-
gher and Appenzeller 1999). There are also 
many types of complex systems. The most rel-
evant for the analysis of organizational dynam-
ics are made up of agents of different kinds 
(for example, directors, managers, employees, 
clients, and suppliers). Each agent defines his 
or her own strategy and reacts to environmen-
tal changes and to the actions taken by others; 
simultaneously, agents attempt to modify the 
environment to maximize their benefits. That 
is to say, the system is characterized by a num-
ber of independent decisionmakers, multiple 
interactions, and many feedback mechanisms 
operating at different scales (micro, meso, and 
macro) and speeds (that is, slow- and fast-
changing variables interacting continuously). 
The nature and strength of the feedback mech-
anisms also change often. Such systems belong 
to a class known as complex adaptive systems 
(CASs). Examples of CASs are a colony of 
ants, large ecosystems, an army, and a market 
economy.
 Patterns of behavior specific to groups of 
agents and to the system as a whole emerge 
from the actions and interactions among indi-
The PFs have greatly changed in their 10 years of existence. Today’s PFs look very differ-ent from what their creators originally imagined: instead of being passive organizations subordinated to the political authorities, they are independent institutions often suggest-
ing policies to a reactive public sector. The PFs evolved through the interactions of many actors, 
none of whom was able to control the process. The dynamics of such processes can be analyzed 
with complexity theories (Section 2.1). The characterization of innovation as a complex process—
especially the relationship between STI and the role of networks in the generation and diffusion 
of innovations (Section 2.2)—helps identify new instruments to design and implement innovation 
policies. Finally, Section 2.3 analyzes STI policies from an innovation systems perspective.
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vidual agents; many of the patterns do not exist 
at the level of the individuals. In other words, 
properties that manifest themselves at the 
meso or macro level do not exist at the micro 
level, but these properties influence micro 
behaviors. This phenomenon is known as self-
organization (Kauffman 1995). For example, 
life results from a huge number of simultane-
ous chemical reactions. Age is a property of 
the body and not of any particular reaction; 
however, the reactions are influenced by age. 
Self-organization is one of the most important 
characteristics of a complex system. It is also 
the main reason that traditional methods of 
planning and policymaking fail when applied 
to a complex system (see Section 2.1.2).
 CASs evolve through the combination of 
initial conditions, multiple interactions, trends, 
and random variations of both the agents and 
their interactions.1 The relative importance 
of the trends and the random factors changes 
as the system evolves. When the trends are 
strong, the system is more or less predictable. 
With time, however, new agents, strategies, 
and interactions emerge, increasing instability. 
Eventually the random component predomi-
nates over the trends; at this point, known as 
a bifurcation, the system becomes completely 
unpredictable (Nicolis and Prigogine 1989).
 CASs are characterized by many events 
occurring simultaneously; the majority of these 
events are of little consequence, a few have 
significant outcomes and, very rarely, cata-
strophic effects.2 While trends predominate, 
the probability of the minor events occurring 
is greater, whereas close to the point of bifur-
cation, the probability of catastrophic events 
increases. Although it is possible to study the 
probability distribution of events, it is impos-
sible to know whether the next event will have 
few consequences or will trigger a long chain 
of effects.3 The study of past behaviors allows 
a better characterization of the probability 
distribution of events, but it does not elimi-
nate uncertainty. For example, the movement 
of tectonic plates accumulates energy, which 
eventually causes an earthquake. When the 
accumulated energy is low, it is possible to 
predict with some certainty that an earthquake 
will not occur. As energy accumulates, the 
probability of an earthquake increases. But it is 
impossible to exactly predict either the timing 
or the intensity of the next quake.
 At bifurcations, small events or agents with 
minimal influence can determine the future 
evolutionary path of a CAS, as seen in Box 
2.1. The influence of minor individuals and/or 
events is greater at the beginning of the process 
because it is not yet structured. As time passes, 
organizations increasingly define routines and 
create their own cultures, which condition the 
actions of individuals (Christensen and Raynor 
2003).
 One of the most important factors in the 
evolution of a CAS is the interaction between 
variation and selection. New actors continu-
ally appear, but not all are well adapted to the 
environment. Selection allows for survival of 
the fittest. These concepts have traditionally 
been associated with the theories of Charles 
Darwin; nevertheless, new studies have shown 
that more complex dynamics than simple sur-
vival of the fittest are at play.
 Studies of biological evolution have identi-
fied three characteristics of evolutionary pro-
cesses. First, contrary to what Darwin believed, 
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1The initial conditions are those that prevail at the moment at which the analysis begins, which may differ from those present 
at the beginning of the process.
2In the mathematical literature, the term catastrophic refers to an event that essentially changes the structure of the process. It 
does not have the negative connotation that it has in common use.
3This phenomenon is known as critical self-organization (Bak 1996) or self-organization at the edge of chaos (Kauffman 1995).
the evolution of phenotypes does not indicate 
a movement toward an optimum.4 Second, 
changes in biological efficiency do not occur 
gradually, but in leaps interrupted by long peri-
ods of relative stability. And third, genetic evo-
lution, measured in terms of DNA sequences, 
does not stop during the period of phenotype 
stability but continues at least at the same rate 
as in the period of innovation and adaptation. 
The evolutionary leaps occur without external 
triggers, indicating the existence of “neutral” 
evolution; in other words, many genetic chang-
es do not have a phenotypical expression.
 It has been found that, except for fairly 
restricted settings, the evolution of complex 
systems cannot be characterized by the gradi-
ent of the equivalent of an energy function 
(Crutchfield and Schuster 2003). Thus for 
economics models, no welfare function (even 
a dynamic specification) can capture the rich 
dynamics of social systems.
 The PFs can be analyzed as a CAS because:
1.  They are part of and attempt to operate on a 
wider (innovation) system in which a large 
number of actors of different types (includ-
ing various federal and state public offices,
research and extension institutions, multi-
lateral organizations, farmers, farmer organi-
zations, and private companies) participate, 
and actors may have distinct objectives.
2.  The diversity of the PFs, together with a lax 
system of governance, permits great varia-
tion in work styles, which converge through 
mechanisms of self-organization.
3.  The actions of the PFs affect the innovation 
system through mechanisms that change in 
response to interventions of each of the sys-
tem’s actors, including the PFs themselves.
2.1.2 Policy Design in a CAS
After the industrial revolution, social pro-
cesses have been analyzed using metaphors 
of machines and factories. This mechanistic
vision had profound effects on organizational 
design, emphasizing control and predictability. 
In the public sector, priority was given to rules
designed by hierarchies of relatively expert 
public employees and carried out by sub-
ordinates (Olson and Eoyang 2001).
 In the framework of complexity theories, in 
contrast, self-organization is recognized both 
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Box 2.1  The influence of individuals and minor events on an organization’s evolution
Bill Gates was contracted to develop an operating system for personal computers thanks to 
his mother’s acquaintance with a top IBM executive. He was able to acquire a precursor 
of the operating system Windows from Xerox, because this company did not see its com-
mercial value. IBM then used its marketing muscle to impose the standard, displacing other 
systems that were technically superior to Windows (Rycroft and Kash 1999). As almost all 
personal computers use Windows, there are few incentives for commercial software devel-
opers to write programs for other operating systems. At the same time, there is a great incen-
tive for users of personal computers to choose Windows, as it allows them to easily exchange 
files with other computer users and ensures access to a continuous supply of compatible 
software. In other words, most personal computer users cannot choose alternatives that are 
more efficient than Windows because the cost of using other operating systems is too high.
4The genotype is the set of genes of an individual, whereas the phenotype is the visible expression of the genotype. For 
example, an individual can have genes for blue and brown eyes, but can only have eyes of one color.
as an essential characteristic that reflects the 
decentralized nature of the system and as the 
source of the difficulties in predicting the con-
sequences of interventions. Self-organization 
prevents any individual agent from controlling 
the system; some actors have greater influence 
than others, but none is in complete control. 
For this reason, in complex systems decision-
makers do not seek to direct the system but 
rather to operate on the probability of events 
to increase the probability of desired results 
while reducing the likelihood of undesirable 
outcomes, to suggest new questions, identify 
high-impact interventions, examine new pos-
sible actions, and recognize situations in which 
small interventions might have large effects 
(and large interventions might have only small 
effects) (Axelrod and Cohen 1999).
 From the perspective of complexity theo-
ries, value is placed on bottom-up decentral-
ized approaches, diversity of opinion, risk-
taking, learning, adaptation, permanent nov-
elty, and experimentation (Olson and Eoyang 
2001). From the perspective of this study, the 
two most important mechanisms to operate on 
complex systems are manipulation of variation 
and selection on the one hand, and the balance 
between exploration and exploitation on the 
other.
Managing variety and selection. It was 
mentioned above that two important mecha-
nisms of CAS are variation and selection; in 
natural systems, variation is random and the 
selection criterion is reproductive efficiency. 
Human interventions operate on both mecha-
nisms, modifying them in a directed fashion, as 
exemplified by plant breeding (see Box 2.2).
 The latter example illustrates a key charac-
teristic of evolutionary processes: contrary to 
what an engineer would do, the “solutions” to 
“problems” are obtained through a process of 
directed search without designing them inten-
tionally. The example of molecular breeding 
presented in Box 2.3 illustrates the differences 
between the artificial variation and selection 
method and the rational design method.5
 For this mechanism to be useful, variation 
cannot be infinite. Too much variation raises 
the cost of gathering and processing informa-
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Box 2.2  Manipulating variety and selection
A plant breeder knows the characteristics of the parents available to her and selects those she 
hopes will pass some desired trait to their progeny (for example, resistance to a given dis-
ease). In the early stages of developing a new variety, the breeder usually makes thousands 
of non-naturally occurring crosses. Thus the breeder increases variety by making crosses 
she hopes will raise the probability of obtaining the desired result (as opposed to the totally 
random crosses that occur in nature).
 With artificial selection, the breeder overrides the natural process of selection via repro-
ductive efficiency by selecting the progeny that displays the desired properties (for example, 
disease resistance) while discarding the other crosses without taking into account their 
reproductive efficiency. Similar mechanisms are being successfully used to develop com-
plex computer programs, synthesize new chemical and medical compounds, and operate on 
large-scale ecosystems.
5These mechanisms receive the name “molecular breeding” because of their similarity to traditional plant breeding (Crutchfield
and Schuster 2003).
tion while reducing the solution’s useful life. 
However, too little variation can lead to a pre-
mature convergence of the system on a sub-
optimal solution (for example, see Box 2.1).
 Interventions aimed at operating on diversi-
ty have to balance the creation of diversity at an 
intermediate point between uniformity and cha-
otic variation. The fundamental question that 
decisionmakers face in a CAS is: what should 
the balance between variation and uniformity 
be? The response to this question depends 
on the specific conditions under which the 
decisionmaker is operating (Kauffman 1995; 
Axelrod and Cohen 1999).
 In a changing world, actors or strategies 
that are currently suboptimal are valuable 
resources for the future, whereas uniformity 
can have grave consequences.7 For example, 
farmers only use a few seed varieties well 
adapted to local conditions (that is, the crop’s 
10   CHAPTER 2
Box 2.3  Using artificial variation and rational design methods to operate on a CAS
Estrogen is a human hormone that functions by binding onto a specific receptor in cells; estro-
gen can be thought of as a key and the receptor as a lock. The problem is to find an alternative 
molecule that can imitate estrogen by binding to the receptor. Today it is possible to easily 
generate tens of millions of peptides (small proteins each containing a few aminoacids). Each 
of these peptides is potentially an alternative key that can bind to the receptor.
 To find the alternative key, many copies of the receptor are attached to the bottom of a 
petri dish and are exposed to tens of millions of artificial peptides. The peptides that did not 
attach to the estrogen receptors are subsequently washed away, and the ones that did bind are 
recovered. Any of the recovered peptides is a second key that can bind to the receptor and is 
therefore a candidate to imitate estrogen.
 However, biochemical engineers who use a rational design approach start by building a 
detailed model of estrogen and its receptor, and then design a structure that can serve as an 
alternative key. The sequence is then synthesized and transformed into a structure with the 
desired properties. Rational design is clearly a process that is essentially different from the 
abovementioned process of artificial variation and selection.
 The relative efficiency of the methods depends on the complexity and stability of the pro-
cesses on which one wishes to operate and how much is known about them. If the process is 
little known, changes rapidly, or is complex, rational design is less effective, because it limits 
exploration of the possible solution space and bets that the explored solution is the most 
effective. In these cases, the effectiveness of the rational design approach depends more on 
luck than the management of variety and selection approach.6 It has been demonstrated that 
the method of artificial variation and selection converges on an optimum at least as quickly 
as the rational design method (Crutchfield and Schuster 2003).
6An example is the discovery by Monsanto of the gene that confers resistance to the herbicide Gliphosate. Monsanto invested 
hundreds of millions of dollars over two decades to develop the gene, without success. Eventually, researchers took a sample 
from a chemical waste sink near a plant producing Gliphosate and discovered bacteria that had adapted to a medium with a 
high concentration of the herbicide. Soon they isolated the gene that conferred resistance and they introduced it into plants 
(Charles 2001).
7The future value of diversity has been analyzed, for example, in the literature on financial and real options (Dixit and Pindyck
1994) and business administration (Christensen and Raynor 2003; Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006).
genetic variation is very limited).8 With uni-
formity, farmers obtain the highest yields but 
create the conditions for the emergence of 
diseases that are very effective at attacking the 
varieties in use. Breeders, however, use lower 
yielding varieties to develop new varieties 
resistant to emergent diseases.
 To manipulate diversity, two complemen-
tary strategies may be used: recombination 
of elements and relaxation of restrictions. 
Recombination of elements is similar to the 
work of the abovementioned breeder. This 
method can be used, for example, to create new 
strategies, taking one that was successful in a 
different context and changing certain elements 
to adapt it to a new situation. In the relaxation 
of restrictions, the decisionmaker operates on a 
restriction and observes the response of the sys-
tem to the intervention. Interventions may be 
of two types: modifying one of the system’s 
restrictions (for example, developing an irri-
gation area) or modifying an element (for 
example, using a new type of packaging for 
fresh fruits) (Axelrod and Cohen 1999; Rodrik 
2006).
Exploration versus exploitation.  Policies 
in complex systems must balance the possibil-
ity of choosing among actions or agents that 
are unproved but might be superior to existing 
ones (exploration) and actions or agents that 
are known and for the moment give success-
ful results (exploitation) (Axelrod and Cohen 
1999; Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006).
 Exploitation of proven actions or agents 
generates the greatest gains but, because even-
tually these gains diminish, it is necessary 
to explore and find new sources of benefits. 
Once again, the balance between exploitation 
and exploration can be illustrated with plant 
breeding. Breeders know a group of plants, 
which they use in their crosses. Thanks to this 
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8The genetic variation in this case refers to the variation among seeds and is different from the variation contained in each 
seed’s genetic code (a concept used by geneticists).
knowledge, breeders can identify parents with a 
high probability of conferring given properties 
on their progeny. Nevertheless, as pathogens 
evolve, it is necessary to look for new genes that 
provide resistance to the mutated organisms.
 The problem for decisionmakers is to 
decide the amount of resources that will be 
allocated to exploitation of the known or to the 
search for new sources of benefits. Too much 
exploration reduces the immediate benefits and 
can generate too many potentially useful prod-
ucts that are lost because of the difficulties in 
processing increasing volumes of information. 
Too much exploitation reduces the possibility 
of finding new sources of benefits when the 
current ones are exhausted (Davila, Epstein, 
and Shelton 2006).
 Exploration is especially valuable when 
problems (Axelrod and Cohen 1999)
•  are long term or very broad: the greater the 
probability of obtaining benefits in time or 
space the more profitable the investment in 
searching;
•  have rapid and reliable feedback mecha-
nisms: if these mechanisms do not exist, it 
is worth investing in creating them to profit 
from their exploitation;
•  are relatively free of risks of catastrophes 
stemming from exploration: an example of 
a high-risk process is research on the small-
pox virus, because an accidental escape 
of the virus could cause a worldwide epi-
demic; and
•  threaten disaster: the benefit from explo-
ration is to avoid the cost that comes 
from a strategy based only on exploitation. 
Research on AIDS falls into this category.
 A clear understanding of how these instru-
ments may be used is of critical importance 
for policymakers. For example, the 32 PFs 
serve as a mechanism to explore instruments 
to foster innovation, but they do not have a 
system to systematically monitor these expe-
riences; in other words, there is no selection 
mechanism that allows the PFs to take advan-
tage of variation.
Defining strategies in complex systems.9
Failures are common in complex systems. For 
example, it is estimated that in the twentieth 
century barely 10 percent of companies have 
been able to sustain growth for long periods 
(Christensen and Raynor 2003). The failure 
rate is high because complex processes are dif-
ficult to understand and consequently to pre-
dict, so that only those companies capable of 
adapting to changing conditions survive. Few 
organizations, however, possess this capacity 
because of the difficulty of modifying struc-
tures that have functioned well in the past and 
that in general are still functioning when the 
development of alternative structures should 
be started (Bailey and Ford 2003). Moreover, 
because the strategies to operate on complex 
systems are very different from those used in 
“simple” processes, few organizations posses 
the knowledge to develop alternative strategies 
(Christensen and Raynor 2003).
 In simple processes, it is possible to obtain 
a relatively thorough knowledge of the main 
trends, so the best strategy is to use rational 
design, that is, to undertake careful planning 
followed by a careful execution of the plans 
(see Section 2.1.1). In contrast, in complex 
processes decisions must be taken with a 
limited knowledge of the process’s dynamics. 
Therefore, the strategy should not plan imple-
mentation but learning. Decisionmakers need 
to identify what critical information is missing 
and in what order it will be needed. Planning 
should reflect these information needs or, at 
least, should resolve the main uncertainties 
before committing time and resources to a 
particular action plan.
 Planning in complex processes should rec-
ognize that the processes are not well known. 
With the partial information they possess, 
decisionmakers construct a mental model of the 
process. The next steps include (1) questioning 
the assumptions used to construct the model, 
(2) using pilot projects to discover the most 
relevant dynamics and check the adequacy of 
the original assumptions, and (3) maintaining 
an adequate reserve of resources to maintain 
the flexibility needed to correct the course of 
actions if the initial assumptions are not valid.
 Strategic planning and planning by objec-
tives often fail in complex processes, because 
they do not allow for the discovery of emer-
gent opportunities or for reaction to unforeseen 
problems. Normally, when the results do not 
meet the stated objectives, these approaches 
recommend investing additional resources to 
close the gap between what was planned and 
what is obtained. In other words, emphasis 
is placed on deepening the original lines of 
action. On the contrary, in complex systems 
most of the benefits are often derived from un-
anticipated opportunities. Only when decision-
makers have minds open to identifying these 
opportunities (that is, they look for them) and 
enough resources in reserve can they take 
advantage of unanticipated opportunities.10
 The PFs operate on especially complex 
processes. Research is uncertain, because it 
attempts to develop new knowledge. Moreover 
the diffusion of innovations is complex, 
because it depends on many factors, including 
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 9This section is based mainly on Christensen (2003) and Christensen and Raynor (2003).
10Serendipity only happens to those who have a mind open to surprises or who are searching for something, only to find 
something other than what they were looking for. Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin after bacteria failed to grow in 
two of several petri dishes in which he was growing them. Instead of washing the dishes and starting the culture again (which 
probably many scientists did before him), he realized something was preventing the bacteria from growing and investigated 
the phenomenon.
markets and domestic and foreign economic 
policies, technological developments, political 
developments, and cultural elements.
2.2 Innovation Processes
2.2.1 What Are Science, Technology, 
and Innovation?
To identify what role science should play in 
innovation processes and to design STI poli-
cies adequate for different innovation systems, 
it is necessary to clarify what science, technol-
ogy, and innovation are.
 In the past decade, a consensus has 
emerged among philosophers of science that 
no one characterization of science exists, and 
no single scientific method has universal appli-
cation. Each science has its own mechanisms 
for research and for accepting statements. 
Furthermore, these statements are based both 
on empirical observations and on socially 
acceptable criteria (Machamer 2002). If sci-
ence is not “a method of discovering objective 
truths,” what is it? This question has different 
answers, depending on the perspective from 
which it is analyzed. Following Stoneman 
(1995), we define science as what scientists 
do, whereas technology is what technologists 
do. This definition highlights the fact that the 
difference between science and technology is 
not what professionals do but why they do it, 
and what criteria they use to accept knowledge 
as valid. In other words, it is recognized that 
research and development are immersed in 
social processes that determine what the pro-
fessionals do.
 Scientists seek to create new knowledge, 
which should be freely diffused as quickly 
as possible by specialized means. That is to 
say, the scientists’ objective is the creation 
of information, a public good.11 In contrast, 
technologists seek to obtain benefits by cre-
ating private goods; thus they seek to keep 
the information within the firm until it is no 
longer valuable. The race to decode the human 
genome exemplifies these differences. Two 
teams of researchers participated in this race, 
one coordinated by a private firm and the other 
by public institutes from several countries. The 
private team sought to patent the knowledge, 
whereas public researchers tried to publicize 
their discoveries as quickly as possible. Both 
teams were researching the same phenomenon 
(although they used different methodologies) 
and obtained the same result, but one was 
doing science and the other technology.
 The other difference between science and 
technology lies in the acceptance criteria. 
For science, knowledge is valid when it can 
explain the phenomenon being studied and the 
same result is obtained by different researchers 
working independently. But for a technolo-
gist, the criterion is to solve a problem—the 
comprehension of the underlying processes is 
a secondary objective. The increasing use of 
directed search methods to find solutions to 
“scientific” problems (see Section 2.1.2) and 
the stronger protection of intellectual property 
rights sought by public research institutions 
are blurring the traditional distinction between 
science and technology.
2.2.2 Innovation Processes: 
The Importance of Networks 
in Technology Transfer
An innovation is defined as the successful 
introduction of a novelty into a social or eco-
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11A good is defined as public if it is nonexcludable and nonrival. Nonrival means that the consumption of the good by one 
person does not affect the amount available for other consumers. Nonexcludable means that no one who wishes to consume 
the good can be prevented from doing so. Open-broadcast television is a public good, because the reception of the signal by 
one person is not affected by how many television sets receive the same signal (nonrival) and because no person with a tele-
vision set can be prevented from watching the programs (nonexcludable). Being a public good does not depend on whether it 
is produced by a public agent or a private firm, but only on these two properties.
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nomic process. This definition emphasizes 
three key elements. First, innovation is the 
creative use of knowledge in response to 
social or market needs or opportunities (OECD 
1999). It is not enough to invent something; it 
only becomes an innovation when it is used 
productively (Fagerberg 2005). An important 
consequence of the definition is that research-
ers do not create innovations; they create 
inventions. Second, the introduction has to be 
successful: many agents and farmers try new 
things (Bellon 2001), but not all of these trials 
lead to practices or products that improve what 
already exists. Third, innovations are defined 
as such in a specific social context (Bailey and 
Ford 2003): what is an innovation in one place 
or for a specific group of actors might not be in 
another context (Box 2.4).
 In the terminology of complex systems 
(see Section 2.1.1), innovation results not only 
from variation (trying new things) but also from 
selection (finding things that are better than 
those in use) and its incorporation into eco-
nomic or social processes. Innovation processes 
are generally complex (that is, continuous and 
cumulative) and are at times interrupted by 
radical jumps. In others words, innovations are 
mainly incremental and only sometimes radical; 
but they are always the fruit of technological, 
administrative, or commercial learning pro-
cesses combined with a mental attitude open 
to the identification of opportunities for change 
(Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006).
 Innovation processes are complex: if they 
could be planned in their totality, they would 
be routines, not innovations (Nickles 2003). 
Because they are evolutionary processes, their 
dynamics are determined by the interaction 
between exploration (including variation and 
selection) and exploitation on the one hand, 
and between trends and random processes on 
the other.
 Innovations are classified as product (when 
they result in something new that is marketed) 
or process (when they modify the way of 
doing something without modifying the final 
product) (OECD 1999). In general, an innova-
tion process includes a succession of product 
and process innovations (Davila, Epstein, and 
Shelton 2006). For example, the introduction 
of a new crop requires the development of new 
marketing mechanisms, or access to new sales 
venues requires the adoption of production 
techniques that produce more uniform crops.
 Innovations that have important economic 
or social impacts only stem from processes that 
are sustained over time by the combined efforts 
of actors with different capabilities, because 
individual actors (including firms) generally 
do not possess all the resources required to 
innovate. Thus innovators integrate into inno-
vation networks in which a variety of actors 
participate (Rycroft and Kash 1999; Christensen 
and Raynor 2003). Network integration is not 
easy because of difficulties in implementing 
collective action (that is, agreeing upon and 
Box 2.4  The contextual nature of innovation
In the 1990s, an agronomic package that included planting corn in rows was adopted by 
many small farmers in Ghana. One component of the package was placing a pole at one end 
of the plot to help the farmer walk in a straight line (Ekboir, Boa, and Dankyi 2002). Clearly 
the pole is an innovation only in the context of very poor farmers who do not use machinery. 
In contrast, improvements in biotechnology techniques used in plant breeding are not inno-
vations for these farmers, because they do not use improved seeds.
implementing rules of interaction, creating con-
fidence, and avoiding opportunistic behavior).
 The evolution of innovation networks is 
determined by the dynamics of the relation-
ships among agents, technologies, markets, 
and the formal and informal rules that regulate 
people’s behavior. A discussion of the struc-
ture and dynamic of innovation networks can 
be found in Rycroft and Kash (1999), Ekboir 
(2004), and Powell and Grodal (2005).
 The structure and dynamics of innovation 
networks depend on the complexity and matu-
rity of the innovations and markets. In the case
of relatively simple or mature innovations and 
markets, most innovations are incremental or 
semi-radical. The networks are more lax; mem-
bers often relate formally or are mediated by 
markets, because each agent has a relatively 
good understanding of the needs of other mem-
bers of the network and the customers, and 
of the technological and market opportunities. 
These are the cases traditionally studied in 
conventional economic theory and that serve as 
models for the majority of agricultural programs. 
Grains, livestock, and traditional export products 
fall into this category. In contrast, in the case of 
complex or new innovations, network members 
have to interact informally, often, and closely to 
overcome emergent hurdles. Because most of 
the innovations are radical and/or the markets 
change rapidly, these networks face great techni-
cal and commercial uncertainties, which prevent 
effective contracting: successful collaborations 
are based on trust (Rycroft and Kash 1999; 
Christensen and Raynor 2003). Fresh fruits 
and vegetables and high-value meat products 
fall into this category. The characterization of a 
market or innovation as simple or complex can 
change, reflecting new technologies or commer-
cial opportunities, as exemplified by gourmet 
coffees (from simple to complex) or shrimp 
(from complex to simple).
 The effectiveness of innovation networks 
depends on their capacity to facilitate the 
exchange of information and resources. In the 
terminology of Social Network Analysis, this 
capacity is known as the navigability of the 
network. An innovation network’s navigabil-
ity depends on the existence of central (well-
connected) actors who interact among them-
selves (Buchanan 2002) and the environment 
(for example, laws and markets) in which these 
networks operate. COFUPRO, for example, 
became a central agent that facilitated the 
exchange of information among the PFs.
 One of the major limitations affecting the 
innovation capacity of small farmers in devel-
oping countries is their inability to integrate 
into navigable networks that allow them access 
to technical information, goods, services, mar-
kets, and financing. For this reason, one of 
the central objectives of pro-poor innovation 
policies should be to strengthen these networks 
and increase their navigability (see Section 
2.3). A few PFs actually played the role of 
central actors that linked small farmers with 
processors, technical advisers, and markets 
(see Section 6.5).
2.3 STI Policies
STI policies have changed over time accord-
ing to the models used by decisionmakers to
characterize these processes. These models can
be classified into five generations (Rothwell 
1994). The first generation, known as the
linear model, comes in two versions. The first
version, known as technology push, was devel-
oped in the 1940s and holds that results ob-
tained from basic research serve as inputs 
for applied research, whose output is in turn 
used for technology development (Bush 1945). 
According to this model, public STI poli-
cies ought to finance basic research in public 
institutions, stimulate private investment in
technological development, and, in certain 
cases, finance public extension programs. The 
second version, introduced in the 1960s, pos-
tulated that new ideas came from the market, 
from clients, or consumers (demand pull). In 
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this model, STI policy needed to identify the 
demands of clients or final consumers and ori-
ent research and development activities toward 
meeting these demands.
 This model is still linear because it main-
tains the assumption that researchers work in 
research institutions, isolated from other actors 
in the innovation system. These two approaches 
do not differ on the role of science in innova-
tion processes but on the origin of the informa-
tion that researchers should use to define their 
research programs. In the innovation system 
perspective, information flows are complex 
and multidirectional. Technological develop-
ment often precedes the scientific understand-
ing of the underlying processes (Nelson and 
Rosenberg 1993; Fagerberg 2005). In the 
linear vision, researchers pass on knowledge 
to extension agents, who then pass it to the 
farmers, who are passive adopters. In the inno-
vation systems framework, farmers receive 
technical and commercial information from 
different sources and decide what elements of 
the proposed package are appropriate to their 
needs (Ekboir 2002).
 The 1970s and 1980s were dominated by 
the science/technology/market linkage model, 
characterized by sequential but independent 
stages and multiple channels of interaction 
(see, for example, Mowery and Rosenberg 
1979). In this generation of models, STI poli-
cies should stimulate both technology supply 
and user demand.
 In the 1980s, the discussion focused on an 
integrated model in which the functional stages 
(that is, research, development, and adoption) 
were parallel and highly integrated. In the 
1990s, this model evolved into the system/
network integration model, in which research 
was intrinsically linked to technological and 
economic factors instead of being an autono-
mous knowledge generator. Thus research 
activities were nodes of a wide network of 
knowledge creation and use (Fagerberg 2005). 
In the final two generations of models, STI 
policies attempted to balance technology sup-
ply with the needs of the market, promoting 
the creation of networks, fostering change in 
research institutions and private firms so that 
they can better integrate into innovation net-
works, and strengthening innovative capabili-
ties (Lundvall and Borrás 2005).
2.3.1 Innovation as the Engine 
of Economic Growth
The abundant literature on international “catch 
up” has shown that success stories have always 
been associated not only with technical change 
but also with institutional and organizational 
change (Fagerberg and Godinho 2005), in other 
words, with the development of innovative 
capabilities (see Section 3.1). This finding is 
confirmed by the fact that within developing 
countries certain sectors or productive chains 
have developed unique capabilities (Reardon 
and Flores 2006), but the growth has not been 
uniform; in other words, social and econom-
ic disparities have increased (Goldberg and 
Pavcnik 2007). The factors that contributed 
to the rise of these dynamic sectors have been 
diverse, but in the vast majority of cases in 
agriculture, they were not a result of public pro-
grams but of the curiosity of individual agents 
or of private investors (see the case studies 
in Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003; Gabre-
Madhin and Haggblade 2004; and Pardey, 
Alston, and Piggott 2006). Nevertheless, once 
the processes were under way, public programs 
and policies were often influential in their 
development—but not always in a positive way.
 Several technologically backward countries 
(for example, Denmark, Japan, South Korea, 
and Switzerland) were able to rapidly catch 
up with more advanced countries. In the eco-
nomic growth literature, this phenomenon is 
known as the “advantage of backwardness” 
and suggests that those who import or copy a 
technology can become more competitive than 
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those who developed it (Fagerberg and Godinho 
2005). The advantage may stem from the pio-
neer’s problems (for example, the pioneering 
agent uses older machinery, cannot learn from 
the experience of others, or faces institutional 
resistance generated when old technologies are 
replaced with new, untried ones) or from the fol-
lower’s advantages (for example, the develop-
ment of unique capabilities, or exploiting the fact 
that the technological trajectories have already 
been identified). In the terminology of complex 
processes (see Section 2.1.1), the countries that 
do manage to close the gap initially exploit the 
international stock of knowledge more effi-
ciently than do other countries and devote fewer 
resources to exploration. As the country devel-
ops, the resources devoted to exploration should 
increase (Fagerberg and Godinho 2005).
 The experiences of those countries that 
have not developed clearly show that importing 
modern technology or investing in primary and 
secondary education does not guarantee suc-
cess (Fagerberg and Godinho 2005). Successful 
development requires an environment that 
favors innovation and agents that have the 
capacity to absorb and digest knowledge gen-
erated elsewhere. Countries that succeeded 
in catching up dedicated substantially more 
resources to the acquisition, assimilation, and 
adaptation of imported technologies than to 
the direct purchase of technology (in some 
cases, the investment ratio was 3:1) (IDRC 
1997). In addition, the Asian Tigers combined 
significant capital and infrastructure investment 
with reverse engineering and experimentation 
in selected industrial sectors and an increasing 
supply of highly qualified workers and pro-
fessionals (Fagerberg and Godinho 2005).12
In contrast, the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) countries also made important 
investments in public research institutions and 
imported technology in the 1960s and 1970s 
but did not make the effort to assimilate and 
learn from these importations.
 If companies do not invest in developing 
their absorptive capabilities, it becomes impos-
sible for them to use the knowledge generated 
by the research system and by other companies 
(Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006; Dosi, 
Llerena, and Sylos Labini 2006). Neither can 
they use trained professionals to assist them, 
because they cannot identify their technologi-
cal and innovation needs.
2.3.2 Relationship between Research 
and Innovation Systems
Innovation systems comprise networks of actors 
(including farmers, firms, universities, research 
centers, technological institutes, training cen-
ters, and financial institutions), their actions and 
interactions, and the formal and informal rules 
that form the institutional framework in which 
the networks operate. The actions and interac-
tions influence the production, diffusion, and 
use of economically and socially useful knowl-
edge; in other words, they affect the innovative 
performance of companies and social processes 
(Friedman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). 
Studies of innovation systems are focused on 
the analysis of the interactions, the flows of 
information and knowledge between system 
agents, and the actions to intensify these flows 
and interactions (see Section 2.2).
 The innovation system is larger than the 
research system, because only research institu-
tions participate in the latter. The analysis of 
the larger system is necessary because:
1.  Scientific research only has value when it 
improves productive systems and life qual-
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12The Asian Tigers is a group of fast-growing countries that includes Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
MERCOSUR is a customs union formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay as full members and Bolivia and Chile 
as associated members.
ity; that is, when it is used to satisfy social 
or economic needs or take advantage of 
emerging opportunities.
2.  Technologies are becoming more complex 
not only because they are made of more 
components and their development requires 
a greater scientific effort, but also because 
agents must compete in increasingly inte-
grated markets that are changing at an accel-
erating pace (Rycroft and Kash 1999; Dosi, 
Llerena, and Sylos Labini 2006). Products 
that were previously produced with simple 
and/or well-known technologies and sold 
in stable local markets are being progres-
sively integrated into the global economy 
(Berdegué 2005).
3.  The adoption of innovations is a creative 
and interactive process that involves both 
market and nonmarket institutions. Further-
more, innovations are increasingly depen-
dent on effective interactions between a 
country’s scientific base and its business 
community (OECD 1999). As the scien-
tific base of technological development has 
grown, the information that permits devel-
opment of new technologies is ever more 
in the public domain but also increas-
ingly difficult to understand (Nelson 1998). 
Investment in human capital (especially 
graduates from foreign universities) is an 
efficient tool for building the capacity to 
take advantage of knowledge developed in 
other countries.
4. Companies are today the main source of 
innovations. Their success depends on the 
incentives found on the economic and regu-
latory environment, access to critical inputs, 
the internal capacity to take advantage of 
economic and technological opportunities, 
and their abilities to integrate themselves 
into innovation networks (Christensen and 
Raynor 2003).
5. From the perspective of the innovative 
agents, scientific activities are more impor-
tant as a source of highly qualified per-
sonnel and scientific information than as 
generators of commercially relevant infor-
mation (Mowery and Sampat 2005; Dosi, 
Llerena, and Sylos Labini 2006). When 
researchers interact actively with innovat-
ing agents, the former help the latter to 
strengthen their absorptive capabilities.
2.3.3 Balance between the Creation 
of Information (Research) and the Use 
of Existing Information (Innovation)
The balance between the use of existing infor-
mation and the creation of information new to 
the world is one of the most important issues 
for the design of STI polices: the problem is 
that there are no objective procedures to deter-
mine this balance. The innovation system being 
complex, the balance depends on a set of fac-
tors, especially the sophistication of the innova-
tion system, the patterns of interaction among 
different agents, and the political economy of 
financing research and development activities 
(Branscom and Florida 1999; Kraemer 2006).
 In developing countries, one of the factors 
that most influences this balance is the negotia-
tion of public administration budgets, because 
it defines the investments of public research 
institutions in physical and human capital. 
However, these negotiations rarely include an 
explicit discussion of the countries’ scientific 
and technological needs; in other words, poli-
cies in these areas are defined implicitly by a 
small group of agents with a limited under-
standing of the subject.
 The sophistication of the innovation sys-
tem defines the limits and possibilities of 
innovation policies. Within these policies, one 
of the most important decisions is the balance 
between domestic development (exploration) 
and imitation or adaptation of information gen-
erated in other countries (exploitation).
 Countries or sectors with weak innova-
tion systems depend almost exclusively on 
technologies developed in other countries. In 
these cases, investments in formal research and 
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development have little influence on growth 
rates, and investments in education and train-
ing seem to play a much more significant role 
(Gittleman and Wolff 1998). The reason is 
that education and training programs increase 
the capacity to explore the largely unknown 
international stock of information. But these 
policies are only effective if the society can 
productively use the trained manpower, for 
which it is necessary to establish policies to 
strengthen the absorptive capabilities of private 
companies and the public sector. Otherwise the 
most capable people migrate in search of better 
working conditions.
 Weak research institutions can only under-
take simple research (that is, minor develop-
ments). To tackle more complex tasks, it is 
necessary to strengthen these systems through 
investments that are significant and sustained 
for prolonged periods, until the critical mass 
necessary for effective research institutions is 
reached. In addition, it is necessary to create 
institutional cultures that enable the expression 
of the researcher’s creativity. Thus investments 
aimed at creating original information are only 
beneficial in the long run, and only if the infor-
mation can be transformed into knowledge and 
innovation.
 Beyond a certain level of development, 
the strategy of importing technology without 
a local adaptation effort becomes ineffective 
(Malerba 1993; Archibugi and Michie 1998). 
At that stage, it becomes necessary to carry out 
local research and development activities; these 
activities have special characteristics (Box 2.5) 
which make them complex. Therefore, spe-
cially designed public policies are needed.
 To increase an economy’s competitiveness, 
it is necessary to strengthen innovation net-
works through long-term policies to (1) build 
up research institutions; (2) foster research and 
development in private companies; and (3) pro-
mote investment in human resources, research 
infrastructure, and the creation of instruments 
that promote interinstitutional collaboration on 
research and development (Lundvall and Borrás 
2005). The success of these policies depends 
on continuity, because institutions that required 
many years to build can be destroyed rapidly if 
adequate incentives are not maintained.
 As the innovation system gains strength, the 
research spectrum widens. Eventually, it can 
reach a high level of sophistication. Once this 
level is reached, the country or sector no longer 
depends on imported technology but can now 
develop its own. The stronger the research sys-
tem, the more important the international search 
for knowledge becomes, so that promising lines 
of research can be identified and competitive-
ness maintained (see Sections 2.1.2, 2.2.1, and 
3.1). In other words, as the innovation system 
evolves, the profile of research institutions, 
the private sector’s attitude toward knowledge 
absorption, the competence of technicians, the 
private-sector links with research institutions, 
and the government’s capacity to design appro-
priate STI policies must also change in response 
to the new conditions for knowledge generation 
(Fagerberg and Godinho 2005).
 In developing countries, universities are 
generally weak and work in isolation from other 
actors in the innovation system (Eun, Lee, and 
Wu 2006). In addition, they have an organiza-
tion similar to most European universities, where 
these institutions are supposed to research, edu-
cate, and link with the private sector. It has been 
found, though, that this arrangement has not 
resulted in first-class institutions in any of the 
three tasks they are supposed to address (Dosi, 
Llerena, and Sylos Labini 2006).
 Technological institutes can be an essential 
instrument in support of the private sector 
in the identification and digestion of use-
ful information. To do this, they may play a 
more important role than universities, because 
they have been created to undertake applied 
research and to liaise with the private sector 
(although they have not always done so), and 
because the linear vision that prioritizes basic 
research (and is isolated from the rest of soci-
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Box 2.5  Features of research and development activities
 1. Research and development activities are more uncertain than most other activi-
ties in terms of the probability of obtaining results, their nature, and the timeframes in which 
they can be productively used. Often the results obtained were not foreseen at the beginning 
of the research process and turn out to be more valuable than was originally aimed for. For 
example, the Post-it resulted from using a nonsticking adhesive (which was considered a 
failure in the original project) to design a new product (Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006). 
Furthermore the total value of a new discovery may be unknown even at the end of a project 
(Huffman and Just 2000; Christensen and Raynor 2003).
2. More than one approach may be valid to study a given problem, and it is impossible 
to predict which is the most appropriate. Similarly there are alternative solutions to the same 
problem, and not all of them come from formal research (Huffman and Just 2000; Kraemer 
2006). For example, losses in the transport of fresh fruit can be reduced by improving roads, 
developing new packaging methods, or creating a variety more resistant to shocks.
3. Most of the benefits from investing in research and development come from the 
best discovery and not from the sum of all the discoveries. For example, if various crop vari-
eties adapted to a particular ecosystem are developed, only the best variety will be adopted 
by farmers. Thus, much of what is discovered does not have immediate social value, because 
it is not substantially better than the best available technology (Huffman and Just 2000).
4. Even research projects that do not obtain the desired results or are not used in 
productive processes can be valuable, because they provide information useful for defin-
ing other research strategies, or they can prove valuable in the future. The “failed” projects 
provide information about alternative research strategies and thereby increase the probability 
of success of new projects (Weisberg 2003). In addition, results that have no applications 
today can be valuable in a different social and economic context.
5. The relationship between a scientist and the administration of the institution that 
employs him or her is asymmetric, because it is costly (and probably ineffective) to control 
the scientist’s effort (Huffman and Just 2000). Given the uncertainty at the beginning of a 
research project, the real effort put in by the scientist cannot be inferred from the results. 
Researchers that carry out the most innovative or most risky studies have a lower probability 
of obtaining results than do researchers conducting more conventional work. But the former 
may produce better quality work than the latter, even when the results are not what was 
aimed for. An incentive structure based on outputs discriminates against the most innovative 
or risk-taking research projects—the very ones who often produce greater mid- and long-
term benefits (Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006).
6. Scientific productivity, measured by publications, has an extremely asymmetric 
distribution. For example, bibliometric studies show that the great majority of published 
works are never cited, but this does not imply that they are of no importance, because they 
can influence other researchers in ways that are not registered by these studies. Furthermore, 
one study found that in North American universities, 50 percent of published work is pro-
duced by 10 percent of researchers (and fully half of that work is published by only 2 percent 
of the total number of researchers). The other 50 percent of published work is produced by 
the remaining 90 percent of researchers (McClellan and Dorn 1999). Research incentives 
ety) has generally predominated in universi-
ties. The principal role of the universities ought 
to be preparing highly trained professionals 
(Mowery and Sampat 2005).
2.3.4 Extension Systems from the 
Innovation System Perspective
From its beginning at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the mandate of public extension was 
to pass information from research institu-
tions to farmers. Over the years, this mandate 
expanded, and today extension agents are 
expected to have a broader vision of agricul-
ture and are no longer considered simply as 
channels for the passage of information but 
also as consultants, facilitators for collective 
action, and conduits of information flows 
(Alex, Zijp, and Byerlee 2002).
 Following these changes in the vision of 
extension, various countries have experiment-
ed with a variety of institutional arrangements 
for public extension: decentralization (within 
the same organization), geographical disper-
sal, outsourcing, public–private alliances, and 
privatization. In parallel, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), farmer organizations, 
and private firms have also begun to offer 
extension services. In most cases, the institu-
tional arrangements that have involved public 
organizations (even when they are only funding 
private extension) have continued to reflect the 
linear vision of science, in which the extension 
agent essentially fulfills the role of information 
channel (Rivera and Alex 2005). In contrast, in 
both developed and some developing countries 
highly effective private-extension mechanisms 
have emerged.
 From the point of view of the innovation 
systems framework, extension agents need to 
play a different role than that assigned in tradi-
tional models. As is explained in Section 3.1, 
innovation depends on the individual and col-
lective capabilities of agents to absorb informa-
tion and to use it in the development of solutions 
to their economic or social problems. In this 
conceptual framework, the extension agents 
should function as facilitators throughout the 
innovation process. In other words, the exten-
sion agents must not focus simply on “passing a 
package,” but instead their interventions should 
adapt as the innovation process matures.
 Most extension agents have technical train-
ing related to agriculture. Nevertheless, if it is 
accepted that the biggest difficulty that farmers 
(especially small ones) have is the accumula-
tion of human and social capital and integra-
tion into innovation networks, then it is not 
necessary that extension agents know about 
agriculture, but rather about how to facilitate 
social processes and collective action. Thus 
extension agents should be social workers or 
educators rather than agronomists or animal-
production specialists. Traditional extension 
agents specialized in technical subjects can 
only help those farmers who are able to absorb 
external knowledge and use the extension 
agents’ advice; generally these are the largest 
or the most innovative farmers.
 Recognition of the new roles extension 
agents should play and what these roles imply 
based on this indicator would exclude most researchers. There are also consequences for 
interinstitution comparisons. If researchers could move freely, the institutions that publish 
the most would be able to invest more resources in hiring the “most productive” research-
ers, creating two categories of institutions. If there is no free mobility and the researchers 
are tenured from the moment of being hired, publishing capacity is a random variable that 
is resolved at the moment in which the institution contracts a researcher over whom it will 
subsequently have very little control.
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for the organization of extension programs and 
the training of professionals is of key impor-
tance for the functioning of the PFs and public 
extension programs.
2.3.5 STI Policies
STI policy recommendations changed as new 
models of the innovation processes gained 
recognition. Nowadays it is accepted that these 
policies must adjust to the level of economic 
development and the strength of research and 
extension systems (see Sections 2.3.1 and 
2.3.2).
 In developed countries with consolidated 
innovation systems, the prime objectives of 
scientific policies are to (1) expand or reach 
the frontiers of scientific knowledge, (2) train 
high-level human resources, and (3) contribute 
to the solution of social and economic prob-
lems (EC 2003). To attain these objectives, it 
is necessary to consolidate research capabili-
ties, adapt the intellectual property regime, and 
encourage the adoption of criteria of excellence 
(Lundvall and Borrás 2005; Dosi, Llerena, and 
Sylos Labini 2006).
 In turn, the goals of technology and inno-
vation policies are to (1) generate technologi-
cal knowledge, (2) promote the transference 
and assimilation of technology in strategic 
areas, (3) foment the learning capacities of 
companies, and (4) train human resources. 
Finally, innovation policies have as objectives 
to (1) raise the rate of successful introduction 
of new products, processes, and services; (2) 
support the creation and diffusion of knowl-
edge, especially in support of private research 
and development; and (3) contribute to eco-
nomic growth and increased productivity and 
competitiveness (Lundvall and Borrás 2005).
 Developing countries, however, generally 
have relatively weak research systems (World 
Bank 2003; Eun, Lee, and Wu 2006). For 
this reason the emphasis should be placed on 
strengthening the innovation system while 
building the research system (see Section 
2.3.2). Policy instruments must vary with the 
capacity of the innovative agents and research 
institutions. Furthermore, it is likely that the 
capacity of all these agents will not evolve in 
parallel, so specific sets of policy instruments 
should be developed for specific situations.
 Traditional scientific research stresses the 
creation of information that is new to the world. 
In contrast, innovations mostly use existing 
information to improve a social or economic 
process (Fagerberg 2005). In the process of 
absorbing information, sometimes new infor-
mation is created. In other words, innovation 
processes can also generate scientific informa-
tion. The main problem for countries and sec-
tors that are not on the technological frontier 
is to balance the creation of new information 
and the use of existing information. This bal-
ance determines what instruments to use in STI 
policies.
 According to the linear vision of science 
(see above), the public sector must support 
research to compensate for the private sector’s 
suboptimal investment (from a social point 
of view). The underinvestment is the optimal 
response to
•  indivisibilities that arise because there is a 
minimum level of investment below which 
research is not efficient;
•  inability of the private sector to appropri-
ate all research benefits because scientific 
information is a public good; and
•  uncertainty and the long time required for 
investment to mature, which affect the pri-
vate sector more than the public.
 The innovation systems framework shows 
that these justifications are insufficient, because 
they are based on false assumptions about the 
behavior of firms on the one hand and the 
relationship between the creation and use of 
technical information on the other. Recent 
research on innovative capabilities has shown 
that the public-goods justification is based on 
a simplistic view of research and technology. 
In fact, all public information is a public good, 
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but that does not mean that private agents can 
use it. Pure public goods do not require any 
special effort or skill on the part of the recipi-
ent of the services or goods. But this is not 
the case with technical information: to use it, 
innovative agents have to invest substantial 
resources to develop absorptive capabilities 
that enable them to identify and digest existing 
information. In other words, although public 
goods are free, their use is not, and spillovers 
only exist when agents invest in their absorp-
tive capabilities (Fagerberg 2005; Verspagen 
2005). The difference in absorptive capa-
bilities (see Section 3.1) explains why some 
agents succeed where others fail.
 In addition to the traditional justifications, 
the state should intervene to solve systemic 
problems. In particular, the state should not 
only define the quantity of resources dedicated 
to science and technology policies but also 
help improve the functioning of the innova-
tion system. Another fundamental difference 
between the traditional vision of science and 
that of the innovation system is that the former 
emphasizes technological change in isolated 
firms, whereas the latter emphasizes that inno-
vation results from interactions among agents 
(Lundvall and Borrás 2005).
 Besides market failures, the difficulties 
that firms have in innovating come from insuf-
ficient infrastructure, problems of transition 
to new research routines, inertia stemming 
from technological trajectories, cultures that do 
not favor interaction with other agents in the 
innovation system, institutional failures, gov-
ernment failures, and systemic failures. The 
latter include problems in the capital markets, 
when there is very little and very expensive 
venture capital, and in those markets for highly 
qualified human resources that lack a critical 
mass of professionals for STI development. 
Government failures are associated with defi-
ciencies in the allocation of resources among 
different instruments and agents, and with dis-
tortions in the incentives offered to researchers 
that discourage behavioral changes aimed at 
excellence, pertinence, innovation, linkage, 
and regionalization. The systemic failures are 
linked to the lack of an interactive and compre-
hensive understanding of the functioning of the 
system (Foro Consultivo 2006).
 In the same way that globalization reduced 
the ability of countries to implement totally 
divergent economic policies, the integration of 
innovation systems is intensifying the pressure 
to harmonize national intellectual property 
rights and economic, political, tax, and scien-
tific policies. This trend toward convergence 
does not mean that governments have lost their 
capacity to influence economic development, 
but rather that the dynamics of the internation-
al and national economies have changed along 
with the available policy options (Fagerberg 
and Godinho 2005). In the specific case of sci-
entific policies, it is now recognized that active 
participation in the world economy increases 
the potential for economic development, as 
it (1) raises the technology supply available 
to domestic companies, (2) improves access to 
the stock of international knowledge, and (3) 
elevates the standards for scientific and tech-
nological activities (Nelson 1993; Archibugi, 
Howells, and Michie 1999; Fagerberg and 
Godinho 2005).
 Analysis of the international experience 
helps identify key elements that countries not 
on the scientific frontier should consider in the 
design of scientific and technological policies:
1.  One of the fundamental conditions for 
strengthening an innovation system is defin-
ing the role that each institution should 
play (Ekboir 2004; Dosi, Llerena, and 
Sylos Labini 2006), in other words, defin-
ing which institutions will become cen-
ters of excellence in research and which 
will become teaching centers. Once this 
decision is made, institutional goals, the 
resources necessary to attain them, and the 
incentives offered to professionals should 
be changed accordingly. In Mexico, research 
centers include both Public Research Centers 
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and those in the private sector (for profit and 
nonprofit).13 Teaching institutions related to 
the rural sector include public and private 
universities and technical colleges. Most 
educational institutions have research cen-
ters, but the vast majority of these have very 
limited research capabilities (Ekboir 2004).
2.  Research institutions should play an increas-
ingly important role in the consolidation 
of the innovation system (Fagerberg and 
Godinho 2005). For them to play this role, 
it is necessary to define strategies to raise 
them to international scientific standards.14
Changes in institutional cultures and inter-
changes of professionals with other domes-
tic and foreign institutions should figure 
prominently in these strategies.
3.  The complexities of public policies, includ-
ing STI policies, are growing. Govern-
ments increasingly have to rely on scientific 
information to regulate the acquisition and 
absorption of technology and to improve 
their own activities. For example, regulating 
the use of genetically modified organisms or 
analyzing the environmental impact of agri-
cultural activities requires sophisticated ana-
lytical abilities that are normally possessed 
only by researchers. However, to make use 
of this information, public officials must 
also develop their own capabilities.
4.  The generation of scientific information by 
research institutions is not sufficient for it 
to be adopted as a technology. In the case 
of the rural sector, extension programs, the 
farmers’ innovative capabilities, and the 
regulations that link research institutes with 
farmers greatly influence the dynamics of 
the innovation system. To foster innova-
tion, extension programs must adopt new 
modes of interaction with researchers and 
innovative agents (see Section 2.3.4).
 In this context, scientific and technology 
policies should seek to strengthen the capac-
ity of the system to use and generate informa-
tion useful for innovation agents, especially 
(1) improving researchers’ capabilities, (2) 
integrating them into international research 
networks, (3) transforming institutional cul-
tures and incentives to facilitate the integra-
tion into innovation networks, (4) promoting 
the entrance of young researchers into the 
system, and (5) consolidating the research 
infrastructure.
 The most important innovation policies 
are those that seek to increase (1) interactions 
among the system’s agents and institutions; (2) 
information flows and identification of useful 
foreign and domestic innovations; (3) the pri-
vate sector’s innovative capabilities, including 
financial support for its innovative activities; 
and (4) domestic supply of inputs key to the 
processes of research and development, espe-
cially research infrastructure and the training 
of scientists and highly specialized workers 
(Lundvall and Borrás 2005).
 Innovation policies cover an ample range 
of topics and include educational and research 
financing policies, financial regulations, tax 
law, market competition and intellectual prop-
erty laws, support programs for technological 
prospecting by private firms, and strengthen-
ing the public sector’s capabilities (Arnold et 
al. 2000). These policies can be divided into 
several broad categories (Table 2.1).
2.3.6 Mechanisms to Define 
Research Priorities
Among researchers of STI policies, there are 
basically two approaches to define research 
priorities in the public sector. In the tradi-
tional approach, priorities are defined by the 
organizations that manage the funds, and then 
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13The nature of Public Research Centers as legal entities is defined by federal law. The law allows them greater independence 
in managing their resources than traditional public offices do.
14Research that does not have high standards of quality is not research. But besides maintaining high quality, researchers must 
interact actively with other agents of the innovation system.
a system of competitive funds is used to dis-
tribute the available resources according to 
agreed priorities (Alston, Norton, and Pardey 
1995; Echeverría and Elliot 2002). In spite of 
the stated objective of guiding the actions of 
public research institutions, the experience of 
developing countries shows that these mecha-
nisms have not functioned as expected (Gill 
and Carney 1999; Vera-Cruz et al. 2008).
 It is worth pointing out that most developed 
countries and advanced research centers—
as well as companies with strong research 
programs—lack centralized and rigid mecha-
nisms for priority setting. In a survey of 95 
research universities in the United States, 
Welker and Cox (2006) found that 65 percent 
of researchers thought that their institutions 
established overall institutional priorities, but 
only 35 percent thought that their institutions 
defined research priorities. Moreover, they 
agreed only weakly that research priorities 
were known by faculty.
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Table 2.1  Typologies of innovation policies
Category Examples of policy
Foster the emergence of an innovation-friendly  Support the formation of human resources in science, technology, 
  environment   and innovation
 Reduce key market failures, such as financing of research
 Maintain macroeconomic and social stability
Foster the emergence of a culture of innovation Diffuse best practices in innovation management
 Update the curricula of public educational institutions
  Promote a change of mentality and culture in public research 
  institutions
Foster the spread of innovations  Help strengthen private firms’ absorptive capabilities, for example, 
   with consulting services, extension activities, technological 
interchanges, and seminars and workshops in marketing and 
administration
  Improve interactions between public research institutes and firms, 
  especially small and mid-sized ones
  Use the state’s purchasing power to create markets for new 
  products
  Foster the emergence of bridging institutions to facilitate 
  interaction between productive and social agents and researchers
Encourage the emergence of innovation networks Act as catalyst, bringing together potential partners
  Diffuse information about commercial and technological 
  opportunities
  Support researcher mobility between public research institutes and 
  private companies
Strengthen research and development capabilities Increase investments in research
  Promote adjustments in public research institutions, especially in 
  incentives and quality standards
 Promote public–private alliances for research and development
 Promote international scientific and technological interchanges
 Promote labor mobility of scientists and technologists
Respond to globalization Promote networks of nationally competitive firms
 Promote international alliances among companies
  Strengthen the research system, ensuring it is permanently updated 
  and is inserted into international knowledge networks
Improve the design and implementation of policies Strengthen the analytic capacity in the public sector
  Improve communication between the public sector and the rest 
  of society
 Ensure that users of policies participate in policymaking process
Source: Elaboration based on Arnold et al. (2000).
 The strength of these research systems is 
not based on a clear definition of priorities but 
rather on the quality of the researchers, a diver-
sified research system (that is, a system with 
multiple capabilities that can be tapped for spe-
cific research needs), and strong interactions 
with the users of the technologies (Nelson and 
Rosenberg 1993; Kraemer 2006).
 The traditional approach for defining 
research priorities has been criticized because 
the rigid definition of priorities at a national 
level may leave out research opportunities 
that do not have a national scope or are not 
sufficiently well understood by those who 
manage the prioritization process (because the 
processes they are expected to influence are 
very complex or the main trends have not suf-
ficiently consolidated) (Teubal 1997; Huffman 
and Just 1999; Christensen and Raynor 2003). 
In the terminology of complex systems (see 
Section 2.1.2), the traditional approach would 
be classified as rational design. As seen below, 
the alternative approach is based on the man-
agement of variety and selection.
 In recent decades, several developing coun-
tries have established research-prioritizing 
mechanisms through the identification of user 
demands (Byerlee, Alex, and Echeverría 2002). 
The experience of the past two decades has 
shown that these mechanisms have not solved 
the problems affecting research systems. The 
reason is that demand-driven mechanisms con-
tinue to be structured according to the linear 
vision of science and do not solve the problem 
of interaction between researchers and users 
and, additionally, do not influence research 
quality.15
 The second approach, based on complex-
ity theories (see Section 2.1.2), is based on the 
premise that the definition of research priorities 
(a complex process) requires more flexible 
mechanisms than just demand-identification. 
These mechanisms should recognize the com-
plexity of the systems they seek to influ-
ence and the capabilities of all actors in the 
innovation system. The process of prioritizing 
research, then, is organized as an exploration to 
balance the exploitation of existing knowledge 
and capabilities and the exploration of new 
opportunities (Branscom 1999; Christensen 
and Raynor 2003; Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 
2006). A successful example of opportunity 
exploitation is the Fundacion Chile, a nonprofit 
privately owned corporation created in 1976 
by the Chilean government and the ITT 
Corporation of the United States. The Fun-
dacion successfully supported the joint devel-
opment or adaptation of technological and busi-
ness models for several products that captured 
significant portions of international markets, 
such as salmon and fresh fruits.
2.3.7 The Effectiveness of 
Competitive Funds
The mechanisms to disburse public funds and
the amounts invested determine to a great 
degree the dynamics of research systems. In 
most developing countries, the amounts dedi-
cated to public research are decided as part 
of the discussion of the national budget, with-
out consideration of the relevance of the 
research carried out with these resources.16
 The deregulation of national economies 
since the 1980s, globalization and the conse-
quent pressure on competitiveness, the reduced 
effectiveness of traditional policies in the new 
international context, and the growth experi-
ence of various developing countries have 
forced a re-evaluation of the administration of 
science and technology. In developed coun-
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15Hall et al. (2001) relate the experience of a cooperative of mango farmers in India. Needing to solve technical problems, they 
contracted the services of three universities. The researchers developed the technological solutions, but during that process 
they did not interact with the farmers. The result was that the “solutions” were not adapted to the resources that the farmers 
had and so were never used.
16In a few developing countries (for example, Brazil) the states also contribute to the financing of research.
tries, direct government financing has fallen 
and new mechanisms have been introduced 
to finance innovative activities, including the 
creation of competitively awarded research 
funding, contracts for the development of 
specific products, purchases of new products 
by the public sector, subsidies for innovation 
activities in private firms, and the formation 
of public–private consortia (Echeverría 1998; 
Branscom and Florida 1999; Huffman and Just 
1999; OECD 1999; Lundvall and Borrás 2005; 
Kraemer 2006). Even competitive funds vary 
in their structure and selection mechanisms 
(see, for example, Lepori et al. 2007; Thèves, 
Benedetto, and Larédo 2007).
 These new mechanisms did not replace tra-
ditional financing but rather complemented it. 
In the United States, the share of competitive 
mechanisms in total financing of agricultural 
research is limited. In 2000, they accounted 
for less than 4 percent of the financing of state 
experimental stations, whereas direct federal 
and state budget contributions accounted for 74 
percent of the total; private contributions, 15.3 
percent; and other sources, 6.7 percent (Huff-
man and Evenson 2003).
 Although there is a consensus among spe-
cialists that the financing of public research 
institutions should combine fixed budget con-
tributions with variable allocations (Echeverría 
1998; Huffman and Just 2000), in the develop-
ing world competitively awarded financing 
has been almost the only instrument used to 
allocate operational funds. The arguments in 
favor of these mechanisms (Echeverría and 
Elliot 2002) are that competitive funds
 1.  increase research effectiveness by trans-
ferring funds to the more productive 
researchers;
 2.  increase efficiency by cost reduction 
through competition and cofinancing 
schemes that reduce duplication of effort, 
exert more control over research activities, 
and allow better utilization of installations 
by providing operational funds;
 3.  promote the identification of research pri-
orities at the national level;
 4. increase the flexibility of fund allocation 
by prioritizing new research areas or pend-
ing problems;
 5.  promote a demand-driven and object-
oriented research system;
 6. boost interinstitutional interaction;
 7.  encourage diversification of the national 
innovation system by financing scientists 
from institutions that traditionally received 
no public funding;
 8.  mobilize additional funds;
 9.  bring about institutional change in the 
national innovation system by separating 
scientific financing from operational pol-
icy; and
10. augment research quality, because re-
searchers would know their reviewers’ 
comments.
 Among the identified problems of competi-
tive funds are (Axelrod and Cohen 1999; Huff-
man and Just 2000; Echeverría and Elliot 2002; 
Ekboir 2004; García and Sanz-Menéndez 2005; 
Laudel 2005; Kraemer 2006; Vera-Cruz et al. 
2008)
 1. long-term research capabilities may be 
compromised, because in general only 
operational costs are funded, preventing 
required investments in infrastructure and 
equipment;
 2.  allocation mechanisms in small research 
systems cannot be transparent, because 
the researchers can identify the reviewers 
by their comments and writing style—thus 
reviewers may be reluctant to criticize a 
proposal, knowing that in the future they 
may be evaluated by those whose proposal 
they are currently evaluating;
 3. academic quality may not be the most 
important factor in the decision to fund the 
project;
 4. funds finance relatively short-term proj-
ects, biasing resource allocation against 
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multiyear projects and so discouraging 
fundamental research;
 5.  they do not finance either institutional 
strengthening or investment in human 
capital;
 6. they increase uncertainty about financing;
 7. they are biased against novel approaches, 
because reviewers do not want to be 
blamed for approving untested methods 
that can fail;
 8. they have high transaction costs, because 
much time is invested in the preparation of 
proposals, and in some cases, in lobbying 
the funding agency, thereby reducing the 
effective research time;
 9. they can be biased in favor of large institu-
tions;
10.  research problems concerning a single 
state or region may be underfunded in the 
national competitive-grant process, even 
though such problems could be critical for 
those areas and may have a large net social 
payoff;
11. uncertainty is increased when funds are 
awarded to lesser known institutions; and
12. except for a few large research systems, 
proposals from different disciplines usu-
ally compete among themselves, reducing 
the transparency of the selection process, 
because there are no unequivocal methods 
to choose among two good proposals from 
different disciplines.
 Although there are indications that com-
petitive funds have had major influences on 
the way agricultural research is conducted, 
solid empirical evidence of what these impacts 
have been is almost nonexistent (see below). 
Moreover, most of the few publications that 
analyze competitive funds take for granted 
that they are an efficient instrument to allocate 
research funds. This point is crucial, because 
it has been long recognized that the effective-
ness of competitive funds depends on the 
presence of appropriate research capabilities 
(Gill and Carney 1999). Strong anecdotal evi-
dence, however, indicates that not even devel-
oping countries with large research systems 
(for example, Brazil, India, or Mexico) have 
reached a threshold where competitive funds 
can operate effectively.
 Based on the assumed effectiveness of 
competitive funds, several authors have ana-
lyzed their impact on the research system, 
including redirection of research activities, 
changes in governance, transformations in 
research institutions, institutional and indi-
vidual reputation building, increased interinsti-
tutional collaborations, and impact on research 
competitiveness (Echeverría and Elliot 2002; 
Toro and Espinosa 2003; García and Sanz-
Menéndez 2005; World Bank 2006b), without 
realizing that most of these effects can also 
be obtained with other allocation mechanisms 
(for example, non-bid contracts).
 Traditionally, evaluation of proposals 
submitted to competitive programs has been 
based on academic quality as measured by peer 
review. Interviewing researchers in Germany 
and Australia, Laudel (2005) found out that the 
quality of proposals was an important but not 
sufficient factor in the allocation of competitive 
funds. Other factors, such as the policies imple-
mented by the research institutions and previous 
success in obtaining funding, influenced the 
probability of obtaining a grant. This finding 
is supported by Rubenstein et al. (2000), who 
found that competitive funds were the most 
concentrated mechanism of all those used to 
fund agricultural research in the United States.
 Competitive funding is a preferred mecha-
nism in Mexico for the allocation of pub-
lic resources to cover the operating costs of 
research and innovation projects. The PFs have 
used them for several years, but their implemen-
tation has evolved as the foundations learned 
from experience. Moreover, frustrated because 
they felt competitive grants were not effective 
in fostering innovation, the PFs started to try 
alternative approaches to achieve this goal.
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CHAPTER 3
Innovative Capabilities, Organizational Learning, 
and Poverty Alleviation
Throughout their existence, the PFs accumulated experiences and developed capabilities that enabled them to become key actors in the Mexican agricultural sector. This evolution was characterized by the interaction of a few highly innovative individuals operating in 
an environment that enabled expression of their creativity. Section 3.1 analyzes the nature of inno-
vative capabilities, the interaction between individual and collective innovative capabilities, and 
how these capabilities influence institutional learning. In addition to capabilities, an organization’s 
innovative performance depends to a great extent on its institutional culture and the structure of 
governance it develops. Some essential features of organizational cultures are discussed in Section 
3.2, and governance is analyzed in Section 3.3. Finally, Section 3.4 discusses poverty-alleviation 
policies from the perspective of innovation systems, especially how these policies should be 
adapted to reflect a better understanding of innovation capabilities.
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3.1 Organizational Innovation 
Capabilities: The Role of Learning
Research, development, and innovation enable 
organizations to improve their capacity to 
absorb information generated by other agents 
and to use new internally created knowledge, 
technological as well as other kinds (Tidd, 
Bessant, and Pavitt 1997).
 Innovative organizations possess a number 
of characteristics that can be grouped into stra-
tegic and organizational capabilities. The for-
mer include long-term vision and the ability to 
identify, process, and assimilate economic and 
technological information. The latter include 
internal and external cooperation with Public 
Research Centers, clients, and suppliers, and 
the ability to become involved in processes 
of change and learning. Human resources are 
paramount in the innovation process (Dosi, 
Nelson, and Winter 2000).
 Just as individuals may or may not have 
the profile of an innovator, organizations may 
or may not develop innovative capabilities. 
Organizational innovative capabilities are a 
function of individual factors (such as individ-
ual creativity) and collective factors (such as 
work routines, collective learning mechanisms, 
and organizational cultures) (Christensen and 
Raynor 2003; Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 
2006). For example, the Xerox laboratory in 
Palo Alto, California, developed in 1973 a 
personal computer with a graphic interface 
and mouse (subsequently copied by Apple), an 
operating system that enabled the simultane-
ous use of multiple applications (subsequently 
sold to Bill Gates and used as the basis for 
Windows; see Box 2.1), Ethernet connectiv-
ity, and the first word processor that showed 
directly on screen the document as it would 
be printed. But the company’s culture, focused 
on photocopiers and big computers, did not 
allow Xerox to profit from these developments 
(Carayannis, Gonzales, and Wetter 2003).
 The traditional vision of the organization 
is based on the assumption that it optimizes its 
operations subject to exogenous restrictions. 
The resource-based vision of the organization, 
in contrast, posits that it obtains benefits by 
combining its idiosyncratic resources to create 
new capabilities that effectively relax external 
restrictions (Henderson and Cockburn 2000; 
Christensen and Raynor 2003). Capabilities 
are defined as the ability to carry out planned 
actions. To be capable of something is to have 
a generally adequate and reliable capacity to 
accomplish the objective as a result of a 
deliberate action. Capabilities bridge the gap 
between intention and results, and they do it 
in such a way that the results are definitely 
related to what was attempted (Dosi, Nelson, 
and Winter 2000).
 Capabilities imply organized activity. In 
the specialized literature it is recognized that 
organizational capabilities reside in individuals 
(including managers, technical support person-
nel, and line workers), the technology, and the 
structure of the organization (including rou-
tines, methods of coordination, and learning 
processes) (Argote and Darr 2000).1 Among 
these factors, the organizational principles 
through which individual and collective skills 
are structured, coordinated, and communicated 
play an important role. That is, organizations 
are social communities that use their relational 
structure and shared codification methods to 
define transference and communication mech-
anisms for new capabilities (Zander and Kogut 
1995) and to condition individual innovative 
abilities (Bailey and Ford 2003).
 An alternative view of the nature of orga-
nizational capabilities posits that these result 
from the interaction of resources (individuals 
and fixed capital), processes (the mechanisms 
agreed on by the organization for doing things), 
and values (including institutional culture and 
long-term goals). In new organizations, most 
capabilities reside in the resources, especially 
their people. The incorporation or departure of 
a key person can have a big influence on the 
probability of success. In time, the capabilities 
of successful organizations are transferred to 
processes and values (Christensen and Raynor 
2003).
 It is useful to distinguish between techno-
logical capabilities and organizational capabil-
ities, although the two concepts overlap in the 
real world. The distinction is based on the fact 
that technological capabilities refer to elements 
of scientific and technological knowledge, 
and to routines essentially concerned with the 
structure of nature and how to manipulate it 
(for example, transforming a piece of metal 
into a particular structure). Organizational 
capabilities, in contrast, are shared elements 
of knowledge and routines concerning gover-
nance, coordination, and social interaction in 
the organization and with external entities (for 
example, with suppliers and clients) (Dosi, 
Coriat, and Pavitt 2000).
 In addition to being an essential part of 
the organizational memory and production 
processes, routines reflect governance struc-
tures, control methods, decentralized decision-
making mechanisms, and compromises among 
divergent interests. In essence, routines are 
conscious or unconscious agreements that arise 
from conflicts of interests in the organization 
(Coriat 2000). At times routines are so com-
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1Routines are an essential component of organizational capabilities. The development of new capabilities is based, to a great 
extent, on the adoption of routines more effective than the currently used ones.
plex and tacit that the organization itself is not 
aware of their existence or does not understand 
them (Dosi, Nelson, and Winter 2000).
 Capabilities are specific to each organiza-
tion—their development is based on invest-
ment and idiosyncratic processes, and other 
organizations have difficulties in imitating or 
understanding them (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 
1997). That is why some organizations suc-
ceed where others fail. Capabilities are also 
contextual: those that confer advantages in a 
particular context can become handicaps in 
a different situation (Appelyard, Hatch, and 
Mowery 2000; Christensen 2003).
 Because organizational capabilities cannot 
be easily bought, they must be built through 
sustained investments, strong leadership, and 
adequate selection of those responsible for 
new projects (Christensen and Raynor 2003; 
Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006). However, 
organizations cannot develop their capabilities 
arbitrarily; instead they follow specific trajec-
tories that define the options currently open to 
the organization and limit future options. In the 
long run, decisions to develop specific capa-
bilities are almost irreversible (Teece, Pisano, 
and Shuen 1997; Dutrénit 2001).
 An essential issue faced by all organiza-
tions is how to maintain, nurture, and renovate 
existing capabilities so that they can respond 
to changes in the business and technological 
environment (Leonard-Barton 1995). Efficient 
development of new capabilities requires a 
vision of the changes to be introduced, many 
trials to reduce uncertainty (see Section 2.1), 
effective feedback mechanisms, and discussions 
to reach a wide consensus about what is desir-
able and acceptable (Dosi, Nelson, and Winter 
2000; Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006). The 
efficiency of learning and feedback mecha-
nisms is fundamental, because the number of 
options that can be tried is limited by coordina-
tion problems in the organization, the resources 
available for exploration of alternatives, and 
organizational learning capabilities (Levinthal 
2000; Christensen and Raynor 2003).
 Usually organizations find it difficult 
to learn and innovate. Successful routines 
hamper experimentation of potentially better 
approaches to problem solving, managers and 
employees are absorbed by routine activi-
ties, and mid-level managers filter ideas they 
think top managers will reject. To overcome 
these hurdles, it is recommended that special-
ized exploration units be established. These 
units should operate outside the organization’s 
structure but develop strong links with the rest 
of the organization (Christensen, Anthony, 
and Roth 2004; Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 
2006).
3.1.1 Profile of the Innovative 
Individual
Most innovation policies and programs are 
based on the implicit assumption that the entire 
target population has the capacity to innovate. 
This assumption is largely true for actors oper-
ating in dynamic markets, because competi-
tion pressures them to innovate to maintain or 
improve their competitive positions.2 But in 
static markets, actors can survive without inno-
vating, especially subsistence farmers, while 
other actors have to generate at least enough 
earnings to feed themselves. In other words, 
competition functions as a selection mecha-
nism based on, among other factors, innovative 
capabilities.
 Individual innovative capabilities stem from 
the specific organization of cognitive experi-
ences. These experiences result in representa-
tions of reality, that is, how each individual 
sees, understands, and interprets his or her sur-
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2In the complexity literature, this phenomenon is called the Red Queen effect. In Lewis Caroll’s book Through the Looking 
Glass, Alice says to the Red Queen, “in my country one runs to arrive at where one wants to go.” And the Queen responds, 
“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you 
must run at least twice as fast as that!” (Carroll 1982, 104; Robson 2005).
roundings. The essence of individual innovation 
is originality in the individual’s representation 
of the world. Intelligent people, in particular 
innovators, see, understand, and interpret their 
reality differently from the rest of the world. 
Their representations are general, categorical, 
conceptually rich, complex, and unique, making 
possible exceptional performance and attain-
ments (Shavinina and Seeratan 2003).
 Innovative individuals distinguish them-
selves by having general and specific abilities 
superior to the average (although not necessar-
ily exceptional), being strongly committed to 
a project, and being creative (Renzulli 2003; 
Shavinina and Seeratan 2003). Innovative tal-
ent depends on the interaction among these 
three factors and not on possessing exceptional 
capabilities in one or two of them. Two other 
factors that affect the manifestation of innova-
tive capabilities are personality and the envi-
ronment (Bailey and Ford 2003; Georgsdottir, 
Lubart, and Get 2003).
 General abilities are capabilities to process 
information, integrate experiences, and have 
abstract thoughts, whereas specific abilities are 
the capabilities to acquire specialized knowl-
edge or skills. Outstanding among the general 
abilities are academic capabilities, whereas sci-
entific, artistic, and sporting skills are important 
examples of the specific abilities (Shavinina and 
Seeratan 2003). It has been shown that intellec-
tually talented people can be distinguished by a 
knowledge stock that is adequate, sophisticated, 
and well structured, which they can access eas-
ily. Possession of specialized knowledge or an 
innovative profile is not necessarily linked to 
formal education but more to learning processes 
(see Section 3.1.2).
 Task commitment is also defined as perse-
verance, specialized practice, self-confidence, 
and the ability to carry out major tasks in-
dependently. There is no universally accepted 
definition of creativity, but in general, it is rec-
ognized that creativity is related to the ability 
to think things that nobody else has thought.
 Although these abilities cannot be mea-
sured quantitatively, it is estimated that inno-
vators fall into the upper 20 percent of the dis-
tribution in each one of these factors (Renzulli 
2003); thus less that 1 percent of the population 
will simultaneously and adequately possess the 
three attributes necessary for innovation.
 “A person is not always innovative or 
never innovative. Innovation occurs in certain 
people (not all people), at certain times (not 
all the time), and under certain circumstances” 
(Renzulli 2003, 83). Some people have only 
one innovative episode in their lives; others 
maintain their innovative capabilities for long 
periods.3 No one is an innovator at all times 
or never, as opposed to other abilities that 
manifest themselves more or less permanently 
(for example, sporting or artistic abilities). 
Furthermore, those who are consistently more 
creative have had noncreative periods after 
long and intense manifestations of their talents 
(Renzulli 2003).
 Innovative capabilities can be developed in 
some people if they are adequately stimulated 
and trained for those activities for which they 
have talent and they interact appropriately with 
the environment (Renzulli 2003; Vandervert 
2003). However, individual responses to stim-
uli have great variability; furthermore, it is 
impossible to predict which individual will 
respond favorably to given types of stimuli. 
Consequently, in the design of programs to 
develop innovative capabilities it is preferable 
to include rather than exclude those who have 
potential to develop innovative ideas or prod-
ucts (Renzulli 2003).
 The literature reviewed above only focuses 
on innate and acquired idiosyncratic factors. In 
fact, the expression of these factors depends on 
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other variables, such as wealth, luck, experi-
ence, culture, and gender. For example, in a 
study of innovative African farmers, Reij and 
Waters-Bayer (2001) found that in most cases 
they (1) were men (reflecting differences in 
asset ownership and cultural discrimination); 
(2) had strong personalities; (3) were relatively 
old and had great experience; (4) were rela-
tively rich (which enabled them to experiment 
more); (5) had contacts with other regions, 
which were a source of technological informa-
tion; (6) were full-time farmers; (7) showed 
no correlation between creativity and formal 
education; and (8) tended to develop integrated 
agricultural systems.
3.1.2 Learning
Learning is defined as the process by which 
people and organizations create knowledge 
and acquire capabilities. It is a complex pro-
cess based on repetition, experimentation, and 
selection, which enables improved and faster 
performance of tasks and the identification of 
new opportunities (Dodgson 1993). Learning 
processes have a gradual, cumulative, sys-
temic, and idiosyncratic character.
 Knowledge is the fruit of the learning 
process, and the application of knowledge 
is a feedback to the process. Learning has 
been recognized as an essential component of 
human capital, but it is a special form of capi-
tal, because it increases with use and depreci-
ates if it is not applied (OECD 1996).
 Learning takes place basically at three lev-
els: individual, organizational, and network. 
Simon (1996) points out that all learning 
begins at the individual level—thus an orga-
nization learns in two ways: (1) through the 
learning of its members, or (2) through incor-
porating new members who have knowledge 
that the organization does not possess. Thus 
the definition of learning, and therefore of 
knowledge, is in the first instance an individual 
affair. But this classification is insufficient, as 
it does not account for knowledge developed 
jointly by several individuals.
 Individual learning is also a social phe-
nomenon: what an individual learns largely 
depends on what is known by other members 
of the organization and what the organiza-
tion allows in terms of experimentation (Von 
Krogh, Ichijo, and Nonaka 2000; Bailey and 
Ford 2003). In general, organizations do not 
allow for innovations, because they weaken 
routines that have yielded positive results 
in the past and are still considered useful 
(Bailey and Ford 2003; Davila, Epstein, and 
Shelton 2006). Collective knowledge depends 
on routines and conventions developed (often 
unconsciously) and accepted by members of 
the organization. In turn, through interactions, 
individuals define new operational routines; 
that is, routines are an expression of collec-
tive learning (Dosi, Nelson, and Winter 2000). 
Therefore, although organizational learning 
occurs through individuals, it is not the sum 
of the individual learning of the organization’s 
members (Dodgson 1993).
 Organizational capabilities are a combina-
tion of elements sometimes explicit and articu-
lated and sometimes tacit and subconscious 
(Dosi, Nelson, and Winter 2000). For this 
reason, two important components of organi-
zational learning are (1) being able to share 
knowledge with different areas of the organiza-
tion and with new members of the development 
team and (2) making tacit knowledge explicit 
so as to be able to reflect on it and transmit it 
across time, especially after the owners of the 
tacit knowledge leave the organization.
 Collective learning occurs not only through 
individuals’ imitation, like the master–apprentice 
relationship, but also as a result of the combina-
tion of individual efforts to understand complex 
problems. Learning requires developing shared 
codes of communication and search procedures. 
In organizations, routines are the manifestation 
of these codes and procedures (Teece, Pisano, 
and Shuen 1997). Organizations often are not 
aware of everything they know, making the 
construction of an institutional memory a key 
element of organizational learning.
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 Knowledge is complex, diverse, and vola-
tile. In addition, its availability has grown 
exponentially in recent decades. For these
reasons, companies increasingly need to co-
operate and share information and innovative 
capabilities; that is, they need to integrate into 
networks. Innovation is increasingly the result 
of cooperation. Networks allow interchange 
of knowledge, abilities, and resources among 
different actors and institutions that make up 
systems at the local, regional, national, and 
international levels (Powell and Grodal 2005; 
Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006).
 Lundvall (1992) highlights the interactive 
character of learning, which depends on the 
formation of networks made up of different 
actors from the innovation system, including 
companies, research centers, farmers, sup-
pliers, and users. The effectiveness of these 
networks depends on flows of knowledge, the 
mechanisms used by agents and institutions to 
learn collectively, and the acquisition of capa-
bilities through interaction. Strengthening the 
mechanisms by which learning and distribu-
tion of knowledge occur and encouraging the 
formation of networks have become key issues 
for decisionmakers.
 A robust learning strategy needs to include 
various dimensions. First, it should simultane-
ously include both operational and strategic 
components. Second, it should define the goals 
of the learning, that is, what the organization 
needs to learn, including technological and 
organizational elements. Third, it should iden-
tify sources of learning and knowledge (inter-
nal, external, domestic, or foreign). Fourth, it 
should specify who learns (individuals, lead-
ers, the organization, or networks). Fifth, it 
should identify the localization of the knowl-
edge (that is, in which areas of the organiza-
tion the knowledge will be produced). Sixth, 
it should identify the learning mechanism, in 
other words, the means or activities through 
which the actors learn (Vera-Cruz 2004).
 Learning can occur through a number of 
activities, including production, research and 
development, reverse engineering, analysis of 
competitors’ innovation portfolios (including 
the product basket and research and develop-
ment projects), visits to other firms, team 
work, monitoring internal work, strategic alli-
ances (with other firms and/or research institu-
tions), and licensing.
 In recent years ignorance management 
(that is, knowing what is not known) has 
been recognized as an important component 
of knowledge management (Root-Bernstein 
2003; Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006).
3.1.3 Codified and Tacit Knowledge
Knowledge is a key component of capabili-
ties. Knowledge is a concept related to data 
and information but is broader than these. 
Davenport and Prusak (1998) define knowl-
edge as an evolving mix of structured expe-
riences, values, contextualized information, 
and expert ideas, which help the organization 
to evaluate and incorporate new experiences 
and information. Knowledge originates and 
operates in the minds of those who know. In 
organizations it is frequently incorporated in 
organizational routines, processes, and rules. 
Documents and depositaries are not knowl-
edge, they are just information—they become 
collective knowledge when they define how 
things are done in the organization.
 An organization’s knowledge includes both 
tacit and codified elements that are usually dis-
persed in different areas. Codified knowledge 
is articulated in formal language; that is, it is 
expressed with words, numbers, and drawings, 
including grammatical declarations, mathe-
matical expressions, specifications, and manu-
als.4 Tacit knowledge is difficult to articulate 
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cept of explicit knowledge, but to preserve consistency with the concepts used in this study, codified knowledge is used in 
the remainder of this report.
through formal language; it is personal and 
accumulated in the course of individual and 
group experiences and is transmitted through 
practice. To be communicated and shared 
within the organization, it must be codified in 
some way; in other words, it must be converted 
into words or numbers that other people can 
understand (Dutrénit 2001, 2002; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995). To use codified knowledge, it 
is essential to have a significant stock of tacit 
knowledge, for example, anyone can read a 
car repair manual, but only an experienced 
mechanic can repair the car adequately.
 Knowledge can be generated from internal 
and external sources of information. The abil-
ity to use external information in productive 
and commercial activities is critical for the 
development and maintenance of innovative 
capabilities. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) called 
this ability absorptive capability. It depends on 
external factors (for example, economic stabil-
ity, the competitiveness of markets, and rela-
tions between research institutions and orga-
nizations) and internal factors (including the 
company’s culture, resources invested in the 
search for and adaptation of external informa-
tion, the quality of its personnel, and mecha-
nisms for socializing knowledge).
 To exploit external information, among 
other factors, organizations must have accu-
mulated some level of knowledge related to
the new information. Making the new exter-
nal information intelligible (for the organiza-
tion) depends on the ability to link new and 
existing concepts. Organizations with stronger 
absorptive capabilities are more able to exploit 
emerging opportunities, whereas those with 
weaker absorptive capabilities tend to be more 
reactive.
 An organization’s absorptive capabilities 
are a function of individual and collective 
capabilities. The latter depend not only on 
interactions with the external environment but 
also on the organization’s internal interfaces. 
Shared language and symbols facilitate the com-
munication and effective interaction among 
different and diverse structures of knowledge. 
Acceptance of frequent revisions of operating 
routines and of searches for ways to improve 
operations (or to identify new areas where the 
organization can operate) also contributes to 
developing collective learning. Thus the orga-
nizational culture influences the development 
of absorptive capabilities (see Sections 3.1.1 
and 3.1.2).
 An organization’s absorptive capabilities 
depend on the effort and resources that the 
organization has invested in them. In this 
sense, creation of absorptive capabilities is a 
deliberate process in which the intensity of 
effort is critical.
3.2 Organizational Culture
The role of organizational culture in shaping 
behavior has been receiving increasing atten-
tion. Organizational culture is a series of basic 
assumptions, values, and beliefs that were 
largely established during the organization’s 
early life. These elements form a sort of orga-
nizational personality that emerges slowly and 
is hard to change but is not immutable. Culture 
affects learning and governance; some cultures 
facilitate individual learning, whereas others 
foster collective learning. Some emphasize 
vertical and centralized management, and oth-
ers promote horizontal decisionmaking (Vera-
Cruz 2004).
3.2.1 The Concept of Culture
Several definitions of organizational culture 
have been presented in the specialized litera-
ture. One of the most widely accepted states 
that culture is a pattern of basic assumptions 
and beliefs (not values or behaviors) invented, 
discovered, or developed by a group in the pro-
cess of learning how to address the problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration 
(Schein 1984, 1991). This pattern has func-
tioned well enough to be considered valid and, 
as such, is to be taught to new members of the 
organization as the correct way of perceiving, 
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thinking, and feeling in relation to the prob-
lems of adaptation and integration. These basic 
assumptions and beliefs operate unconsciously 
and define an organization’s view of itself and 
its environment.
 This definition highlights the evolution-
ary forces that influence an organizational 
culture, especially the means by which it is 
learned, transmitted, and changed. Likewise, 
it emphasizes that a culture is rooted in the 
organization’s need to solve problems associ-
ated with external circumstances that it had 
to face in its beginnings (external adaptation) 
plus the mechanisms used to integrate workers 
and cultivate their loyalty to the organization 
(internal integration). Finally, the definition 
stresses that construction of a culture is a 
protracted process that involves the repeated 
use of specific and successful approaches for 
solving similar problems.
3.2.2 Levels of Organizational Culture
Schein (1996) argued that a culture has three 
clearly differentiated levels. The first one cor-
responds to the “visible artifacts,” that is, the 
physical and social surroundings constructed by 
the organization and the visible organizational 
processes and structures. They include the archi-
tecture, technology, office distribution, audible 
or visible patterns of behavior, and printed 
documents (for example, statutes, employee 
orientation materials, and reports). These data 
are readily available but difficult to interpret. 
This level describes how the organization builds 
its environment and what the patterns of behav-
ior are, but not why they are what they are. 
Understanding why an organization behaves in 
a particular way requires jumping to the second 
level: the values that govern behavior.
 Values refer to the ideal of what should be, 
and as such are difficult to apprehend directly. 
Values govern behavior and consist of strate-
gies, goals, philosophies, and manifest justifi-
cations. They can be inferred from interviews 
with key members of the organization and the 
analysis of the visible artifacts. Nevertheless, 
they often are a manifestation of what a culture 
believes “should be” and not what the actual 
culture is. Although values could be present 
in the organization’s unwritten code, that does 
not mean that they are applied in practice.
 The third level includes the basic assump-
tions and refers to the organization’s essential 
themes, such as human nature (good, bad, or 
neutral, and whether it can be improved), the 
nature of human activity (active, passive, or 
self-determined), the nature of human relations 
(cooperative or competitive, individualist or col-
laborative), the vision of reality (ways of accept-
ing something as true, based on facts or the 
opinions of influential people), and the relation-
ship with the surrounding world (to what degree 
the organization considers it can influence its 
environment). Fundamental assumptions are 
firm beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings
taken as given; they are invisible and pre-
conscious. They are very effective in explaining 
an organization’s behavior. The basic assump-
tions are the essence of the organizational culture, 
whereas the values and behaviors are visible 
manifestations of this essence (Schein 1991).
3.2.3 Types of Culture
Whereas Schein (1991) seeks to understand 
the process by which an organizational cul-
ture is generated, Handy (1995) describes the 
basic types of cultures and pairs each type 
with a Greek god. He points out that “each 
culture . . . or each god works on quite dif-
ferent assumptions about the basis of power 
and influence, about what motivates people, 
how they think and learn, how things can be 
changed. These assumptions result in quite 
different styles of management, structures, 
procedures and reward systems” (Handy 1995, 
11). These types of cultures bring with them 
different styles of administration, structures, 
procedures, and reward systems. Handy argues 
that each organizational culture is made up of 
different values and shared interests, resulting 
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in specific ways of doing things and of evaluat-
ing what will function and what will not.
 The culture types identified by Handy rel-
evant for the study of the PFs are:
1. Power, Club, or Zeus Culture. This type 
is oriented toward activity. It is focused 
on the construction of useful relations to 
gain influence through informal channels. 
Although there may be a division of tasks 
based on function or products, true power 
is concentrated at the highest decision level 
and is distributed from the center to the 
periphery. The power of individuals in the 
organization depends on their relationships 
with the top decisionmakers and is based 
on empathy and trust. As a consequence, 
the opinions of influential people weigh 
more than those in technical positions. 
Outside the circle of power, relations are 
established through the hierarchy.
2. Role or Apollo Culture. This culture is based 
on the definition of specific roles and not 
on personalities. It emphasizes hierarchies, 
rules, clearly defined functions, and other 
structures that help people effectively do 
their assigned jobs. Individuals are impor-
tant, but only as part of the organization.
3. Task or Athena Culture. This culture is 
focused on work activities. It appears in 
interdisciplinary groups organized around 
specific problems. There is an assump-
tion of equality, where every opinion is 
important, and power is based on knowl-
edge. The structure is quite decentralized 
and integrated into networks. Nevertheless, 
as different units have different specific 
responsibilities within a general strategy, 
this culture still preserves some formal ele-
ments. This structure is the one that most 
facilitates organizational learning.
 Handy (1995) pointed out that many orga-
nizations were created as Club Cultures based 
on their founder’s personality and, as the 
organization matured, they evolved into other 
forms. Most organizations contain aspects 
of several types of cultures; thus they have a 
mix of management styles. This mix does not 
lack contradictions; for example, a dominant 
personality (Zeus) in a horizontal (Athena) 
culture can generate enormous contradictions 
and discourage people from contributing to the 
organization, because the typical Zeus admin-
istrator is seen by Athenians as countercultural. 
Handy argues that each culture is good for 
something. No culture or mix of cultures is bad 
or erroneous in itself; it can be adequate in cer-
tain circumstances and inadequate in others.
 Cultures resist change. Each culture gener-
ates great loyalty and unity on the part of its 
followers: those who are accustomed to one 
culture have difficulty in accepting the prin-
ciples of another. Thus it is hard to change cul-
tures, and many organizational problems result 
from attempting to continue doing things as 
usual, rejecting cultural changes when they are 
needed (Handy 1995; Christensen and Raynor 
2003; Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006).
3.2.4 How an Organizational 
Culture Is Built
A culture’s elements can be defined as learned 
solutions to problems (Schein 1996). In gener-
al, there are two types of situations that foment 
learning: (1) positive solutions to problems 
that generate self-reinforcing processes when 
the solutions work and (2) anxiety aversion, 
which generates self-reinforcing processes 
when solutions help avoid anxiety. An orga-
nization may have cultural elements based on 
both types of situations. The first case occurs 
when, to find positive solutions to problems, 
a group tries different alternatives until they 
find one that works. The repeated solution to 
the same problem through a similar response 
legitimates that mechanism as the correct way 
of solving the problem. In the second case, 
when a response that effectively avoids anxiety 
is found, the group repeats that response with-
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out checking whether the cause of the anxiety 
has disappeared.
 An organization’s founders shape its cul-
ture; they incorporate it and transmit it. Later, 
the organization’s leaders (usually the top 
management) play a key role in transforming 
the culture (Vera-Cruz 2004; Davila, Epstein, 
and Shelton 2006). A culture depends on the 
group’s experience; thus the process of culture 
formation is associated with the emergence of 
a group’s identity.
 Several external and internal factors drive 
the process of culture creation. External factors 
are related to the leaders’ and group’s percep-
tions regarding the external context and how to 
survive in it. Internal factors are associated to 
their perceptions on how to organize relations 
among members to enable survival in a given 
context—the relations should combine effec-
tive performance with internal comfort.
 Problems of external adaptation and sur-
vival are associated with
•  mission and strategy: obtaining a shared 
vision of the organization’s mission, objec-
tives derived from that mission, primary 
activities, and manifest and latent functions;
•  means: developing a consensus about the 
means to be used to attain the objectives, 
such as organizational structure, division of 
labor, and system of authority; and
•  incentive structure and metrics: developing 
a consensus on the criteria used to evalu-
ate to what extent the group has attained its 
objectives (for example, on an information 
and control system); similarly, developing a 
consensus on appropriate remedial strategies 
in the case of nonattainment of objectives.
 The problems associated with internal inte-
gration are
•  developing a common language and con-
ceptual categories, so that members can 
communicate and mutually understand 
each other;
•  defining group borders and criteria on who 
can be a member and who cannot, and cri-
teria to determine membership;
•  defining the criteria and rules by which a 
person acquires, keeps, and loses power;
•  setting what is rewarded with status and 
power and what is penalized; and
•  establishing ideology and “religion,” that 
is, the way events are interpreted.
3.3 Governance
Governance concerns all the rules, procedures, 
and practices affecting how power is exercised 
in an organization. The governance function 
of the organization is understood as a space 
where strategic decisions are taken, especially 
those relating to global resource allocation, 
and where the inevitable crises of any complex 
organization are faced and overcome.5 Ack-
nowledging that organizations establish a web 
of internal and external social interactions, the 
new organizational proposals are based on 
models of inter- and intra-organizational col-
laboration (Crozier 1994; Savall and Zardet 
1995). In other words, organizations are seen 
as social spaces for collective action. The latter
depend on the mental models of the indi-
vidual as well as on organizational practices—
especially on the work environment and the 
incentive structure. The key to an organiza-
tion’s success lies in convincing individuals 
that collective interests are more important 
than individual and group values, and in main-
taining the governance to ensure the organiza-
tion’s survival through control of results and 
elimination of conflicts.
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in response to the feedback they receive from the employees (Christensen and Raynor 2003).
 The new organizational models break with 
the traditional vision that sees organizations 
as closed, static systems isolated from their 
environments: the new vision recognizes orga-
nizations as complex systems, in which the 
organization functions as a space where diverse 
groups with different goals and interests coexist 
(Etkin 2000). This diversity can cause the orga-
nization to stray from its declared or founda-
tional goals. Additionally, the organization is a 
system formed by a fuzzy set of plans, projects, 
and activities structured by ambiguous relations 
and contradictory processes. In this set, forces 
that push for change and to maintain the status 
quo coexist, so that the organization is a self-
organizing system (see Section 2.1.1).
 In the analysis of organizations, it is impor-
tant to merge governance approaches with the 
complexity perspective to analyze such themes 
as legitimacy, decisionmaking, political par-
ticipation, management representation, and the 
dimension of power. Analysis of the gov-
ernance of organizations encompasses three 
dimensions: structure (distribution of functions
and coordination), process (communication–
coordination–harmonization, leadership, learn-
ing policies, and operative processes), and stra-
tegic axis (mission, shared vision, and strategic 
lines and plans of action).
3.3.1 Structure
An organization’s structure has been defined 
as all the means used to divide the work 
into separate tasks and ensure their coordina-
tion (Mintzberg 1999). The structure defines 
authority, jobs, functions, responsibilities, and 
communication links among the organization’s 
members. Mintzberg (1999) identified different 
organizational configurations, each correspond-
ing to different coordination mechanisms:
• Mutual adjustment. Work coordination is 
carried out by the simple process of infor-
mal communication.
• Direct supervision. Coordination is car-
ried out by one person who is in charge of 
employees.
• Standardization of work process. Coordi-
nation is carried out through fulfilling the 
functions established in the procedures 
manual.
• Standardization of results. Coordination is 
defined on the basis of the results that must 
be obtained.
• Standardization of qualifications. Coordi-
nation of different types of work is carried 
out based on the know-how of those who 
do the work.
• Standardization of rules. Workers carry 
out their functions based on the rules that 
are one component of the organizational 
culture.
 The existence of a number of alternative 
structures reflects the complex social nature of 
the organization, that is, an organism plagued 
by potential conflicts among actors and by 
the dysfunctions the structures may provoke. 
To maintain unity, organizations must per-
manently coordinate areas and spaces with 
divergent modes of thought, resources, and 
priorities. The structural model thus defines 
the degree of centralization of responsibili-
ties and the degree of autonomy and cohesion 
of tasks that condition the development of 
new skills necessary for survival in a chang-
ing world. To develop an effective structure, 
an organization’s government should seek 
out configurations that (1) are effective and 
congruent with the goals and resources, (2) 
identify limitations of the hegemonic model 
that allowed survival in the past, and (3) allow 
the emergence of alternatives.6
 In an alternative classification of organi-
zational structures, Gibson, Ivancevich, and 
Donnelly (1996) described two basic models. 
The organizational model refers to a mecha-
nistic model that emphasizes achieving high 
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6The organization’s government consists of those people or groups who make the strategic decisions.
levels of production and efficiency through 
the intensive use of rules and procedures, 
centralization of authority, and strict work 
specialization. In contrast, the organic model
emphasizes the importance of achieving 
high levels of adaptability and development 
through the limited use of rules and proce-
dures, decentralization of authority, and rela-
tively low levels of specialization. Theories 
of contingent design are based on these two 
models. These theories hold that the organi-
zation’s structure should fit the needs of a 
given situation, including issues related to 
technology, environmental uncertainties, and 
strategy.
 In the mechanistic model of the organiza-
tion, decisionmaking is concentrated at the 
pinnacle of the organization. The organiza-
tion is designed to give the most authority 
and responsibility to the highest position in 
the hierarchical structure, because the person 
occupying this position is supposed to possess 
greater ability and knowledge than the lower 
ranks. Such a management model is based on 
a generalized distrust of the performance of 
the lower ranks, justifying a tight control over 
the organization’s implicit knowledge. It is 
now recognized that these models only create 
the illusion of control, because all employees 
have a certain amount of power, even if it is 
only the power to obstruct the decisions of 
their superiors (Olson and Eoyang 2001).
 In contrast, the organic model is based on 
decentralized and flexible structures built on 
confidence. This model starts from the idea that 
every actor has the ability to make decisions 
according to his or her position in the hierar-
chy (Olson and Eoyang 2001; Christensen and 
Raynor 2003). Thus the organization recog-
nizes the accumulated experience of all actors 
and the possibilities that are opened with the 
active participation of all members of the orga-
nization. The success of the decentralization 
process depends on all actors internalizing the 
organization’s vision and mission.
3.3.2 Organizational Processes
An organization takes shape through its pro-
cesses, that is, recurrent activities that use re-
sources. The study of processes allows visuali-
zation of the decisionmaking mechanisms 
(beyond what figures in organizational charts or
operations manuals) and behaviors that result 
in specific outcomes, successful or otherwise. 
The principal processes are communication–
coordination–harmonization, leadership, poli-
tics, learning, and the organization’s opera-
tional processes.
Communica t ion–coord ina t ion–
harmonization process. Subjects in an 
organization interact across space and time, 
pursuing their individual and collective inter-
ests. These subjects belong to different social 
groups (for example, social, professional, 
occupational, or educational classes) and have 
diverse experiences, which can lead them into 
idiosyncratic behaviors.
 Because the capacity for action, decision-
making, the establishment of strategies, and 
the organization’s shared vision depend on the 
abilities and resources acquired by its members, 
the organization must generate adequate condi-
tions for collective action. Horizontal com-
munication processes help to generate internal 
consensus through guided discussion, easing 
the transition from an individual to a shared 
organizational vision. These processes generate 
collective or organizational knowledge.
 Organizations often confuse information 
with communication, because internal reports 
and memos automatically foment the creation 
of shared meanings and values, which, in 
turn, generate a sense of belonging. On many 
occasions, however, concise memos lead to 
a sense of dissonance or separation from the 
organization. Thus, instead of strengthening 
the collective identity, these brief communi-
cations provoke a distancing between actors, 
especially between those who have authority 
and those who do not.
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 The organization’s internal communication 
process is present in all social interchanges. 
Communication affects the construction, com-
prehension, and influence of multiple mean-
ings that are transmitted in all social spaces. 
Communications form an indispensable part of 
cultural processes, which is why it is important 
to put into place operational, functional, and 
stimulating information systems. Such systems 
motivate action through a continuous negotia-
tion process (Savall and Zardet 1995).
Leadership: Managing, deciding, influ-
encing, and motivating processes. 
Most experts on human behavior have tried 
to correlate leadership characteristics with 
performance. The consensus today is that a 
modern leader must develop leadership with a 
sense of duty; in other words, she or he must 
project into the interior of the organization a 
commitment that functions as a reference for 
the transformation of organizational structures. 
The leader has to create a symbol of leadership 
that serves as an example to promote a more 
committed and responsible participation that 
responds more to conviction than to coercion 
exercised by authority and induces members 
to contribute their knowledge, abilities, and 
experience toward common goals.
 An effective leader motivates, shows per-
sonal interest, generates an environment of con-
fidence, develops the capacity for self-control, 
exercises effective leadership that facilitates 
rapid decisionmaking on the part of collabora-
tors, and awards opportune recognition for 
work well done. In addition, he or she creates 
a sociable work environment, is a communica-
tor, and demonstrates willingness and ability 
to listen and keep an open dialogue to share 
information. He or she explains and transmits to 
the team a clear vision of the present situation 
and possible future outlook (Crozier 1994). The
leader should also encourage and facilitate 
the personal and professional development of 
the team members and participate in learning,
training, and development processes while en-
suring that the continuous improvement process 
in his or her area of responsibility is appropriate-
ly documented (Luhmann 1997). In his study of 
the role of the leader in the promotion and guid-
ance of the administrative process, Mintzberg 
(1999) found that leaders do not simply plan, 
organize, direct, and control; they also fulfill 
three fundamental roles: interpersonal, informa-
tive, and decisive (Table 3.1).
Political processes in the organization. 
The political approach sees the organization as 
a space in which different groups (with their 
own goals) coexist and make formal or tacit 
agreements on matters relevant to the orga-
nization, including the form of governance, 
the rules of the game (normative framework), 
resource distribution criteria, and negotiations 
with other institutions. The political axis of the 
organization seeks areas of coincidence and 
establishes means of resolving the conflicts 
that stem from a diversity of goals.
 Political analysis attempts to discover and 
negotiate hidden aspects, including declared 
interests that guide decisions and exist in par-
allel with the official objectives, forces that 
operate on the margins of or outside formal 
structures, and negotiations among interest 
groups that do not interact within the tradition-
al channels of communication (Etkin 2000). 
The mechanisms used in political dynamics 
include power plays, alliances, and coalitions, 
negotiation processes, public consultations, 
and assemblies called to defend rights or pro-
mote changes in labor relations.
Power: Sources and mechanisms; for-
mal and informal relations. The concept 
of power is of vital importance, not only 
because every organization has some kind of 
hierarchical structure, but also because the 
organization establishes power relations with 
other organizations or political institutions. 
The definition of power in its most gen-
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eral sense refers to the capacity or possibility 
of producing effects (Bobbio and Matteucci 
1988). As a social phenomenon, power is 
the relation among individuals. Weber (1984) 
defines power as the possibility of imposing 
one’s own will in a social relation, even in the 
face of resistance and whatever the basis of 
that relation is. Power relations can be based 
on the control of resources valued by a group 
(Adams 1993), social conventions, or psycho-
logical factors (subjection of a weak character 
by a strong one).
 Power confers on its holders the capacity 
to induce a person or group of people to work 
toward a desired objective. But power is not 
absolute; all actors possess a degree of power 
that allows them to choose a strategy to reach 
their individual or group objectives (Crozier 
and Friedberg 1977).
 Panebianco (1990) considers power as a 
relation of reciprocal interchange in which the 
terms of interchange favor one of the parties; in 
other words, it is an asymmetric relation. Power 
relations are established among leaders and/or 
elites on the one hand, and among followers 
on the other. In these relations, the followers 
support the leader if they receive something in 
return. There are two types of power relations: 
horizontal (among the power elite or among 
followers) and vertical (between elite and fol-
lowers). Both types of relations are found in 
the interior and the exterior of the organization. 
However, in the study of power structures it 
is not sufficient to simply be acquainted with 
actors and the power relations they establish. It 
is also necessary to understand the content of 
the interchange, where it is most concentrated, 
the content of the negotiations, the set of incen-
tives (collective and/or selective) that elicit 
participation, and the benefits obtained by the 
actors in the negotiation.
 The sources of power are the elements that 
confer the ability to influence other actors. Five 
types of power, based on their source, have been 
identified: coercive, reward-based, legitimate, 
expert, and referential (Robbins 1999):
• Coercive power. Based on fear of the con-
sequences of not obeying, it rests on either 
the threat or the actual application of sanc-
tions.
• Reward-based power. People obey to 
obtain benefits, and power rests on the 
ability to distribute rewards or benefits.
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Table 3.1  Role of the leader
Interpersonal
  Figurehead Symbolic head, needed for numerous legal and social duties
  Leader Responsible for leading and motivating subordinates
  Connector Maintains a network of external contacts for favors and information
Informative
  Observer  Receives a wide variety of information; functions as an internal–external node of information 
  for the organization
  Disseminator  Transmits information received from subordinates or external sources to the organization’s 
  members
  Spokesperson  Transmits information to external entities on the organization’s plans, policies, actions, and 
  results; serves as an expert in the organization’s industry
Decisionmaker
  Entrepreneur Searches out and initiates projects that lead to organizational change
  Obstacle manager  Responsible for corrective action when the organization confronts significant or unexpected 
  obstacles
  Resource distributor Makes or approves significant organizational decisions
  Negotiator Responsible for representing the organization in major negotiations
Source: Robbins (1999).
• Legitimate power. Each position in an 
organization’s formal hierarchy has a cer-
tain amount of influence attached to it, 
and power requires that the organization’s 
members accept the authority derived from 
the position.
• Expert power. Influence is based on experi-
ence, skill, or knowledge. This is one of the 
most powerful sources of influence, because 
it is based on the respect that recognition 
brings.
• Referential power. Based on the identifica-
tion with someone with desirable resources 
or personal characteristics, it rests on admi-
ration and the desire to emulate the admired 
person.
 Alternatively, Foucault (1978) considered 
three types of power:
• Economic power is related to asset owner-
ship (in particular capital) and the purchas-
ing power such ownership confers.
• Ideological power is related to the ability to 
impose a world view.
• Government power is that conferred by a
community on an individual or a small 
group to allocate the goods produced by 
the community, according to agreed rules.
Operating process: The organization’s 
raison d’etre. Organizational processes are 
a set of interrelated recurrent activities that 
serve to maintain and develop the organization 
and to guide its interactions with the external 
environment. Changes that occur in process-
es in response to external developments are 
aimed at guaranteeing efficient performance 
of the organization’s basic operations and its 
survival. Actual processes are the result of pur-
poseful design, chance, and past experiences; 
as such, they are closely related to routines 
(Dosi, Nelson, and Winter 2000).
Governing the organization. The func-
tion of government is to promote a creative and 
proactive attitude for searching for long-term 
opportunities, given the external and internal 
contexts. A manager should challenge existing 
routines without fostering excessive change. 
A leader manages the organization’s relations 
with the external world and, in this context, 
steers the organization’s evaluation of expan-
sion opportunities, new demands, changes in 
its environment, and establishment of strategic 
alliances with other organizations (Christensen 
and Raynor 2003). The leader helps to mediate 
and resolve internal conflicts. Success of the 
government function thus depends on leader-
ship that promotes the emergence of a set of 
opinions and shared values. Another key facet 
of the government function is the definition of 
strategic plans to
•  act on the organization’s external environ-
ment; for example, success in the market 
(these objectives constitute the organi-
zation’s visible, organized, and planned 
superstructure) and
•  act on the organization’s internal environ-
ment to reduce dysfunctions (these actions 
are directed at six areas: working condi-
tions, the organization of work, communi-
cation–coordination–harmonization, time 
use, integrated training, and strategy im-
plementation; the internal environment 
nearly always corresponds to the hidden, 
unplanned, badly organized part of the 
strategy) (Savall and Zardet 1995).
 The role of a strategy is to create new capa-
bilities that enable advances in the organizational 
learning process at both the individual and col-
lective levels. Savall and Zardet (1995) mention 
four fundamental attributes of the strategy:
1.  Human potential is essential in the search 
for new strategies.
2.  An effective strategy results from the par-
ticipation of all organizational actors in 
a process that is negotiated through the 
hierarchy.
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3. An organization’s strategy is an attempt 
to conciliate, partially but significantly 
and effectively, the individual strategies of 
internal and external actors as well as those 
of actors in different categories.
4.  A strategy simultaneously defines medium-
term goals and the means to reach them. 
The concerted strategic planning process 
legitimates the strategic goals and action 
plans, leading to more effective implemen-
tation.
 The indiscriminate use of strategic plan-
ning has been criticized in recent years 
(Olson and Eoyang 2001; Christensen and 
Raynor 2003). In emergent processes (new 
technologies or markets) the information to 
carry out a deep analysis of the situation in 
which the organization is going to operate 
simply does not exist. In these cases, stra-
tegic planning is too structured, and more 
flexible planning methods should be used 
(see Section 2.1.2).
3.4 Innovative Capabilities 
and Poverty Alleviation
Development depends on the ability of a num-
ber of actors to develop individual and col-
lective innovative capabilities. This ability is 
particularly important for poverty alleviation, 
because poor rural households have to find new 
strategies to integrate into globalized econo-
mies (Berdegué 2005). Although many authors 
have analyzed innovation processes that involve 
small farmers, and even more agencies have 
implemented programs to help these farm-
ers to innovate, few authors have systemati-
cally researched how to build the institutional 
capabilities that agencies need to strengthen 
their impact on poverty. Section 3.4.1 briefly 
surveys the literature on innovation in small 
farms, focusing on recommendations to build 
institutional capabilities to foster pro-poor inno-
vations. Section 3.4.2 explores how the skewed 
distribution of innovation capabilities influences 
the impact of poverty-alleviation policies.
3.4.1 What Is Known about 
Agricultural Innovation Policies 
and Poverty Alleviation?
The study of agricultural innovations and how 
they relate to poverty alleviation has evolved 
essentially from two sources: one that started 
with the Farming Systems Research approach 
in the 1970s and another that, since the late 
1980s, has analyzed the organization of agri-
cultural research and extension systems. In 
recent years, the analysis of agricultural inno-
vation systems has exploded. The analysis of 
this literature, however, exceeds the scope of 
this report; a good literature survey can be 
found in Hirvonen (2007). Many publications 
on agricultural innovation systems are descrip-
tive and provide general policy recommenda-
tions. This section reviews a few documents 
that contain concrete guidelines to foster pro-
poor agricultural innovations.
 This literature has influenced the activities 
of several organizations that work in pov-
erty alleviation (including the World Bank, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
[IFAD], Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research [CGIAR] centers, univer-
sities from developed countries, and a number 
of NGOs) that have explored how the innova-
tion systems framework could help them to 
strengthen their impact. It has been difficult, 
though, to incorporate this framework into 
their working routines (Berdegué 2005; Rodrik 
2006; Smit 2007). Two reasons explain this 
difficulty: on the one hand, organizations resist 
change (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2); on the other 
hand, because of the complexity of innovation 
processes, there are no clear recipes on how to 
make the innovation systems operative (World 
Bank 2006a).
 Although the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and IFAD have 
explored the use of the innovation systems 
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framework in their operations, these attempts 
have been isolated. Among the CGIAR centers 
that have explored how to use this framework, 
Bioversity, the International Potato Center 
(CIP), the International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT), and the International 
Livestock Research Institute stand out; among 
the universities, Wageningen and the United 
Nations University–Merit have active research 
programs related to agricultural innovations. 
The Institute of Development Studies has 
published seminal works in Farming Systems 
Research, in particular, Chambers, Pacey, and 
Thrupp (1989).
 Berdegué (2005) stresses that the diversity 
of rural poverty prevents applying one-size-
fits-all recipes and suggests that IFAD could 
become a promoter of experimentation, financ-
ing new types of projects for which it should 
build the appropriate capacities. Hall, Clark, 
and Naik (2007) also recognize the importance 
of capacity building for developing pro-poor 
innovations.
 World Bank (2006a) presents a conceptual 
framework to analyze agricultural innovation 
systems and an intervention framework to 
guide the design of interventions according to 
different stages of development of the innova-
tion processes. Hall, Clark, and Naik (2007) 
and World Bank (2006a) both stress the impor-
tance of self-organization and emergent inno-
vation processes. Biggs and Matsaert (2004), 
Ferris et al. (2006), and Hartwich et al. (2008) 
discuss several methods to build innovation 
networks, and Biggs (2005) presents a method 
to develop innovations by learning from posi-
tive experiences.
 This report builds on these works and com-
plexity theories to develop guidelines on how 
to foster pro-poor innovations. The report’s 
main insight is that relying on emergent pro-
cesses is effective only when variety and selec-
tion are managed appropriately—otherwise, 
too many resources are lost in random experi-
mentation (see Section 2.2). To do this, appro-
priate capabilities must be built, as discussed 
not only in this chapter, but also in Chapter 7 
and Appendix C.
3.4.2 How Should Uneven Innovative 
Capabilities Influence Poverty-
Alleviation Policies?
Currently, poor rural households can follow 
three pathways to escape poverty: becoming 
commercial farmers, seeking off-farm employ-
ment, or migrating (World Bank 2007). The 
combination of paths each household chooses 
depends on its accumulated assets, including 
its human and social capital and its innovative 
capabilities. Innovation policies can contribute 
to poverty alleviation along the first two path-
ways. Supporting commercial agriculture cre-
ates employment and reduces food prices. Many 
instruments have been found to be effective in 
supporting commercial farmers (see, for exam-
ple, Table 2.1). Because the focus of this section 
is on the role of innovation policies in support-
ing small farmers, instruments to support com-
mercial agriculture will not be analyzed.
 Several innovation policies can help small 
farmers become entrepreneurs, in particular 
(1) helping them to build their individual and 
collective innovative capabilities, (2) teaching 
them how to integrate into value chains and to 
search for and use commercial and technical 
information, (3) facilitating the diffusion of 
information and devising new extension meth-
ods, (4) building physical infrastructure, and 
(5) reducing market inefficiencies. Because the 
development of entrepreneurial capabilities is 
a complex problem (see below), it is impos-
sible to know in advance which menu of poli-
cies will be effective at a particular juncture.
 Finding the right combination of programs 
requires an evolutionary approach to policy-
making (see Section 2.1). Several agents, includ-
ing NGOs (for example, Technoserve), advanced 
research institutions (for example, Michigan State 
University), and international research centers 
(such as CIP and CIAT) have implemented pro-
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grams to develop value chains and market niches 
for small farmers. Few, however, have had more 
than local success, an indication of the complexity 
of poverty alleviation. As the experience of the 
PFs clearly shows (see Section 6.5), in addition 
to a flexible approach to project management, the 
presence of individuals highly committed to pov-
erty alleviation in charge of the experimentation is 
a crucial factor in project performance.
 Innovation results from the interaction of 
motivation and capabilities. Motivation for 
economic innovations arises from commercial 
opportunities. To take advantage of these oppor-
tunities, innovators must have the individual 
and collective capabilities to develop a package 
that combines appropriate technologies with a 
business plan (Christensen, Anthony, and Roth 
2004; Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006). As 
was explained in Section 3.1.1, it is highly prob-
able that only a fraction of small farmers would 
have such capabilities. Two current processes 
provide indirect support to this assertion. First, 
although many projects have sought to facilitate 
the access of small farmers to high-value chains, 
very few cases have been documented in which 
small farmers remained important suppliers 
when these chains matured (see, for example, 
Holden, Shiferaw, and Pender 2004; World 
Bank 2005, 2007; Reardon and Flores 2006). 
In other words, many small farmers try but few 
succeed.
 Second, remittances to rural households 
have soared in the past two decades. Inter-
national remittances in 2006 were estimated 
at US$300 billion (IFAD 2008). There are no 
estimates of the remittances sent by domestic 
migrants, but undoubtedly they also contrib-
uted significantly to diversifying the income 
of rural households. It has been consistently 
found that remittances are mostly invested in 
education and health (that is, in human capital 
that can be used in off-farm employment) and 
housing, and only a small share is used in pro-
ductive activities, especially agriculture (Davis 
et al. 2000; Vargas-Lundius 2004; López-
Córdova and Olmedo 2006). In fact, it has been 
found that for many of these households, increas-
ing agricultural productivity has become less 
relevant than expanding other sources of income 
(Davis et al. 2000; Barrett, Reardon, and Webb 
2001; World Bank 2007). In short, agricultural 
production is not one of the main priorities of 
households that receive remittances.
 The effectiveness of innovation programs 
can be enhanced by targeting farmers with 
strong innovative capabilities. This target-
ing, however, is complex, as attested by the 
literature on programs for gifted students 
(Reis and Renzulli 2003).7 Devising targeting 
mechanisms requires exploration and effec-
tive learning routines (see Section 2.1.2). 
Few organizations that implement innovation 
programs, however, have developed learning 
capabilities; most are trapped into what has 
been called the “To Do Mode” (Smit 2007). 
The PFs, however, are investing actively to 
develop such capabilities (see Section 6.5 and 
Chapter 8).
 Despite the rapid growth of commercial 
agriculture, most poor rural households still 
depend on traditional crops for their living 
(World Bank 2007). For these households, 
higher and more stable yields can increase 
income and reduce food insecurity (Meinzen-
Dick et al. 2004). It is unlikely, however, that 
they will be able to escape poverty producing 
only traditional crops, even if they use the 
best available technologies. In some cases, the 
higher output of traditional crops has enabled 
poor farmers to start new income-generating 
activities (Ekboir, Boa, and Dankyi 2002; 
Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004), but it is these new 
activities that have allowed them to escape 
poverty. And the new activities a rural house-
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7Identifying farmers with strong entrepreneurial capabilities among all small farmers is similar in nature to identifying gifted
students among the general student population.
hold can start depend, again, on their assets 
and capabilities.
 Traditionally it was assumed that formal 
research contributed to poverty alleviation by 
developing technologies that poor farmers could 
use. As explained above, however, the use of 
technical information depends on the farmers’ 
absorptive capabilities. Therefore, research poli-
cies can help small farmers mainly by facilitat-
ing the researchers’ integration into innovation 
networks, which can be achieved by promot-
ing changes in the researchers’ cultures and 
creating new incentives that do not emphasize 
peer-reviewed publications. As seen in Sections 
6.4, 6.5, and Appendix C, the PFs are already 
exploring some of these incentives.
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CHAPTER 4
Concepts and Methods
4.1 Conceptual Framework
Chapters 2 and 3 presented a detailed review 
of relatively new concepts that have appeared 
in usually separate branches of the scientific 
literature. The detail given in these chapters 
is greater than needed in the present empirical 
analysis; the extra material was kept in this 
report, however, because it is a useful review 
of topics that are not always easy to access.
 These concepts are the basis of the con-
ceptual framework used in the institutional 
analysis of the PFs. This framework views 
organizations as complex organisms influ-
enced by the interaction between motivation 
and capabilities. Motivation results from the 
opportunities for change: in private firms these 
are mainly market or technological opportuni-
ties; for civil society organizations, the main 
driver is a sense of duty and the importance of 
the socioeconomic problems being addressed. 
The capabilities determine how organizations 
respond to emerging opportunities. Capabilities 
are constructed through sustained investments 
Social processes can be analyzed as complex systems in which different actors interact through multiple channels that include positive and negative feedback loops. Additionally, these interactions and their intensities change over time, often in unpredictable ways (see 
Section 2.1.1). The study of such processes requires flexible approaches to discover the emergence 
of new actors and changes in the patterns of interaction. Section 4.1 presents the conceptual frame-
work used in the empirical analysis. Section 4.2 reviews the role of quantitative and qualitative 
methods in the analysis of complex social processes, and Section 4.3 describes the methodology 
used in the empirical analysis.
and depend on a number of factors, including 
the organization’s past, its culture, governance 
structures, the presence of innovative individu-
als, and the environment in which the organi-
zation operates. Each factor’s influence on the 
organization’s dynamics changes over time, 
so that variables that have a positive effect at 
a particular point in time can be detrimental 
later (Christensen and Raynor 2003; Davila, 
Epstein, and Shelton 2006).
 The dynamics of organizational capabili-
ties and their interaction with external factors 
can be explained by the properties of CASs. 
These systems evolve through the interactions 
among a large number of actors of different 
types, conditioned by the process’s history, 
the socioeconomic environment in which 
they operate, and random events (Kauffman 
1995). In the case of agricultural innovations, 
the actors may include farmers, private firms, 
researchers, NGOs, farmers’ associations, 
financial institutions, and policymakers. This 
section discusses organizational innovations 
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as complex processes, the nature of organi-
zational capabilities (especially the role of 
learning, institutional cultures, and gover-
nance structures), and the role of networks in 
innovation processes.
4.1.1 Organizational Innovations 
as Complex Processes
Innovation processes are an example of CAS. 
Self-organization is one of the key features of 
CAS: properties that do not exist at smaller 
scales emerge at larger ones from the actions 
and interactions among different actors (Kauff-
man 1995; Axelrod and Cohen 1999; Crutch-
field and Schuster 2003). For example, life 
results from a huge number of chemical reac-
tions, but each reaction is not alive. The inter-
action between self-organization and random
events is the main reason that CASs are un-
certain and unpredictable.
 The most important instrument to influence 
a CAS is the creation of variation combined 
with effective selection mechanisms. In natu-
ral systems, variation is random, and selection 
is based on reproductive efficiency. Human 
interventions operate on both mechanisms, 
modifying them in a directed fashion, as exem-
plified by plant breeding (see Box 2.2). The 
effectiveness of this method depends crucially 
on having appropriate selection mechanisms. 
Because of the system’s complexity, though, 
there are no optimal selection mechanisms: 
appropriate solutions can only be found with 
a directed trial-and-error approach based on 
strong learning capabilities (Crutchfield and 
Schuster 2003).
 Organizational strategies can be of two 
types: deliberate and emergent. Deliberate strat-
egies are those consciously defined by the orga-
nization, whereas emergent strategies are those 
that result from the day-to-day, decentralized 
actions of all decisionmakers in the organization 
(for example, top and middle managers, sales 
people, and floor workers). These actions tend 
to be tactical and include, for example, resource 
allocations within divisions or deciding which 
clients should be prioritized. The accumula-
tion of these operational decisions results in 
the organization’s actual resource allocation, 
which may differ from the allocation decided in 
the deliberate strategies (Christensen, Anthony, 
and Roth 2004). Without strong leadership and 
effective learning mechanisms, emergent strate-
gies dominate the evolution of organizations. In 
such cases, organizations cannot operate con-
sciously to take advantage of emergent opportu-
nities. The PFs evolved through a combination 
of emergent and deliberate strategies, whose 
relative importance changed on several occa-
sions over time.
4.1.2 Organizational Innovative 
Capabilities
Three of the most important institutional fea-
tures that influence organizational innovative 
capabilities are learning mechanisms (because 
they determine how fast new information can 
be developed and used), organizational culture 
(because it determines the often “unconscious” 
factors that influence innovation), and gover-
nance structure (because it defines the flexibil-
ity an organization has to organize its activities 
and resolve conflicts).
Organizational learning. Innovation pro-
cesses are complex because if they could be 
planned in detail, they would be routines, not 
innovations. Innovations result not only from 
variation (trying new things) but also from 
directed selection (finding things that are bet-
ter than those in use). Managing variation and 
selection depends on the innovators’ ability 
to test new things until a solution to a prob-
lem or opportunity is found (Crutchfield and 
Schuster 2003). This ability, in turn, depends 
on the capability to integrate into innovation 
networks and the network’s ability to facilitate 
the exchange of resources and information. 
In other words, innovations depend on the 
interaction between individual and collective 
(organizational) learning capabilities (Dosi, 
Nelson, and Winter 2000).
CONCEPTS AND METHODS   49
 Individual abilities result from the combina-
tion of a person’s innate talents and learned abil-
ities (Renzulli 2003). In contrast, organizational 
capabilities result from the interaction among 
the organization’s resources (individuals’ abili-
ties and fixed capital), processes (the mecha-
nisms agreed on by the organization for doing 
things), and values (including the institutional 
culture and long-term goals). In new organiza-
tions, most capabilities reside in the resources, 
especially their people (including managers, 
technical support personnel, and line workers). 
The incorporation or departure of a key person 
can have a major influence on the probability of 
success. In time, the capabilities of successful 
organizations are transferred to processes and 
values (Christensen and Raynor 2003). Because 
of the crucial importance of individuals in the 
organizations’ early life, this report explores 
how innovators interacted among themselves 
and reacted to external influences to create 
strong innovative capabilities and set the basis 
for the institutional culture.
 Organizational capabilities must be built 
through sustained investments, strong leader-
ship, and adequate selection of those respon-
sible for new projects. It is also necessary that 
top managers install a vision of the chang-
es to be introduced, conduct many trials to 
reduce uncertainty, develop effective feedback 
mechanisms, and foster discussions to reach a 
consensus about what is desirable and accept-
able (Levinthal 2000; Crutchfield and Schuster 
2003; Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006). The 
effectiveness of learning and feedback mecha-
nisms is fundamental, because the number of 
options that can be tried is limited by coordina-
tion problems in the organization, the resources 
available for exploration of alternatives, and 
organizational capabilities (Dosi, Nelson, and 
Winter 2000). Learning is also important to 
define effective deliberate strategies.
 Usually organizations find it difficult to 
learn and innovate. Successful routines hamper 
testing potentially better approaches to prob-
lem solving, and managers and employees are 
absorbed by routine activities (Dosi, Nelson, 
and Winter 2000; Christensen and Raynor 
2003). This difficulty also affected the PFs at 
some stages of their development, but most of 
the times they were able to develop new inno-
vative capabilities.
 Learning takes place basically at three 
levels: individual, organizational, and network. 
Learning begins at the individual level, enabling 
people to process information to build concep-
tual frameworks. Individual learning is also a 
collective process, because what an individual 
learns largely depends on what is known by 
other members of the group and what the orga-
nization allows in terms of experimentation 
(Von Krogh, Ichijo, and Nonaka 2000; Bailey 
and Ford 2003). Organizational learning is the 
process whereby knowledge is created and 
distributed across the organization, communi-
cated among its members, and integrated into 
the organization’s operations (Dodgson 1993; 
Dosi, Nelson, and Winter 2000). Network 
learning involves several individuals and orga-
nizations creating shared knowledge and is a 
special case of organizational learning.
 Learning can occur through several mecha-
nisms; for the analysis of the PFs, the most 
important mechanisms are learning by doing, 
from hiring key individuals, from interacting 
with partners, and from information searches.
Organizational culture. An organizational 
culture is a series of basic assumptions, values, 
and beliefs largely developed during an orga-
nization’s early life. Organizational cultures 
determine, to a great extent, what is accept-
able within an organization (Schein 1996). 
Some cultures facilitate individual learning, 
whereas others foment organizational learning. 
Some emphasize vertical and centralized man-
agement, whereas others promote horizontal 
decisionmaking. Two of the basic types of 
cultures identified in the literature are used in 
the analysis of the organizational culture of the 
PFs (Handy 1995; see also Section 3.2.3):
•  Power, Club, or Zeus culture is oriented 
toward activity. The power of the individu-
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als within the organization depends on their 
relationship with the highest level of man-
agement and is based on empathy and trust.
•  Task or Athena culture is focused on work 
activities, integrated by interdisciplinary 
groups organized around solving specific 
problems. Power is based on knowledge in 
a quite decentralized structure.
 No type of culture is absolutely better than 
the others; some types are better in particular 
situations and can be a liability in others or as 
the organization matures. The cultures of the 
PFs were developed by two distinct groups, the 
presidents and the managers, and their interac-
tion was a major influence on how the PFs 
evolved and learned.
Governance structure. The analysis of 
governance of the PFs focuses on three dimen-
sions: (1) structure (distribution of functions 
and coordination), (2) process (communication–
coordination–harmonization, leadership, learn-
ing policies, and operative processes), and 
(3) the strategic axis (mission, shared vision, 
and strategic lines and plans of action). The 
structure defines authority, jobs, functions, 
responsibilities, and nexuses of communica-
tion among the organization’s parts; processes 
are recurrent activities that use organizational 
resources; and the strategic axis defines the 
objectives and action plans.
 Whereas organizational cultures change 
very slowly and are mainly an emergent prop-
erty of the organization’s evolution, gover-
nance can change relatively rapidly and as a 
result of deliberate action (Mintzberg 1999).
4.1.3 Innovation Networks
Individual actors (including firms) generally do 
not possess all the resources they need to inno-
vate; therefore, actors integrate into networks 
that facilitate the interchange of knowledge, 
abilities, and resources (Powell and Grodal 
2005). The evolution of innovation networks 
is determined by the changing relationships 
among agents, technologies, markets, the for-
mal and informal rules that regulate people’s 
behavior, and the complexity and maturity of
the innovations. For relatively simple or mature 
innovations and markets, networks are rather 
lax; members often relate formally or are medi-
ated by markets because each agent has a 
relatively good understanding of the needs of 
partners and customers, and of the technologi-
cal and market opportunities. In contrast, in the 
case of complex or new innovations, partners 
have to interact informally, often, and intensely 
in order to overcome emergent hurdles. Because 
most of the innovations are radical and/or the 
markets change rapidly, these networks face 
great technical and commercial uncertainties, 
which prevent effective contracting: successful 
collaborations are based on trust. In fact, the 
degree of formality varies along a continuum 
that goes from completely formal to absolutely 
informal. Moreover, the characterization of a 
market or innovation as simple and formal or 
complex and informal can change, reflecting
new technologies or commercial opportunities: 
as the markets evolve, membership in the net-
work changes, reflecting changes in the agents’ 
objectives and emerging technological chal-
lenges (Rycroft and Kash 1999).
 A catalyzing agent is one of the most 
important factors in the emergence and con-
solidation of innovation networks. This agent 
induces partners to invest time and resources in 
the network. Once the network is consolidated, 
the importance of the catalyzing agent dimin-
ishes, because other actors are more willing to 
participate when the benefits of participation 
become clearer and the interaction rules are 
known to all partners.
4.2 Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches in the Study of 
Complex Processes
When studying social phenomena, scientists 
have to make a crucial decision: whether to 
focus on the complexity of social processes 
and use qualitative methods or to make broad, 
homogenizing assumptions about cases and 
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document generalities—patterns that hold 
across many instances—which lead to quanti-
tative strategies.1
 The qualitative approach emphasizes in-
depth analysis of a small number of cases to 
show how the different aspects of each case 
mutually interact to form the whole case, and 
then compares and contrasts different wholes. 
The quantitative strategy, in contrast, seeks 
broad patterns across many cases by studying 
a small number of dependent variables across 
many cases and drawing statistically valid 
inferences.
 Qualitative research rests in part on the fol-
lowing assumptions: (1) populations are sets 
of heterogeneous cases; (2) populations are 
often redefined as the research advances; (3) 
cases are configurations of many aspects that 
should be understood at the level of the specific 
instance; and (4) causation is contextual, plu-
ral, nonlinear, and nonadditive—causes may 
combine in different and sometimes contradic-
tory ways to generate the same outcomes, or 
the same causes may have opposite effects 
in similar situations. In contrast, quantita-
tive research assumes that (1) populations are 
homogeneous with well-defined distribution 
functions; (2) populations are defined prior to 
the collection of data and analysis; (3) expla-
nations are heavily variable-oriented, and the 
individuality of each case is not relevant (that 
is, idiosyncrasies are considered a deviation 
from the common behavior); and (4) causation 
is predetermined and stable, and often additive 
and linear, making the approach insensitive to 
causal complexity.
 Both approaches use theory and data to 
build representations of reality—the differ-
ence lies in the way theories and data are 
used. Qualitative researchers use theories to 
identify important issues that must be explored 
in fieldwork. As the information is collected, 
different theories and causal links are checked 
against collected information on a large num-
ber of variables and interactions until a satis-
factory explanation has been built. Based on 
these results, new theories can be developed. 
Quantitative researchers, however, use a priori 
knowledge and theories to build a concise rep-
resentation of the phenomenon. With this 
representation, they collect large datasets of a 
few variables. The data are then analyzed with 
statistical tools to find correlations, which are 
seen as confirmation of the theories.
 In general, there is mutual mistrust be-
tween qualitative and quantitative research-
ers. From a quantitative point of view, case 
studies are seen as untrustworthy, because 
they are more likely than large collections of 
data to provide distorted representations of 
broad, population-wide patterns. For qualita-
tive researchers, quantitative research often 
constrains the dialogue between ideas and evi-
dence in unproductive ways (Richters 1997), 
especially by imposing a simplistic causal 
structure on the analysis. For the qualitative 
researcher, confidence comes from depth; for 
the quantitative researcher, it comes from 
breadth.
 Case studies do not meet the standards for 
valid statistical inference because, among other 
reasons, the latter requires random selection of 
the cases studied. The qualitative researcher, 
in contrast, deliberately selects cases because 
they show a particular behavior. Despite their 
lack of statistical validity, in-depth case studies 
provide the basis for constructing generaliza-
tions that hold, at least, for the cases analyzed. 
Often these generalizations have wider rel-
evance. For example, although Freud’s study 
of hysteria was based on the experience of a 
single patient (Freud 1963), it has been con-
sidered by psychologists as representative of a 
very large number of individuals.
 In fact, many areas of science in which 
experimentation is not possible (for exam-
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ple, astronomy, geology, history, and social 
sciences) depend on the analysis of a small 
number of uncontrolled cases, which plays a 
role similar to experiments in the construction 
of theories (Yin 2003). The evaluation of infor-
mation in the construction of the case study, 
including the acceptance and rejection of spe-
cific pieces of evidence, constitutes the basis 
for building theories of broad application.
 Quantitative analysis also has its drawbacks, 
because any dataset can be explained by an infi-
nite number of theories (Miller 2000; Machamer 
2002); therefore, good statistical properties (for 
example, high correlation coefficients) do not 
constitute a valid explanation, as exemplified by 
what is known as spurious correlation. In addi-
tion, having a relatively large random sample is 
no guarantee that the inferences will be valid for 
the whole population.
 The question a social scientist should answer 
is: which approach is more appropriate for the 
research’s objective and the problem under 
study? Quantitative approaches are useful for 
the study of relatively stable, simple relation-
ships that hold for large numbers of cases; 
examples of such relationships are responses to 
conditional transfers or to educational policies. 
Qualitative approaches, however, are appropri-
ate for the analysis of complex relationships 
that change over time or space, such as political 
processes or economic development.
4.3 Study Methodology
The questions this report seeks to answer are 
how a civil society organization managing 
public funds for research and extension can 
sustain organizational innovation over extend-
ed periods, and how it can learn and adapt to 
maximize its impact on the agricultural inno-
vation system. The answers to these questions 
will yield lessons that will help to improve the 
design and implementation of research and 
innovation programs in developing countries.
 A qualitative methodology was considered 
the most appropriate approach because of the
process’s complexity, the impossibility of con-
trolling behaviors, and the focus on ongoing
events (Yin 2003). To minimize the re-
searcher’s subjectivity, test the research design, 
and ensure its quality, multiple sources of evi-
dence were used, a chronology was developed, 
a chain of evidence was established, and key 
informants reviewed the draft report to check 
the validity of the arguments and the accuracy 
of the data (Yin 2003). The theoretical proposi-
tions used to build the conceptual framework 
were based on the literature on complexity, 
innovation processes (including STI policies), 
organizational learning, organizational cul-
tures, and governance. The theory was then 
reviewed in light of discrepancies between the 
theory and the evidence, or when new pro-
cesses were identified. This cycle was repeated 
until a coherent case was built.
 The study comprised a single case, in 
which COFUPRO was the unit of analysis, 
and the focus was on its learning routines, its 
coordinating activities in the set of relevant 
foundations, and its relations with external 
agents in the agricultural innovation system. 
Interactions with other actors in the broader 
innovation system were also briefly studied.
 Most of the information was collected in 47 
semi-structured interviews. The interviews were 
complemented with informal conversations and 
participation in meetings, reviews of published 
materials (especially from COFUPRO and 
the foundations), and direct observation. The 
different sources of data were integrated and 
compared to identify contradictions, and when 
needed, some actors were interviewed more 
than once to clarify inconsistent information 
obtained from different sources.
 The interviews, which lasted between 1 
and 3 hours, were conducted in the first half 
of 2006 and were all recorded and transcribed. 
These transcripts formed the basis for the data-
base of the case study. In addition, the research 
was enriched with 137 interviews carried out 
by one of the authors in 2004 for a previous 
study (Ekboir 2004). In both rounds of inter-
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views, the interviewees included current and 
former actors that participated in the creation 
and evolution of the PFs and COFUPRO, in-
cluding the present and all past COFUPRO 
presidents and executive secretaries, federal 
and state public officials (including all former 
federal secretaries of agriculture who interacted 
with the PFs), managers of the National Coun-
cil for Science and Technology (CONACYT) 
who interact with COFUPRO, INIFAP’s 
national director, the executive secretary for 
the National Research and Technology Trans-
fer System (SNITT), farmers, researchers, 
technical advisers, private firms, and the 
former research director for the International 
Service for National Agricultural Research 
(ISNAR). In the states of Michoacán, Nuevo 
Leon, and Puebla the interviews included the 
presidents, managers, treasurers, and lower 
level employees of the state foundations, 
current secretaries of rural development, 
INIFAP’s state authorities, SAGARPA’s rep-
resentatives, researchers, and the presidents 
of the state research and technology councils. 
To ensure that the interviewees would speak 
candidly, they were promised that the indi-
vidual contributions would not be identified 
in the final report.
 Based on existing information, an initial 
guide for the interviews was prepared. The 
guide was modified as new information was 
collected and new questions emerged. Appen-
dix D contains the main topics covered in the 
interviews.
 At the time this report was being written, the 
research team was conducting a formal survey 
of foundations’ presidents and managers to
identify learning mechanisms developed by the 
individual foundations. Preliminary conclusions 
from the survey were used for Section 6.5.
54   CHAPTER 4
CHAPTER 5
History of the PFs and COFUPRO
 The history of the foundations is an exam-
ple of a complex process (see Section 2.1): 
none of the actors who created the founda-
tions or who directly or indirectly influenced 
their development were able to foresee what 
the final outcome would be. Decisions that 
were taken at a particular moment with spe-
cific objectives in mind had unexpected and 
far-reaching consequences. The role played 
by certain individuals was crucial, but so 
was their ability to operate in an environment 
that allowed them to express their innovative 
capabilities.
 The fact that there were 32 foundations had 
contradictory consequences. On the one hand, 
the initial system was highly atomized, with 
too many small foundations, leading to high 
operating costs and imposing a low limit on the 
amount that could be allocated to individual 
projects. Some of the foundations, aware of
this problem, induced the creation of a co-
ordinating agency (COFUPRO) to improve 
their negotiating position with the federal gov-
ernment and benefit from economies of scale
by consolidating various activities. On the other
hand, the great variety present in the PFs 
allowed the emergence of an innovative group 
that led the set of foundations to separate func-
tionally from government, develop a culture of 
innovation, and adopt a code of conduct that 
placed great value on community service and a 
strong sense of duty.
 Going beyond the initial objectives of its 
creators, COFUPRO coordinated collective 
learning among the foundations and so played 
an important role in their individual and col-
lective consolidation and in the creation of an 
institutional culture. The interaction between 
the foundations and COFUPRO has been char-
acterized by the gradual transference of power 
from the foundations to the coordinating agen-
cy. This transference happened voluntarily 
(but not easily) as some individual foundations 
came to realize that certain tasks could not be 
accomplished on an individual basis. At the 
same time, some foundations were reluctant to 
lose the independence they had enjoyed since 
their inception. This contradiction in the col-
lective culture had a profound influence on the 
evolution of the foundations.
 The combination of autonomous yet coordi-
nated foundations together with a culture of self-
criticism became an effective search mechanism 
(creation of variety and selection) that rapidly 
took the PFs to the cutting edge of knowledge 
regarding the financing of agricultural research 
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The PFs have been a sociopolitical phenomenon of great importance in Mexico, influencing the relationship between, on the one hand, state and federal political structures, and farm-ers on the other. They have supported the transformation of public research organizations 
and influenced the design and implementation of STI and agricultural policies.
and extension—conscious of the limitations of 
existing instruments, the foundations searched 
for new instruments to foster innovation. Today 
there are very few examples on an international 
level that the foundations can follow. To con-
tinue being innovative, the PFs needed to build 
capabilities and develop learning mechanisms 
to systematically study their own experiences 
and explore new programs and projects (see 
Sections 2.1.2 and 3.1).
 The creation of the PFs followed an inter-
national trend in which donors and multi-
lateral institutions promoted the use of competi-
tive grants to induce changes in public research 
institutions (Echeverría and Elliot 2002; Vera-
Cruz et al. 2008). The ensuing institutional inno-
vations, however, were uniquely Mexican: for-
eign actors had very limited influence on them.
5.1 Mexican Agriculture 
in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth Century
The history of the Mexican agricultural sector 
in the second half of the twentieth century can 
be divided into two distinct periods: from the 
1960s until the debt crisis of 1982 and from that 
point on. Before the crisis, most developing 
countries followed policies of import substitu-
tion and strict regulation of domestic markets 
and foreign trade. These policies caused fiscal 
and trade imbalances that governments tried to 
compensate for by borrowing in international 
financial markets (Staatz and Eicher 1998). 
By the late 1970s, many developing countries 
(Mexico included) were heavily indebted. In 
1981, the United States tightened its monetary 
policy. The resulting increase in international 
interest rates caused simultaneous crises in 
several important developing countries, which, 
in turn, spread to international financial and 
goods markets. The generalized crisis showed 
the limits of the import-substitution strategies
in an increasingly globalized economy, and 
the import substitution paradigm lost its appeal 
among policymakers and social scientists. 
Many developing countries liberalized the 
most important markets (especially trade) and 
reduced the size and scope of government. 
These policies eventually became known as 
the Washington Consensus (Rodrik 2006). 
Mexico also followed these trends.
 In the first period, the Mexican agricultural 
policy emphasized self-sufficiency in food pro-
duction, exports of a few traditional products, 
and support for small producers. Competitive-
ness or sustainability were not considered 
in these policies. The instruments used were 
investments in infrastructure (especially roads 
and irrigation systems), subsidies for products 
marketed in protected domestic markets, and 
the creation of public research and extension 
institutions. A fundamental trait of public 
policies was their centralized and hierarchical 
character.1
 The public agricultural research institutes 
were created at the beginning of the 1950s to 
provide technical support for these policies and 
to train human resources for the public sector. 
INIFAP’s main objective was to help increase 
the output of products of social importance 
(such as maize, wheat, beans, and barley) and 
cattle ranching.2 Significant investments were 
made in a public extension system to spread 
the technological recommendations developed 
by the public research institutes. The agri-
cultural universities, such as Chapingo and 
Antonio Narro, were created to educate profes-
sionals for public service (especially as exten-
sion agents), while the Colegio de Posgradua-
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began to open the political system. In 2000 a candidate from a different party was elected president.
2For reasons of brevity and clarity, the name of INIFAP is also applied to the institutes that preceded it.
dos educated professors for the agricultural 
universities (Ekboir et al. 2003).
 Organized as public offices, these institu-
tions had little operating flexibility, weak qual-
ity controls, and focused only on the productive 
aspects of agriculture (such as plant breeding). 
Furthermore, direct government interference 
caused research programs to change in accor-
dance with public policies. The universities 
were organized following the twentieth-century 
European model of higher education: teach-
ers had no obligation to undertake research or
interact with the rest of society, quality con-
trols were weak, and universities were sup-
posed to be autonomous institutions, isolated 
from external influences (Malerba 1993; Dosi, 
Llerena, and Sylos Labini 2006). Despite this 
institutional setting, a few high-quality research 
teams emerged in various institutions.
 Influenced by the political environment 
prevalent in those times, the research, teach-
ing, and extension institutions developed a 
hierarchical institutional culture that put a 
premium on obedience and discouraged cre-
ativity. The hierarchical institutional culture 
and the linear vision of science meant that 
the public research and extension institutions 
isolated themselves from productive agents. 
Setting themselves apart from the institutional 
culture, some researchers and extension agents 
established close links with farmers.
 In products that were technologically mature 
and were traded in protected markets, research-
ers could guess the farmers’ needs and devel-
oped some useful outputs. These were used 
by those farmers able to absorb external infor-
mation. In other words, these institutions did 
have a small impact, especially among small 
farmers who had no access to other sources of 
technical information.3
 In the 1960s, North American traders con-
tacted farmers in northern Mexico to produce 
fresh vegetables for export. Driven by high 
profits, production rose steadily for three 
decades. The technology was imported, ini-
tially from the United States and subsequently 
from Israel and Europe (Calvin and Barrios 
1999; Ekboir et al. 2003). The contribution 
of the Mexican public sector to this process 
was essentially the development of irrigation 
and transport infrastructure. In contrast, the 
public research institutions did not participate, 
because the emerging high-value products
were not among the priorities of the federal gov-
ernment. Besides, the impossibility of hiring 
new researchers and the difficulty in retraining 
established professionals hindered the devel-
opment of new research capabilities.
 By protecting internal markets, agricultural 
policies reduced the need for innovation and 
allowed the survival of inefficient production 
structures. Stable policies also reduced the need 
for the research institutions to interact with 
other agents and adapt to changes in the envi-
ronment in which they operated. The situation 
changed after the 1982 crisis and especial-
ly during the 1990s, when domestic markets 
(including the market for land) and international 
trade were deregulated. The agricultural sector 
had to adjust rapidly to the new rules of the 
game and responded by changing its productive 
structure. These changes enabled considerable 
growth in nontraditional products and, con-
trary to expectations, also in some traditional 
products, including maize, wheat, and beans 
(Yunez-Naude and Barceinas Paredes 2003). 
The expansion resulted from the adoption of 
more productive technologies, improvements in 
marketing mechanisms, and public and private 
support for agriculture (the latter in the form of 
remittances from migrants).
 The new political and economic environ-
ment changed the farmers’ technological and 
commercial needs, with competitiveness and 
sustainability now on the top of the agenda. 
Attention to these factors requires new research 
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routines, based on a systemic perspective of 
productive and marketing processes, and on 
close cooperation between the various agents 
of the innovation system (see Section 2.2). 
For example, sanitary standards for export 
are very strict, so to expand foreign sales of 
fresh fruits and vegetables, it is necessary to 
improve the efficiency of sanitary campaigns. 
But their efficiency does not depend entirely 
on control measures, but also on the solution 
to externalities and improvements in producer 
profitability.4
 The technological needs of producers of 
nontraditional products continued to be sat-
isfied by the private sector, especially with 
imported technologies, although there were 
some significant but isolated efforts to develop 
private domestic research programs. The pri-
vate sector also began marketing new technol-
ogies for traditional products, especially seeds, 
machinery, and agrochemicals. Public-sector 
research institutions continued with their tradi-
tional routines and lines of research, although, 
in recent years, some institutions have made 
considerable efforts to develop ties with other 
agents.
 The changes in the socioeconomic envi-
ronment, especially the new technological and 
commercial needs of farmers, exposed the 
inflexibility of public research and extension 
institutions. Even though these institutions did 
not have the means and the incentives to par-
ticipate in the dynamic innovation processes, a 
few researchers (as individuals) made impor-
tant contributions.
 When the inability of the research institu-
tions to adapt to the new reality became appar-
ent, the government and the farmers began 
to question their very existence. Seeking to 
increase their efficiency and promote linkages 
with other private and public agents, the public 
research and extension systems were reformed 
in the 1990s. The two most important instru-
ments used were new financing mechanisms 
(including the reduction of treasury grants and 
the introduction of competitive grants) and the 
enactment of laws to increase the system’s 
flexibility, especially the science and technol-
ogy laws of 1999 and 2002 and the Sustainable 
Rural Development law of 2001.
 The aforementioned reforms were an 
incorrect response to a correct diagnosis of 
the prevailing situation of the research and 
extension institutions (particularly their weak 
contacts with farmers). The reforms failed for 
two reasons. First, they were based on a linear 
vision of science instead of a systemic view of 
innovation networks, and as a consequence, 
they did not solve the problem of insuffi-
cient interaction between researchers and other 
innovative agents (see Section 2.3). Second, 
the changes were initially implemented at the 
level of the regulating institutions (SAGARPA 
and CONACYT) and not within the research 
institutes. Starting in 2000, the main agri-
cultural research institutions became Public 
Research Centers. This change gave them 
more autonomy in the management of resourc-
es, but did not bring corresponding changes in 
the research methods, the incentives offered to 
researchers, or interactions with other agents in 
the innovation system.
 Change in the research institutions pro-
gressed slowly until 2004, when the threat of 
closing down these institutes and increased 
pressure from SAGARPA accelerated the 
changes. Nevertheless, the transition has been 
slow and progress uneven because of vari-
ability in research budgets, the autonomy of 
universities (which isolates them from external 
pressures), labor laws and budget restrictions 
(which hamper the recruiting of profession-
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als with new skills), unclear new institutional 
mandates, the inertia of a research culture that 
does not favor interaction with other agents of 
the innovation system, deterioration of human 
capital, and the introduction of inadequate 
incentive schemes.5
 The changes in the extension system were 
more drastic than those in the research system. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, extension was con-
sidered to be an important instrument to pro-
mote economic development. However, in the 
1980s and 1990s, following an international 
trend (see Section 2.3), public investment in 
extension was considerably reduced because 
of the apparent lack of impact, together with 
structural adjustment policies. The reasons for 
the distrust of public-sector extension lay in the
significant influence SAGARPA had on the 
extension institutions and in the paradigm 
shift from self-sufficiency in food production 
toward agricultural competitiveness and sus-
tainability (Ekboir et al. 2003).
 Public extension structures were disman-
tled in the 1990s and were replaced by dif-
ferent mechanisms to encourage the develop-
ment of a market for technical services. The 
results, however, were not positive because 
of implementation problems and the struc-
tural limitations of small firms (Ekboir 2004). 
The most important program to develop a 
market for technical services (Program for 
Capacity Building in Rural Areas, known as 
PRODESCA) was implemented as part of the 
Alliance for the Countryside.6 Private firms, 
research or teaching institutions, and NGOs 
could submit to the program a project to pro-
vide technical services in a particular location. 
The project was required to clearly identify the 
types of farmers that would be served and 
the technologies that would be “transferred” to 
the farmers. Once the project was approved, the 
recipient institution would hire professionals to 
do the fieldwork. These professionals, in turn, 
had to contact the farmers and convinced them 
to join the program. Often farmers would join 
not because they were interested in the tech-
nologies offered, but because they expected 
other subsidies to be made available through 
the program (Ekboir 2004). PRODESCA had 
a top-down structure that allowed farmers 
little participation. The difference between 
PRODESCA and the public programs it 
replaced was that the extension agents were 
now hired by an intermediary instead of being 
public employees.
 Parallel to public-sector efforts to rebuild 
agricultural extension, several private mecha-
nisms of varying efficacy emerged. Many 
input suppliers offered their clients technical 
advice. Commercial farmers often contracted 
specialized technical services. Nevertheless, 
small farmers did not have access to these 
markets because of structural limitations 
that characterize this type of firm (Shapira 
1999).
 The experience of the Ranchers’ Groups 
for Validation and Transfer of Technology 
(GGAVATT) is particularly illustrative of the 
emergence of valuable local experiences and 
the problems of scaling them up (Ekboir 2004). 
In the early 1980s, an INIFAP researcher spe-
cialized in cattle crossbred Zebu with Euro-
pean breeds in his father’s field. The neighbors 
were interested in these new animals and soon 
organized a group to discuss technological 
matters.
 Following the experience of the Argentine 
Regional Corsortia for Agricultural Experimen-
tation (CREA) groups, a few INIFAP researchers 
induced the creation of similar groups. INIFAP 
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strongly objected to these actions, claiming that 
they were extension activities and thus beyond 
the institute’s mandate. The researchers respond-
ed by organizing the meetings on Saturdays so 
they would not be accused of using their working 
hours for unauthorized activities.
 Early in the 2000s, the federal authorities 
acknowledged the good performance of the 
few existing GGAVATT and mandated that 
the methodology be used in all publicly sup-
ported extension activities. This strategy led 
to an explosion in the number of GGAVATT. 
But most of the new groups were created by 
the initiative of the technicians hired to orga-
nize the groups and did not respond to the 
farmers’ goals. The result was that only a few 
of the new GGAVATT improved the techno-
logical level of their members.
5.2 Creation of the PFs
Farmer support for agricultural research in Mexico 
has a long history. Although their financial con-
tributions were never significant at a national 
level, they were considerable in some states. For 
example, farmers in the Yaqui Valley, in the state 
of Sonora, have interacted actively with Norman 
Borlaug’s team since the 1950s.7 Following this 
experience, in 1969, Sonora farmers created a 
civil association, Foundation for Agricultural 
Research and Experimentation (PIEA), to sup-
port agricultural research, mainly development 
of high-yielding grain seeds. To date, PIEAs are 
financed by voluntary contributions paid when 
applying for irrigation permits.
 Following this example, in the following 
decades INIFAP pushed for the creation of sim-
ilar associations to support agricultural, cattle, 
and forestry research in other states. In 1995, 
there were 56 PIEAs, though only 31 were 
active (Polanco Jaime 1996), but only a handful 
contributed significant resources to research.
 The great majority of these PIEAs failed 
for two reasons: first, the political climate did 
not allow free expression from civil society 
organizations, and strong interference from 
INIFAP prevented farmers from developing 
any sense of ownership. This sense of alien-
ation did not encourage farmers to contribute. 
Second, because INIFAP had in general little 
interaction with farmers, responding essen-
tially to SAGARPA’s mandates, most farmers 
were not satisfied with the institute’s services.
 There were a few successful exceptions 
(including the PIEAs of Sonora, Sinaloa, and 
Guanajuato). Three reasons can explain their 
success: (1) because many farmers were not 
poor and valued technology, they had the 
means and the will to buy technology, domes-
tically or abroad; (2) commercial farmers in 
irrigated zones were relatively few (which 
facilitated collective action) but were sufficient 
to muster resources for an adequate contribu-
tion; and (3) the irrigation-permit system pro-
vided an efficient fee-collection structure.
 An important experience previous to the PFs 
was the Technological Foundation of Sinaloa, 
created during Francisco Labastida Ochoa’s 
tenure as governor (1984–89) and directed by 
Jorge Kondo López. This Foundation managed 
public resources and funded various technologi-
cal projects. Two examples were the acquisition 
of nozzles to apply ammonia in Guasave and the 
installation of a greenhouse in Culiacán to sup-
ply hotels and gardens with ornamental plants.
 In 1995 Labastida took office as federal 
secretary of agriculture. He appointed Kondo 
director of INIFAP and suggested replicating 
the Sinaloa experience in other states, with 
funding from the Alliance for the Countryside. 
This action had profound consequences for the 
later development of the PFs (see Section 5.3).
 While they were considering the profile of 
the future PFs, Labastida and Kondo visited 
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Fundación Chile. Carlos Arellano Sota, who 
at the time was working for the regional office 
of Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), suggested that a bet-
ter model was the Fundación de Innovación 
Agraria. This Foundation is managed by the 
scientific community with farmer participa-
tion. INIFAP promoted this model in Mexico, 
but the foundations that eventually emerged 
were managed by civil servants and re-
searchers; later management shifted to farmers 
with participation of the scientific community. 
Over the years, the scientists took just an advi-
sory role. These changes in the original model 
were a search and adaptation mechanism used 
by the first actors in the process, and they 
illustrate the flexibility that later characterized 
the development of the foundations. These 
mechanisms eventually became one of the 
foundations’ greatest strengths.
 As stated in Section 5.1, during the 1980s 
the public questioned the isolation of agricul-
tural research institutions. The PFs were seen 
by the authorities as an instrument to trans-
form research from a supply-driven system 
to a demand-driven one. Yet, as explained in 
Section 2.3.6, a demand-driven system does 
not solve the fundamental problem of the 
Mexican innovation system, which is the lack 
of interaction between researchers and other 
innovative agents.
 The other three basic objectives in creat-
ing the foundations were: (1) in line with the 
process of political opening, allow the foun-
dations to have a direct link with the state’s 
farmers and to convey their research needs and 
priorities; (2) increase flexibility in the use 
of research funds, freeing them from public-
sector controls; and (3) increase INIFAP’s 
operating funds. Prior to 1996, INIFAP barely 
had resources to cover salaries and operating 
expenses.
 Throughout 1996, Kondo visited every 
state in Mexico, negotiating the creation of the 
state PF with the governor and local producers. 
Several governors, state secretaries of rural 
development, and producers connected with 
the well-functioning PIEAs objected to the 
idea of a foundation, because it would compete 
with the PIEAs. Among them were Vicente 
Fox, at the time governor of Guanajuato, and 
his secretary of rural and agricultural develop-
ment, Javier Usabiaga Arroyo. After some 
discussions, both endorsed the idea of the PFs 
and supported it vigorously. The Sonora PIEA 
also objected to the creation of the founda-
tion because of its long history and because it 
owned assets, which it feared would be trans-
ferred to the new foundation. It was eventually 
decided that the PIEA would continue operat-
ing but would share part of its resources with 
the PFs.
 The process of negotiation implicitly 
acknowledged that power within the PFs was 
distributed among federal and state agents, 
and, to a lesser extent, private actors. Although 
initially the public sector (especially the state) 
dominated the foundations’ boards, gradually 
the farmers’ power increased (see below). This 
process contrasts with the experiences of other 
competitive funds, both national and interna-
tional, in which structures were imposed and 
the public sector continued to dominate them.
 In February 1996 the first PF was created 
in Sinaloa. The process of creating the foun-
dations continued until 1997, by which time
every state, with the exception of the state of
Mexico, had created a foundation. Until 2009, 
the public funds in the state of Mexico were 
administered by the State Institute for Research 
and Training in Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing (ICAMEX).
 Once the creation of a foundation had been 
decided upon, the governor would invite local 
farmers to join the board of directors. There was 
no one definite criterion for choosing whom 
to invite, but in general the governor invited 
farmers who had gained some recognition as 
technology leaders and, occasionally, also a cer-
tain degree of social or sectoral representation.
Apparently this process repeated the history of
the PIEAs, where the public sector created farmer
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organizations. In fact, in most states the result 
was similar: the foundations remained con-
trolled by the governor or INIFAP.
 But there were two substantial differences 
with the PIEAs. First, whereas the PIEAs were 
financed only by the farmers, most of the PF 
funds were public (state and federal). Second, 
in some states a few farmers asked for more 
independence. It was greatly to the credit of 
federal Secretary of Agriculture Usabiaga and 
a few governors (and a reflection of the new 
social climate that was spreading through the 
country) that they did not abort the process 
when they saw that they were losing control. In 
most states, nonetheless, governors did resist 
ceding control to the farmers.
 From the start, the PFs had to follow rules 
dictated by SAGARPA.8 Initially, these rules 
indicated that at least 50 percent of resources 
should be allocated to INIFAP. The way in 
which these resources were handed over varied 
among states. In some cases, the funds were 
simply transferred, without any control over 
how they would be used. In other states, the 
PFs demanded documentation about the proj-
ects and actions that were to be implemented.
 Many researchers resented having to nego-
tiate their operational funds with the founda-
tions, because they were accustomed to work
without accountability, and they felt they were 
entitled to the resources. One of the argu-
ments used to justify this attitude was that 
the operational rules guaranteed them the 
resources; therefore the PFs had no authority 
over them. In some cases, they considered it to 
be a personal offense when their projects were 
rejected or when they had to document the use 
of the resources they received. This attitude 
reflected a culture common to researchers edu-
cated within the linear vision of science and 
a top-down political system: that as creators 
of knowledge, they were accountable only to 
their peers and to SAGARPA.
5.3 Creation of COFUPRO
In the terminology of complex systems (see 
Section 2.1), the emergence of COFUPRO and 
the PFs’ capacity for change were the result of 
the creation of sufficient variation (32 PFs) and 
an efficient self-organization process (personal 
affinities and a sense of duty) that worked as a 
mechanism for the selection of routines, defin-
ing what was acceptable and what was not. 
The fact that there were many independent but 
strongly linked foundations also functioned as 
a mechanism for the exploration and diffusion 
of organizational routines. Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of this mechanism was reduced, 
because (1) information exchanges were infor-
mal; (2) no methods for systematic search were 
developed; (3) there were no procedures to 
force the individual foundations to adopt best 
practices; and (4) the activities of the PFs were 
poorly structured, so that results depended to 
a great degree on the personalities of those in 
positions of responsibility. The bases of the 
organizational culture of the PFs were also laid 
in this period; some elements of this culture 
still persist, albeit with significant changes.
5.3.1 Differentiation of the PFs
Influenced by internal and external factors, 
the PFs began a process of differentiation and 
self-organization from the very outset. Among 
the external factors, the local political climate 
and the organizational experience of the state’s 
farmers were particularly relevant; the internal 
factors included the personalities of board 
members and the managers’ backgrounds. In 
this initial period, the most innovative founda-
tions developed a Club culture centered on the 
most innovative farmers (see Section 3.2).
 An implicit assumption that influenced the 
creation of the PFs and the selection of the 
governance structure was that, having solved 
their technology problems, leading farmers 
were able to guide and administer research and 
62   CHAPTER 5
8These rules are defined unilaterally by SAGARPA; nevertheless, the process normally includes consultations with COFUPRO.
extension programs. This assumption, how-
ever, did not reflect reality; the farmers who 
took control of the PFs were not trained for the 
tasks they were called on to perform. They were 
all successful businessmen, but management of 
the foundations required training and experi-
ences different from what they had gained in 
their own companies. In particular, the roles of 
the president and the manager had to be clearly 
defined, so that a professional management 
structure could be put in place (see Section 
6.2.1) and an adequate capacity for STI policies 
could be developed (see Section 2.3).
 To deal with this handicap, a few farmers 
soon began to talk informally to one another 
about the administrative methods they had devel-
oped. These farmers had a clear sense of duty 
as well as an independent attitude toward the 
agricultural secretaries (both state and federal) 
and INIFAP. The innovators devoted substantial 
amounts of time to the consolidation of their 
foundations, displacing less committed farmers. 
In this way, they progressively took control of the 
boards. The informal channels of communication 
enabled them to determine their shared inter-
ests and reinforced their commitments. Personal 
affinities and shared visions about their role were 
powerful incentives for these innovators to form 
a power bloc within the set of foundations, while 
the other presidents had no incentives for collec-
tive action. Through a careful management of
institutional processes, they succeeded in con-
vincing other farmers of the benefits of politi-
cal independence and separation from INIFAP. 
They were frequently opposed by other council 
members.
 At first, the board of directors of each PF 
was a diverse group consisting of farmers, a 
representative from INIFAP, the state rural 
development secretary, and SAGARPA’s del-
egate in the state. In Michoacán in 1997, farm-
ers in the board negotiated with the INIFAP 
local director to give up his seat in the board; 
the farmers also negotiated with the other 
public sector representatives that they would 
have a voice but no vote. It was further agreed 
that every research institution would be treated 
equally—in other words, INIFAP’s preferen-
tial status was eliminated. The public-sector 
representatives accepted the changes to isolate 
the foundation from the political difficulties 
that were affecting the state. These changes 
gradually spread to all the PFs, though not 
without some resistance.
 Several PFs set up intrastate regional coun-
cils to facilitate farmer interaction.9 However, 
these councils did not function well for a 
variety of reasons: in some states they were 
closely tied to public servants; in other cases, 
they copied the structure of the PIEAs (in fact, 
in some cases, they were the same group of 
people); some councils were too heterogeneous, 
because they included farmers with differing 
interests (for example, cattle ranchers and avo-
cado growers); and finally, there was no clar-
ity as to how to identify the concerns of local 
farmers. In time, these councils were replaced 
by state product-system councils.10
5.3.2 Creation of COFUPRO
In 1966, Raul Ovando Rodriguez, INIFAP’s 
regional director, linked together a group of 
PF presidents from central Mexico. They dis-
cussed common research needs and decided to 
organize multistate research projects. Ovando 
also recognized the need for these regional 
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projects and supported the farmers by putting 
them in touch with INIFAP researchers, so that 
the latter could suggest solutions to the prob-
lems identified.
 From this experience, the foundations from 
the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, 
Queretaro, Hidalgo, Mexico, and Puebla saw 
the need to create an office to represent all PFs 
in their dealings with SAGARPA and INIFAP.
A meeting of all the foundations to create this
office was soon organized. The growing in-
dependence of the PFs worried INIFAP and 
SAGARPA, who tried to impose their own 
statutes on the new organization and install 
their candidate for president. In the founding 
assembly, the independent presidents success-
fully maneuvered to have the SAGARPA 
initiatives rejected; the proposed statutes were 
not approved, a commission to write alterna-
tive statutes was appointed, and election of the 
president was postponed.
 Six months later a president was selected. 
Two candidates competed for the position: 
Armando Paredes Arroyo Loza (president of the
Queretaro Foundation), representing the in-
dependent farmers, and Armando Carrillo Soza 
(president of the Sinaloa Foundation), INIFAP’s 
candidate. Before the election, Paredes lobbied 
a number of foundations and secured the sup-
port of the majority. A few days before the elec-
tion, Carrillo negotiated abandoning the com-
petition for the presidency in exchange for being
appointed vice president. In the assembly, the
new statutes were approved, the name COFUPRO 
was chosen, and Paredes was confirmed as presi-
dent, with Gonzalo Torres Arellano as secretary. 
Both factions embraced the idea—also strongly 
supported by INIFAP and SAGARPA—of an 
association independent from the federal and 
state governments.
 From the start, COFUPRO had six objec-
tives: (1) contribute to the institutional strength-
ening of the PFs; (2) create a database of avail-
able technologies; (3) foster interfoundation 
communication; (4) negotiate with the federal 
authorities; (5) raise funds; and (6) develop stra-
tegic alliances with other research-financing 
organizations.
 Not all PFs were convinced of the need 
for a coordinating agency and in particular of 
having to contribute to its funding.11 On vari-
ous occasions some PFs failed to make their 
contributions on time. When COFUPRO had 
no money to pay salaries, Paredes covered 
them personally. This level of commitment to 
the COFUPRO project, shared by a few other 
foundation presidents, was a key element in 
the creation of an institutional culture, setting 
standards that subsequent COFUPRO presi-
dents would have to meet (see Sections 6.1.1 
and 6.1.2). The original plan was to locate 
COFUPRO’s office in the PF of its president, 
but it immediately became clear that the co-
ordinating agency needed to be in Mexico City, 
near to the federal authorities.
5.3.3 Interactions and Convergence 
of the PFs
When the PFs were created, there were as 
many administrative models as foundations. 
For example, each PF adopted its own statutes 
and criteria for choosing officials. The result 
was that in several states the rural development 
secretary was elected president of the board. 
COFUPRO lobbied the state governors to con-
vince them that the board presidents should be 
farmers independent of, but with good access 
to, the political authorities.
 Because COFUPRO had no authority over 
the individual PFs, this process meant convinc-
ing the PFs themselves, as well as the state 
authorities, of the benefits of this change. One 
of the most useful mechanisms in this process 
was the organization of various strategic plan-
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ning exercises with the participation of serving 
presidents and their predecessors. In this way, 
a common culture was created, the more in-
dependent PFs put pressure on the others, and 
presidents imposed by governors became allies 
for change.
 Conscious of his lack of experience in the 
administration of agricultural research, Paredes 
sought people with experience in the topic. In 
one of the strategic planning workshops, he 
met Jesús Moncada de la Fuente and hired him 
as COFUPRO’s executive secretary.12 Paredes 
then completed the team with Raúl Ovando as 
technical secretary. This type of behavior was 
one of the pillars of COFUPRO’s institutional 
structure: the recognition of its weaknesses 
and the search for specialists who could help 
to eliminate them.
 Moncada’s and Ovando’s support was 
important, because they were respected by 
authorities and researchers, they had wide expe-
rience in administrating research institutions, 
and they brought a vision of the role of formal 
research in the process of agricultural develop-
ment. These contributions compensated for the 
lack of experience of the farmers in charge of 
COFUPRO’s management and helped to con-
solidate the PFs. Issues related to extension, 
however, did not receive sufficient attention, 
and even today they are one of the weakest 
aspects of PF development (see Sections 2.3.4 
and 6.4). Paredes was supported by the most
active farmers from other foundations, who 
shared the same vision (see Section 5.2).
 A similar convergence process occurred 
among a few managers who helped to establish 
effective mechanisms for resource manage-
ment and project follow up. It is no coinci-
dence that a majority of the managers in this 
group belonged to foundations whose presi-
dents had independent attitudes toward the 
political establishment.
 As the PFs began to consolidate, the high-
est officials from SAGARPA and some states 
began to value the contributions they received 
from their PFs and from COFUPRO. At times, 
SAGARPA and COFUPRO supported one 
another to curb inappropriate expenditures 
incurred by some PFs and to force these PFs 
to accept the implicit rules that the majority 
of the foundations were defining. Another key 
strategic alliance was with the Association of 
Rural Development Secretaries, which helped 
to pressure those states that had not accepted 
the emerging organizational culture.13
 At that time, CONACYT had begun a pro-
cess of decentralizing its operations to several 
regions. To leverage its own funds, COFUPRO 
contacted CONACYT to develop joint activi-
ties. A strategic planning exercise was orga-
nized to coordinate with CONACYT’s regional 
systems, but the collaboration was interrupted 
when CONACYT abandoned the regionaliza-
tion strategy in 2001.
 As COFUPRO’s presidents gained experi-
ence, they were able to identify various weak-
nesses in INIFAP and started to work to 
bring about changes in the institute. In 2000, 
COFUPRO called a meeting of some re-
searchers to prepare a diagnosis of the prob-
lems with INIFAP and the public research 
system. COFUPRO then gave this diagnosis 
to the transition team of the recently elected 
President Fox, which resulted in the naming of 
Moncada as head of INIFAP. It also contrib-
uted to the creation of SNITT, included in the 
new Sustainable Rural Development law. With 
this support, the PFs took on two roles that had 
not figured in the original project: they were 
advisers in the design and implementation of 
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agricultural research and technology policies 
and became a voice for the interests of farmers 
not linked to the political establishment.14
5.3.4 Consolidation of an 
Organizational Model
At first, each PF established its own way of 
relating to researchers and research insti-
tutions. For example, some PF presidents 
considered that they had the right to receive 
free technical advice from the researchers. In 
other cases, the farmers distrusted how the re-
searchers would use the resources they 
received from their PFs. Because INIFAP 
had serious restrictions on its management 
of external funds, initially the foundations 
directly administered the resources assigned 
to research projects. Some foundations also
tried to influence research protocols. Differ-
ences were also observed in the management 
of resources: some foundations had excessive 
administrative expenses, and some governors 
were trying to use PF resources to finance 
development projects or for their own politi-
cal benefit.
 As soon as they had organized themselves 
as an informal group, the more independent 
PFs and COFUPRO began to try to curb the 
excesses of some foundations—in particular, 
they tried to establish a code of conduct that the 
PFs should follow. The code established that 
the PFs should not interfere with the research-
ers’ actions (especially research protocols), 
should not administer projects themselves but 
only finance them, should not hire researchers 
as salaried workers, should identify the farm-
ers’ technical demands, and should establish 
strategic alliances.
 The above principles were not always fol-
lowed. While gaining experience in the man-
agement of their resources, some PFs realized 
that appropriate extension mechanisms did 
not exist, and they started to explore different 
methods to facilitate farmers’ access to techni-
cal information. This exploration shows that 
the foundations were expanding the limits of 
their culture and the operational rules to iden-
tify more effective mechanisms to fulfill their 
mandate.
 The results of these efforts have, never-
theless, been limited by the lack of effective 
mechanisms to evaluate the experiences and 
by insufficient knowledge of new paradigms 
for the organization of research and extension. 
In particular, the farmers’ perception was that 
many technologies already existed but were 
not used, and therefore, the problem was one 
of extension. This perception was based on a 
linear vision of science and technology. From 
an innovation systems perspective, various 
factors can cause some farmers to fail to use a 
technique used by leading farmers: economic 
restrictions (including lack of credit), riski-
ness of the new technology, the inappropriate-
ness of the technique for the possibilities and 
needs of the nonadopters, the inability of non-
adopters to purchase the requisite inputs for 
the techniques, or problems of scale. In sum, 
the lack of adoption is probably not due to 
problems of knowledge about the technology 
but to other factors that the farmers cannot 
control (see Section 2.3.2).
 The consolidation of operational mecha-
nisms exemplifies the importance of explo-
ration, selection, and self-organization. The 
first actions aimed at improving operational 
mechanisms were directed at the process of 
request for proposals (RFP) and the manage-
ment of funds. Armando Paredes contacted the 
Mexican Foundation for Total Quality to help 
with improving the efficiency of COFUPRO 
and individual PFs. Thanks to their advice, the 
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PFs improved various administrative aspects 
but did not develop the capacity to analyze 
research and extension policies and programs. 
This deficit did not allow the PFs to improve 
their control of the projects that they financed. 
COFUPRO also coordinated a group of inno-
vative managers who wrote administrative 
manuals for the PFs.
 The total quality programs were comple-
mented by contributions from the more inno-
vative PFs, which developed various adminis-
trative instruments. The Jalisco PF pioneered 
the development of a computer program for 
project follow up. Sonora developed an online 
system to manage the RFP and to serve as the 
basis for the accounting procedures. Nuevo 
Leon prepared a database to analyze informa-
tion from all PFs. In 1999 Sonora, Michoacán, 
and Nuevo Leon carried out an analysis of 
productive chains. This analysis pioneered a 
prioritization process that was carried out 3 
years later (see Section 5.4.1).
 At first, about one-third of the PFs used 
competitive mechanisms to allocate resources; 
the rest handed them directly to INIFAP. The 
first RFPs took place in 1997 without a unified 
model; each foundation worked independent-
ly, without a clear idea of what they wanted 
to achieve. In an attempt to improve the 
transparency of resource allocation in 1998, 
Sonora and Nuevo Leon used an RFP model 
designed by INIFAP. Eventually, this model 
was adopted by all PFs. When the Michoacán 
PF believed that the total quality programs 
were not solving their problems related to 
research management, they contacted CIAT 
to learn about the log frame.15 Other managers 
contributed their administrative experience to 
organize internal processes; in this way, they 
discovered that some researches had submitted 
projects that had already been carried out. This 
discovery led to the cancellation by several 
PFs of many of INIFAP’s proposals. Kondo 
and SAGARPA’s delegates supported the PFs 
when INIFAP researchers and directors com-
plained about the cancellations.
 Funds were not transferred from SAGARPA 
to the PFs on specific dates (see below). The 
PFs had problems administering resources that 
were not received on a fixed schedule but were 
used to finance activities that had to conform 
to agricultural cycles. Some PFs responded by 
creating reserves to cushion the oscillations.
 COFUPRO collaborated with a number of 
managers to strengthen their capacity to ana-
lyze research policies. ISNAR supported this 
training process.16 These activities also helped 
to build the institutional culture.
 Paredes worked full time for COFUPRO. 
This set a precedent for subsequent presi-
dents, but it also seriously restricted the type 
of farmers who could run for the job (see 
Section 6.1). The original statutes stated 
that COFUPRO’s president had to be the 
president of a PF; subsequently, the statutes 
were modified so that COFUPRO’s president 
could be a former president. This change was 
made to preserve the institutional culture and 
memory by opening a space for people who 
had once been part of the PF, and because it 
was recognized that the position required a 
full-time commitment.
 The institutional culture also mandated that 
the foundations’ presidents should not earn a 
salary. This condition imposed a burden heavi-
er than many presidents were willing to bear. 
HISTORY OF THE PFs AND COFUPRO   67
15CIAT is one of the 15 CGIAR centers and is based in Cali, Colombia. The log frame is a method for analyzing the logical 
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16ISNAR was a CGIAR center. In 2004 it was closed, and some of its work was absorbed by IFPRI.
Some presidents began sending their managers 
to meetings, which complicated decisionmak-
ing. To compel the presidents to participate, 
it was agreed that they could not delegate 
their responsibilities; this problem of excessive 
delegation of authority, however, has not yet 
been solved. Its solution demands a thorough 
revision of the governance mechanisms (see 
Section 6.2).
 In 1998 the obligation to allocate a fixed 
share of the foundations’ resources to INIFAP 
was eliminated from the operating rules. 
Despite this change, other research institutions 
hardly submitted any projects, mainly because 
they thought INIFAP still received preferen-
tial treatment, and also because they lacked 
the skills to prepare project proposals and 
submit them to external sources of funds. The 
PFs organized several training courses on the 
preparation of proposals. Despite the training, 
the quality of the proposals did not increase 
substantially.17 Resource allocation gradually 
changed, to the point that today some PFs do 
not finance any projects from INIFAP. More 
commonly, the participation of INIFAP has 
merely declined (Muñoz 2005).
5.3.5 First Identification 
of Research Demands
Since their inception, the PFs faced the prob-
lem of defining their resource-allocation pri-
orities. In 1996 and 1997, each PF defined its 
own priorities with no common methodology. 
The board members simply met, discussed the 
problems they observed, and decided what to 
prioritize.
 The first formal method that the PFs used 
was developed by CONACYT and was based 
on a restriction-tree methodology and an ex 
ante cost–benefit analysis of potential projects. 
In 1997, a first attempt was made to identify 
research demands using this method. In addi-
tion, regional projects were identified and 
some were financed jointly by COFUPRO’s 
and CONACYT’s regional funds.
 In 1997, COFUPRO authorities partici-
pated in a meeting in Colombia organized 
by Willem Janssen, ISNAR’s research direc-
tor.18 There they discussed the possibility of 
ISNAR’s supporting the PFs. The plan, how-
ever, was never implemented because of a lack 
of resources. Invited by the northwestern PFs, 
in 1999 Janssen participated in a seminar aimed 
at identifying research demands, where he pre-
sented a methodology developed by ISNAR. 
This methodology was based on accepted 
practices for project design and involved the 
organization of forums in which the various 
actors in agricultural chains could diagnose 
their most important problems. For the next 2 
years, the PFs modified this methodology to 
incorporate the product-systems (the method 
they finally implemented is discussed in more 
detail in Section 5.4.1). The modifications 
were developed by the PFs themselves with 
no support from ISNAR, which demonstrates 
their learning capacity.
 The PFs recognized that ISNAR’s method-
ology was better than CONACYT’s, because 
prioritization was based on a broader set of 
criteria than just expected cost–benefit, and it 
created a space where different actors could 
contribute to the definition of priorities. This 
realization had very important consequences,
because it opened an extremely valuable com-
munication channel between farmers and 
researchers, inducing a cultural change in 
some researchers. It also created a communi-
cation channel between producers and authori-
ties. This channel was much appreciated by 
both federal and state authorities (see Sections 
5.3.3 and 6.4).
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5.4 Consolidation of COFUPRO
During the presidential transition of 2000, 
COFUPRO held a strategic planning exer-
cise in which it was decided to propose an 
increase in the percentage of resources that 
the Alliance for the Countryside devoted to 
the PFs (from 2.8 to 7 percent of the total 
budget).19 It was also agreed to increase the 
contribution of the PFs to COFUPRO to 3 
percent of their budgets. Given the struc-
ture of the Alliance, this decision required 
individual negotiations with each governor. 
These negotiations were facilitated by the fact 
that the new secretary of agriculture, Javier 
Usabiaga, had strongly supported the PFs 
during his tenure as Guanajuato’s secretary of 
rural development; he had also been a found-
ing member of the Association of Secretaries 
of Agricultural Development and was highly 
respected among its members.
 Aware of Jesús Moncada’s good work at 
COFUPRO, Usabiaga appointed him director 
of INIFAP; Carlos Arellano Sota, who had 
worked for the FAO regional office in Santiago 
de Chile, was appointed COFUPRO’s execu-
tive secretary.
 Gonzalo Torres Arellano, then COFUPRO’s 
secretary, took over from Armando Paredes as 
president in mid-2001. Gonzalo Torres had 
direct access to Usabiaga and shared his views 
regarding the role of technology in develop-
ment, the factors affecting competitiveness in 
Mexican agriculture, and the desirability of 
the autonomy of the PFs. In fact, they would 
often discuss the situation of the PFs. José
Laborde Cancino had been an important advi-
ser to Usabiaga ever since the latter had been 
secretary in Guanajuato and had also been 
a researcher. As an adviser, Laborde had an 
indirect but important influence on the con-
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the other states.
20These regions covered several states.
solidation of the PFs and also contributed to the 
improvement of the RFP process.
 Both President Fox and Secretary Usabiaga 
valued that the PFs were civil society organiza-
tions, that several PFs had demonstrated their 
capacity to manage financial resources and 
administer projects, and that they would also 
be able to represent politically independent 
farmers in the design of sectoral policy.
 During Gonzalo Torres’s presidency, 
COFUPRO’s structure was consolidated and the
convergence of the PFs toward a shared model 
was accelerated. In addition, progress was 
made in the creation of regional structures and 
the definition of appropriate actions at the local, 
regional, and national levels.20 The process 
was facilitated by Gonzalo Torres’s coordina-
tion and negotiation abilities, the access to the 
secretary of agriculture, and the support of the 
more innovative PFs. Frequently, COFUPRO 
allied itself with SAGARPA delegates in the 
states to pressure the state governors and the 
PFs that were not following the collective 
rules and values. Nevertheless, various prob-
lems persisted, because neither COFUPRO nor 
SAGARPA had the means to force recalcitrant 
PFs to change.
 One of the major problems COFUPRO 
faced at this stage was to normalize its cash 
flow given Mexico’s complex and bureau-
cratic process of tax collection and distribution 
to the states. Taxes in Mexico are collected 
between March and May. The federal treasury 
secretary (also known as “Hacienda”) then 
transfers the resources to SAGARPA, which 
in turn transfers them to a state trust, which 
finally transmits the funds to individual state 
PFs. The funds normally arrive at the PFs 
between August and September, but the date 
varies from year to year. The three bottlenecks 
in this process are the relationship of the state 
rural development secretary with the president 
of the state PF, the willingness of the latter to 
transfer resources to COFUPRO, and the PF’s 
alignment with the principles of COFUPRO.
 The idea that public funds could be man-
aged by foundations independent from govern-
ment control was a great novelty in Mexico. 
The democratization of Mexican society was 
a quite recent phenomenon, and many politi-
cians objected to this change, especially in cer-
tain states. In addition, some governors refused 
to give up their control of the PFs, hoping to 
use the resources at their own discretion. Often 
the differing views of farmers and governors 
on the role of the PFs soured their relationship; 
it sometimes affected the governors’ relation-
ship with COFUPRO as well. In either case, 
the flow of resources stopped, and COFUPRO 
did not receive the contributions.
 In other cases, however, the governors 
appreciated the information generated by the 
PFs and the communication channels they 
opened with farmers. Nevertheless, very few 
states contributed to the PFs beyond the mini-
mum required by the rules of the Alliance 
for the Countryside.21 Gonzalo Torres visited 
all PFs and rural development secretaries to 
persuade them of the need for a consolidated 
COFUPRO. He also established a contingency 
fund to cushion the cash-flow fluctuations, 
thus normalizing COFUPRO’s income.
 Another important achievement during this 
period was the identification of chain and state 
research demands (see Section 5.4.1). In 2002 
and 2003 this methodology was used to iden-
tify and prioritize productive chains at state 
and national levels. The information generated 
was used for all state RFPs, the SAGARPA-
CONACYT sector fund, and in the design of 
many agricultural policies.22
 COFUPRO also consolidated its role in 
reversing the atomization of the PFs, con-
solidating the RFP process, defining regional 
projects, establishing a mechanism to review 
the portfolio of all state projects financed by 
the PFs to avoid duplications, and participating 
in the SAGARPA-CONACYT Sectoral Fund.
 The set of 32 PFs gave states considerable 
representation but did not allow the financing 
of large projects or those of regional impor-
tance. To solve this problem, it was agreed 
that each PF would transfer 15 percent of its
resources to COFUPRO, which would admin-
ister a fund devoted to national or regional
problems. The decision to transfer resources
was discussed between SAGARPA and 
COFUPRO and was imposed on the individu-
al PFs. The decision to ask the individual PFs 
to transfer the resources, as opposed to speci-
fying automatic allocations in the operating 
rules, was made by the secretary of agricul-
ture, who claimed that it would give farmers 
the chance (and the responsibility) to decide. 
The result of this arrangement was that a 
number of PFs delayed their contributions. 
This decision was in line with COFUPRO’s 
culture: all decisions should be consensual, 
even if it meant higher transaction costs.
 In 2003, it was agreed that these resources
should be integrated into the SAGARPA-
CONACYT Sectoral Fund, of which COFUPRO 
became a third partner. COFUPRO’s objective 
in joining the Sectoral Fund was to double the 
resources available to finance research projects 
of national importance. But later CONACYT 
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22In 2000, CONACYT modified the mechanism to allocate research funds with the purpose of incorporating users’ demands. 
Separate agreements with each secretary of the federal government and with each state were signed to create competitive funds 
to finance research in areas of interest to the secretaries or the states. In these funds, CONACYT contributes half of the resources 
and the partner the other half. The topics financed are defined by the partner, and CONACYT administers the resources. The 
funds constituted by the secretaries are called sectoral funds, and those constituted by the states are called Mixed Funds. At pres-
ent there are 28 state Mixed Funds and 1 municipal Mixed Fund. In addition, there are 14 Sectoral Funds.
could only match SAGARPA’s contribution but
not COFUPRO’s.23 CONACYT’s failure to com-
ply with their obligations (from the point of 
view of the PFs) upset some PF presidents, and 
the possibility of withdrawing from the Sectoral 
Fund was discussed; in the end, the PFs decided 
to stay in.
 More than 1,000 proposals were submitted 
in the first Sectoral Fund RFP. This number 
exceeded CONACYT’s capacity to manage 
the evaluation process, and COFUPRO took 
responsibility for reviewing the proposals, 
because it had more experience in evaluating 
large numbers of projects.
 The creation of a COFUPRO-administered 
fund had two important consequences. On the 
one hand, it created a virtual division of labor 
between COFUPRO and the individual PFs, 
as the former became responsible for address-
ing problems of regional and national dimen-
sion. On the other hand, COFUPRO’s power 
increased, because it was no longer only a 
coordinator but also the administrator of a sub-
stantial amount of resources and a privileged 
counterpart of CONACYT and SAGARPA 
in discussions about the agricultural research 
agenda.
 At first, each PF would issue its RFP on 
a different date; there was no exchange of 
information with other PFs regarding the topics 
included in its RFP or which researchers had 
received funds. Neither was there a common 
methodology to select which topics would be 
covered in the RFPs. This atomization of the 
system resulted in great inefficiencies, because 
it allowed researchers to submit the same proj-
ect to more than one PF and forced repeated 
evaluations of some projects. It also allowed 
the same topic to be financed by more than one 
PF. These problems were gradually solved. To 
avoid duplication of projects, it was agreed to 
issue all RFPs on the same date; once each state 
had evaluated its proposals, the 32 PF manag-
ers met to discuss the projects approved by 
each PF. In the case of duplication, they would 
decide which PF would finance the project.
 With the consolidation of the regional proj-
ects, a trend toward specialization emerged: 
COFUPRO financed larger projects of region-
al or national impact, and the individual PFs 
financed local validation of research findings 
and extension. Despite this specialization and 
the convergence of various common processes 
(for example, administrative mechanisms and 
identification of research demands), each PF 
preserved its independence in deciding which 
projects it would finance. Thus the 32 PFs as 
a group became an exploration mechanism. 
COFUPRO’s and the foundations’ weakness 
was that they did not create effective mecha-
nisms to assess their individual experiences 
and to share the lessons learned. Each PF had 
informal knowledge of the experiences of the 
others, but there were no procedures to system-
atically evaluate these experiences.
 Starting in 1999, the Alliance for the 
Countryside was financed by a World Bank 
loan. The latter imposed a degree of condi-
tionality that reduced the effectiveness of the 
PFs. The most important restriction was that 
individual grants could not exceed US$50,000. 
It soon became apparent that this amount was 
too small to finance relevant projects.24 When 
the loan expired, representatives from the sec-
retary of the treasury objected to any increase 
in the limit. The creation of the regional funds 
allowed elimination of that ceiling for projects 
of regional or national importance.
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Mixed Funds indicate that the partners contribute equal parts. SAGARPA and COFUPRO understood that COFUPRO was 
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COFUPRO was a third—but not equal—partner; thus its participation did not increase CONACYT’s commitment. In the 
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24In general, in agricultural research US$50,000 barely suffices for a few experiments.
 Another problem the PFs had to deal with
was that resources were allocated annually, 
preventing the financing of multiyear proj-
ects. Researchers were forced to divide their 
projects into annual subprojects, which were 
evaluated separately. To overcome this prob-
lem, some PFs decided to give preferential 
treatment to subsequent submissions of sub-
projects. Integration into the Sectoral Fund 
permitted the elimination of these two restric-
tions for projects of national scope, although 
they continued to constrain state projects.
 The budget law that finances the Alliance 
for the Countryside requires that the latter be 
evaluated annually. Starting with the 2001 
evaluation, SAGARPA contracted FAO’s 
regional office in Santiago de Chile, which in 
turn subcontracted to local consultants. This 
review was the first quantitative and qualita-
tive evaluation of the research and technol-
ogy transfer subprogram. FAO has carried 
out these evaluations to date. These evalua-
tions helped COFUPRO identify problems that 
needed immediate attention, for example, lack 
of alignment between identified demands and 
projects submitted by researchers and the need 
to systematize all project information.
 The federal and state authorities began to 
realize the advantages of having independent 
PFs, particularly after the exercise that identi-
fied research demands. The authorities espe-
cially valued the information that COFUPRO 
and some of the PFs provided, as well as the 
channels of communication with farmers they 
opened. But this opinion was not shared by all 
officials in the federal and state governments. In 
2001 COFUPRO and SAGARPA started con-
versations on having the former support exten-
sion activities, but the project did not prosper 
because of the lack of interest in the SAGARPA 
offices in charge of the area. However, in some 
states, especially Michoacán, various innovative 
projects were developed and financed jointly 
by the state PF and PRODESCA, the federal 
program that finances the development of pro-
fessional service markets.
5.4.1 Second Identification 
of Research Demands
One of the actions with the highest impact 
implemented by COFUPRO was the prioritiza-
tion of agrifood chains and the identification of 
research demands during 2002 and 2003. The 
impacts resulted from (1) the opening of mul-
tiple channels of communication among farm-
ers, researchers, and politicians; (2) the use that 
SAGARPA, the states, and CONACYT made 
of the information generated; and (3) the use 
these actors still make of the updates of the 
original information. The methodological prin-
ciples for the identification were developed by 
ISNAR and modified by COFUPRO and a few 
managers, who prepared the training materials, 
trained the facilitators, and managed the whole 
exercise. Besides the information generated, an 
important by-product of the exercise was the 
training of 48 professionals in the method for 
identification of research priorities.
 The methodology is based on the organi-
zation of forums for each chain considered 
important in the state. The process involves 
three stages. In the first stage, farmers, trad-
ers, technical consultants, and researchers 
meet to describe the chain and the processes 
by which the agricultural products reach the 
final consumers, and they agree on a tenta-
tive identification of problems. In the second 
stage, the participants are separated into three 
groups to discuss their vision of the problems 
(farmers and other commercial actors in one 
group, technical consultants in another, and 
researchers in the third). In the final stage, all 
participants get together again to discuss the 
results of the group meetings. All meetings 
have a moderator who helps the groups to 
generate adequate information. Finally, a con-
sultant uses the conclusions of the forums plus 
secondary information to write a report on the 
chain’s research demands.
 The quality of the information generated 
depends on the careful selection of the con-
sultant and forum participants. In addition, 
farmers and other private-sector actors are often 
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reluctant to participate actively and dedicate the 
necessary time to adequately characterize their 
problems. The researchers are more accustomed 
to this type of activity and find it easier to par-
ticipate in forums that last for more than one 
morning. To accommodate these differences, 
COFUPRO cut the farmers’ forums to approxi-
mately 4 hours, whereas the researchers’ forums 
last for 2 days.
 A serious problem with this methodology 
is that only chains that are already important 
can be analyzed and prioritized. Development 
and competitiveness are often based on the 
introduction of new products and markets, but 
this methodology cannot analyze products and 
chains that do not exist yet. For this reason, it 
is necessary to complement the methodology 
with another one aimed at encouraging the 
emergence of new products with strong market 
potential.
 The identification and prioritization of pro-
ductive chains was complemented with the 
promotion by SAGARPA of state system-
product councils (in which only primary pro-
ducers participate) and of national and state 
productive-chain councils (in which represen-
tatives of all links of the chain participate). 
The system-product councils became a new 
channel of communication between PFs and 
farmers, and a growing number of PFs are 
incorporating their presidents into their boards. 
It is not clear, however, just how representative 
the system-product councils are.
 Toward the end of 2004, discussions began 
on the need for updating the information on 
research demands, and the conclusion was 
reached that repeating the 2003 exercise would 
be too expensive. As an alternative, “techno-
logical innovation units” specific for each of 
the most important chains were created. A 
small number of specialists, including farmers 
and researchers, participate in these units with 
the objective of collecting information on tech-
nological and market trends for their chains 
and identifying research topics. However, as 
the definition of priorities is now based on the 
opinions of fewer individuals, these are less 
representative of the opinions of all actors in 
the chain. The PFs currently consider that most 
of these units have not been successful, but no 
alternatives have been explored yet.
 Even though the PFs and SAGARPA 
classify these exercises as identification of 
demands, they are in fact processes in which 
suppliers and demanders interact to identify 
opportunities and needs. Without a centralized 
mechanism for updating demand informa-
tion, several foundations developed their own 
methodologies, which can change as often as 
every year. These mechanisms, however, suf-
fer from various drawbacks, the most obvious 
being the cost of the exercise and the instabil-
ity it brings to research programs because of 
frequent changes in priorities.
5.5 The Present Stage
In November 2004, Carlos Baranzini took over 
as president of COFUPRO, and Raul Romo 
occupied the post of executive secretary, which 
became vacant when Carlos Arellano was 
appointed executive secretary of SNITT.
 The present administration has continued 
two of the previous administration’s main poli-
cies: consolidation of the structure and internal 
procedures, on the one hand, and on the other, 
strengthening COFUPRO’s presence in the 
Mexican innovation system in general and its 
agricultural system in particular.
 One of the most important changes in 
COFUPRO’s operation was the creation in 
Mexico City of a management team composed 
of a few experienced PF managers. The creation 
of this team formalized Carlos Arellano’s reli-
ance on these managers during his term of office. 
Although this team strengthened COFUPRO, it 
weakened some of the PFs, which could not 
replace them easily. This difficulty reflects a 
dichotomy in the organization of the PFs as 
a whole: although each manager’s contract 
depends exclusively on the decision of the PF’s 
president, the manager is operationally subject 
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to the regulations defined by COFUPRO and 
the whole set of managers. COFUPRO gives 
informal advice on hiring a manager when a 
president asks for it, but the final decision on 
hiring and firing a manager is the president’s 
sole responsibility (see Section 6.2).
 COFUPRO’s management team is help-
ing the weaker PFs to professionalize their 
presidents and managers, in particular training 
managers in topics related to the administra-
tion of the PFs. Just as in the past, the training 
transfers the institutional culture to the new 
managers and foments the emergence of an 
esprit de corps.
 Seeking to strengthen the capacity of the 
PFs as a group to analyze specific themes and
to improve regional and national activities, 
managers were grouped into eight stable groups, 
each one examining common problems (for 
example, data processing, identification of best 
practice, and the design of RFPs). In addition, 
all managers meet every 2 months to discuss 
operational themes. This frequent interaction 
also helps to create a culture of cooperation 
among the managers. In 2004, the PFs put into 
place a common information system.
 Procedural rules for the presidents have also 
been consolidated. Several presidents used to 
delegate most of their work, because they could 
not leave their own businesses unattended; now 
COFUPRO is working with those presidents to 
get them more involved in their PFs. In addition, 
to reduce learning time, it is being suggested 
that new presidents be elected among board 
members, so that they are familiar with the 
functioning of the PF before they take office. 
This mechanism would also help to give conti-
nuity to the organizational culture. Until 1985, 
COFUPRO had only one vice president; reflect-
ing the greater diversity of tasks COFUPRO 
has been undertaking, now there are three vice 
presidents: one for agriculture, one for fishing 
and livestock, and one for the research system. 
Finally, COFUPRO’s board was strengthened 
by establishing clear rules for the nomination of 
its 19 members (see Section 6.2).
 Other areas where improvements are in 
progress are upgrading the communication 
infrastructure, and an online system developed 
by COFUPRO to manage the project cycles 
(that is, the RFPs, project selection, signing 
of contracts, disbursement, and follow up of 
implementation). This system was adopted by 
all PFs except the one in Sinaloa, which devel-
oped its own system.
 COFUPRO is also moving forward with 
the standardization of processes and statutes 
to eliminate repetitions and redundancies. This 
process has entailed a gradual transfer of 
power from the individual PFs to COFUPRO. 
Although this process was resisted by some 
PFs, the majority of them gradually came to 
recognize the advantages of uniformity of oper-
ational routines. In 2005, 16 PFs were refusing 
to adopt the common procedures; this number 
fell to zero in 2008.
 The philosophy and the operation of state 
RFPs changed substantially in 2005. The 2003 
exercises to prioritize agricultural chains and 
research topics allowed the PFs to identify 
problems that required immediate attention. 
However, the researchers generally interpreted 
RFPs in a lax manner, so that they could con-
tinue with their own lines of work. The result 
was that the PFs often did not get answers to 
the problems they prioritized. Additionally, the 
PFs believed that the competitive mechanism 
concentrated the resources on a few research 
teams and that the quality of the research was 
not increasing. Similar problems have been 
identified in other countries (see Section 2.3.7). 
Instead of the traditional competition, the state 
RFPs for 2006 identified specific projects of 
significance to the farmers. The PFs then invit-
ed various research institutions to explain what 
strengths they have to investigate one or more 
of the projects identified. Institutions that had 
not been invited were also welcome to submit 
their own projects on the topics included in 
the RFP. Based on this information, the PFs 
selected those institutions most capable in each 
area and asked them to prepare a research proj-
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ect. Also contemplated was the possibility of 
asking one or more of the prescreened institu-
tions to make a joint proposal. These changes 
represent a shift from traditional competitive 
funding to competitive bidding of research 
contracts. It was expected that the new process 
would allow a better alignment of research 
with the farmers’ needs. The experience, how-
ever, has not been totally satisfactory. The main
lessons from the different mechanisms is that 
the various procedures for the RFP (1) did not
improve communication between the farmers
and researchers and (2) did not help to 
strengthen research capabilities. They failed 
to strengthen research capabilities because 
they did not finance long-term projects, invest-
ments in research infrastructure, or the hiring 
of young researchers.
 In years past, COFUPRO has also con-
solidated its participation in the Sectoral Fund 
and decisively influenced the definition of the 
subjects to be included in RFPs and in other 
operational aspects (see Section 6.4).
 Some PFs have developed a capacity to 
rapidly incorporate new ideas. For example, 
in 2003 the Michoacán PF was introduced to 
the concept of innovation networks—the idea 
that farmers innovate by interacting with peers, 
researchers, and other agents in stable social 
networks. The foundation promptly financed 
a project to map the innovation networks in
which state lemon growers operated and to 
use these informal structures to facilitate the 
exchange of technical and managerial informa-
tion. The Sonora PF used a different approach 
to support innovation networks: it organized 
meetings between some system-product farm-
ers and researchers to discuss their research 
programs in depth. In this way, a more direct 
and long-lasting communication channel 
between farmers and researchers was estab-
lished. When the product-systems were well 
organized, the exercise resulted in a strength-
ening of the innovation networks.
 Another example of the capacity to incor-
porate organizational innovations is the proce-
dures to oversee research projects. The 2004 
FAO evaluation pointed out that the PFs only
controlled research expenses but not the quality 
of research or of the final reports. The follow-
ing year some foundations relaxed the admin-
istrative controls and established mechanisms 
to control the research results. Additionally, 
the PFs oversee the projects they fund not only 
through written reports, but they also routinely 
visit the experiments and talk to the famers 
involved.
 In years past, COFUPRO has consoli-
dated its presence in the Mexican agriculture. 
Approximately 4,500 people participate in 
assemblies and other institutional activities. 
COFUPRO also developed a strong relation-
ship with the National Conference of Gover-
nors and with the state secretaries of rural 
development. Various rural associations with
ties to political parties have applied for 
COFUPRO membership in recent years, but 
PF officials objected, because they do not 
want COFUPRO to be politicized. However, 
some of these groups do participate in the 
boards of a few PFs.
 Even though each PF and COFUPRO have 
relatively modest administrative structures, 
they are, as a whole, an important organization 
with approximately 200 employees distributed 
in quasi-independent units (the individual PFs). 
Despite their size, the PFs have not become a 
bureaucratic organization, thanks to the same 
factors that have shaped their evolution and 
impact throughout their history: a decentral-
ized structure and an institutional culture that 
values effective action (see Sections 6.1 and 
6.2), as well as the influence of some individu-
als. This division into independent units does, 
however, bring with it the duplication of cer-
tain activities and consequent higher costs (for 
example, each PF has an independent account-
ing system).
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CHAPTER 6
Institutional Assessment of the PFs
6.1 Institutional Culture
As explained in Section 3.2, an organizational 
culture is a set of basic assumptions strongly 
rooted in the organization’s early life (Schein 
1984, 1991). Several studies of organizational 
culture have indicated that the leaders of an 
organization induce the adoption of solutions 
to overcome threats and sources of anxiety, 
take advantage of opportunities, and tackle 
operational conditions that the organization 
faces at its outset. These solutions (in par-
ticular those that worked well) create a con-
sensus about how things should be done. The 
repeated use of the same solutions gradually 
transforms the principles hidden in them into 
implicit assumptions about how things are; 
these assumptions then become accepted as 
safe guides to behavior until they eventually 
become unconscious rules of action (Schein 
1991; Leonard-Barton 1995) or consolidated 
routines (Nelson and Winter 1982). These 
behavioral rules permeate the life of the 
organization and affect several aspects of its 
The PFs as a group have been a unique organization, because they have been able to re-define their values, processes, and instruments as they learned to manage public funds for research and extension. This experience has been all the more extraordinary because the 
PFs have been able to sustain organizational innovation over an extended period of time. Studies 
of private firms have found that most organizations eventually lose their creativity and seldom 
regain it (see Section 3.1). This chapter analyzes three factors that have been the bases of PF 
innovativeness: their institutional culture, the governance structure, and the learning mechanisms 
they created.
behavior, especially its learning modes, the 
way it relates to its environment, and its gov-
ernance structure.
 In addition to its formal structure, pro-
cedures, operational rules, and shared goals, 
COFUPRO has created an organizational cul-
ture that is rooted in the codes, signs, symbols, 
and images that make up the collective vision 
of the rural sector. Among these, particu-
larly relevant are the higher status of the PF 
presidents, the initial idea that the PFs were 
dependent on the public sector, and the linear 
vision of science (in particular, the superiority 
of researchers’ knowledge and the vision of
technologies as pure technical processes, in-
dependent of economic and social influences). 
This vision of the role of science is particularly 
interesting, because innovative farmers did not 
realize that most of the technical information 
they used did not originate in the Mexican 
public research institutions.
 The codes, signs, symbols, and images 
evolved with the PFs and were replaced by 
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other images, particularly the ineffectiveness 
of public research institutions. These codes, 
signs, symbols, and images were the elements 
that shaped the essential assumptions that 
became the organizational culture. This cul-
ture is a fundamental element of the sense of 
a common identity among the PFs, inspiring 
commitment to the set of PFs and its members, 
as well as a shared vision that clarifies what is 
happening and what is desirable for the PFs as 
a whole. The sense of belonging and a shared 
vision were achieved through the interactive 
processes of communication and learning. This 
section focuses on the culture rather than on 
the codes, signs, symbols, and images, because 
it synthesizes the influences of the subjacent 
four categories.
6.1.1 Basic Assumptions 
of COFUPRO’s Culture
The major factor behind the creation of the 
PFs was the perception that developed in 
Mexican society in the 1980s and 1990s that 
public agricultural research lacked relevance 
(see Section 5.1). A substantial transformation 
of the research system from a supply-driven 
process to one driven by demand was seen as 
the solution to this problem, on the assumption 
that successful farmers, having solved their 
own technological problems, had the required 
knowledge to supervise programs to finance 
research and extension. This assumption con-
tributed to the adoption as a fundamental 
principle that the members of the foundations’ 
boards should be successful farmers. In other 
words, it was taken as a fact that it was the 
farmers who possessed the really important 
knowledge.
 Another significant component of the cul-
ture of the PFs arose from the strong interfer-
ence of the state governors in the early days of 
their existence. In every state, the PFs began 
as organizations subordinate to the state’s 
political authority. In these circumstances, the 
lobbying capacity and the personal friendships 
of PF leaders were characteristics essential to 
the foundations’ survival and fulfillment of 
functions entrusted to them. Leaders become 
extremely important when institutions are 
weak, and policies can change suddenly. This 
principle seems to have been recognized by PF 
members, and it was made clear by all the inter-
viewees, who mentioned that being a recog-
nized farmer with good access to the governor 
was an essential requirement for a president.
 These presidential traits are similar to those 
defined as a charismatic authority in a Club or 
Zeus culture (see Section 3.2.3). In this culture 
the authority of the leader comes from his 
or her proximity to the center of power, and 
the leader’s selection is not based on techni-
cal capacity. This selection criterion tends to 
reproduce itself at all levels and permeates 
power relations in the organization. Thus the 
power of the individual depends on his or her 
personal relations with the highest level of 
management or with external authorities.
 The perception of the sources of leadership 
changed when the PFs gained independence. 
Acting out of conviction and exercising their 
own collective power, the independent presi-
dents brought about reforms in the governing 
constitutions of all PFs. The success of the 
proposal to create a coordinator of all PFs 
politically independent from, but close to, the
federal government led to this political in-
dependence becoming a key value in the over-
all institutional culture. This value was strongly 
reinforced in 2000 when COFUPRO, against 
the prevailing political wisdom and contrary 
to the will of some PF presidents, decided not 
to support the ruling party’s candidate for the 
presidency of the republic. The argument was 
that support for the official candidate would 
reduce the credibility of the PFs and leave 
them in a weak position if their candidate lost. 
This decision was soon proved right and con-
firmed the value of political independence in 
the culture of the PFs.
 The bases of COFUPRO’s organizational 
culture were laid down by the concerted 
efforts of two groups of actors: the indepen-
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dent presidents, especially Armando Paredes, 
COFUPRO’s first president, and a group of 
innovative managers, supported by Jesús 
Moncada, COFUPRO’s first executive secre-
tary. They set standards for succeeding presi-
dents and managers. For example, Paredes 
dedicated himself full time to the consolidation 
of COFUPRO. The main strategy was the cre-
ation of consensuses; with this in mind, several 
strategic planning exercises were organized 
(see Section 5.2), and the importance of nego-
tiations among equals was firmly established. 
Another element of the organizational culture 
was the creation, by this nucleus of innovating 
presidents acting with SAGARPA’s support, 
of values, rules, and routines to govern how 
the foundations’ authorities should behave 
internally and when interacting with the state 
and federal governments.
 At the same time, several managers rec-
ognized that they shared the same work ethic 
and began to collaborate informally to intro-
duce novel forms of management for their 
foundations. Thus the managers’ convergence 
movement coalesced in a culture that valued 
knowledge, technical training, efficiency, ded-
ication to work, and a managerial mindset that 
emphasizes independence as well as deference 
to the PF president (see Section 6.2).
 Currently the organizational structure of the 
PFs and COFUPRO corresponds to an organic 
model in which committees, interfunctional 
teams, and work groups are integrated into a 
structure flexible enough to adapt quickly to 
changing environmental demands (see Section 
6.2). These characteristics typify a Task or 
Athena culture (see Section 3.2.3).
6.1.2 Cultural Duality: Existing 
Cultures and Their Carriers
COFUPRO and the PFs developed a dual cul-
ture, where a Task or Athena culture is domi-
nated by a charismatic figure corresponding to 
a Club culture (see Section 3.2.3). These two 
cultures belong to and are transmitted by dif-
ferent groups in the organization.
 A Task (Athena) culture is the carrier of 
technical knowledge. In this culture such val-
ues as horizontal work relations are cultivated, 
and members act out of conviction. Individual 
power in the group of managers is based on 
skill, work capacity, and the ability to argue a 
case. This culture was created and is transmit-
ted by the operational team, that is, the manag-
ers of the PFs and COFUPRO’s executive and 
technical secretaries. It is the culture that most 
contributes to organizational learning.
 A Club (Zeus) culture has at its heart a 
charismatic leader. As described above, in 
organizations where this culture predominates, 
who one knows—one’s closeness to influential 
people—is generally more important than what 
one knows—technical knowledge and abilities. 
Many organizations are born as Club cultures 
around the personalities of their founders but 
evolve into other cultures as they face the orga-
nization’s emergent necessities. This seems to 
be the path being followed by COFUPRO and 
many of the PFs. The Club culture is the carrier 
of leadership, the organization’s legitimacy, 
and its external positioning. It was created and 
is transmitted essentially by the presidents of 
the PFs and COFUPRO. Its contribution to 
organizational learning depends on the legiti-
macy of the leaders in the eyes of the managers 
and employees.
 Often, members of tasks forces need and 
accept a leader emerging from a Club culture. 
Currently in the PFs the leader’s authority 
comes from the formal structure, but for the 
leader to permanently authenticate his or her 
power in the organization, he or she must 
demonstrate character, ideas, initiative, and a 
capacity for action. If this does not happen, the 
leader’s fundamental claim to authority (that is, 
proximity to political power) is severely under-
mined. It is very important to understand that 
his or her role is to lead and not to administrate. 
The leader is a key player for the organization’s 
success and needs to be an evident member 
of the leadership group and be aware that his 
or her own leadership always depends on the 
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consent of this group. This challenge is one that 
COFUPRO and PF presidents currently face.
6.1.3 Consolidation of Institutional 
Culture and Loss of Innovativeness
By the end of COFUPRO’s first presidency, 
the set of basic assumptions at the heart of its 
organizational culture had been created. The 
next two presidencies strengthened this culture 
in a process of continuity.
 The greatest challenges the second presi-
dency faced were to consolidate COFUPRO’s 
structure, ensure that the PFs converged on a 
shared organizational model, and convince the 
PFs to make their contributions to COFUPRO 
(see Section 5.4). The third presidency contin-
ued the process of internal structuring of the 
PFs and COFUPRO, emphasizing support for 
the less-consolidated PFs, professionalization 
of the PF management cadres, intensification 
of interactions with external actors, and con-
solidation of COFUPRO’s role in the national 
and agricultural innovation systems.
 The process of consolidating the decentral-
ized structure was managed by approaching 
each PF individually. This dynamic was a 
response both to COFUPRO’s lack of formal 
power over the PFs and to the culture of nego-
tiation between equals developed in the first 
presidency. Because of this horizontal, decen-
tralized organization, COFUPRO’s president 
and executive secretary have to invest a great 
deal of time in lobbying the presidents and 
managers of the PFs. The inefficiency of 
this process is evident in various ways: (1) 
in the past achieving an objective sometimes 
depended on SAGARPA’s support, (2) there 
is currently a need to hold multiple meetings 
between COFUPRO and the PFs, and (3) basic 
coordination problems are sometimes impos-
sible to solve. In parallel and for different 
reasons, some managers concentrated on the 
management of their PFs and dedicated little 
attention to the collective action and explora-
tion of new modalities so essential to the first 
interactions among managers.
 Apparently the PFs as a group have 
achieved a stage of maturity at which their 
capacity for new collective actions and the 
creativity of the organizations are reaching a 
limit. This is a phenomenon that all successful 
organizations go through: to the extent that 
they consolidate their structures, their capacity 
to innovate weakens (Bailey and Ford 2003; 
Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006). In the case 
of the PFs, the loss of creativity is because the 
administrative processes, especially the RFP 
cycle and project administration, have already 
attained a high degree of efficiency, so there 
are few gains to be made in improving these 
activities. The other area in which the PFs have 
had a big impact was in the prioritization of 
chains, but this exercise was too costly to be 
repeated regularly. The most important effects 
of this process resulted from better positioning 
of the PFs in the agricultural innovation sys-
tem, the organizational learning process, and 
the establishment of channels of communica-
tion among different actors. It will be difficult 
for similar actions to have such significant 
effects.
 A few PFs still maintain a high degree 
of creativity in the search for new extension 
mechanisms and the promotion of innovation. 
But these are isolated efforts, and there are no 
mechanisms that facilitate an effective sharing 
of successful experiences. As was mentioned 
above, the institutionalized training and shar-
ing of experiences is restricted to operative 
issues: there is no common space for reflection 
on the merits of the different experiments to 
foster innovation. This deficiency stems from 
the evolution of the PFs, which have tradition-
ally focused on administrative issues and not 
on the innovative capabilities some founda-
tions were developing. No group has as yet 
appeared to push the PFs to a new collective 
creative cycle.
 The coexistence of the two cultures (the 
presidential and the managerial) hinders the 
consolidation of operational capabilities and 
the diffusion of best practices, because the 
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absolute dependence of managers on the PF 
presidents causes instability, inhibits commit-
ment to the PFs as a whole (especially if a PF 
president is not integrated into the culture of 
the presidents), and renders more difficult the 
professionalization of technical personnel.
 The legitimacy of each PF is based par-
tially on its president’s interaction with public 
officials. Thus a PF’s independence partly 
depends on the governor’s willingness to allow 
its autonomy. This dependency was a disincen-
tive in the search for other sources of legitima-
cy based on, for example, other administrators 
of science in the state or research institutions 
outside the agricultural sector.
6.2 Governance of COFUPRO 
and the PFs
The concept of governance refers to the institu-
tional and behavioral mechanisms that define 
the interactions among leaders and other actors 
in the organization (Pérez 2003). The analysis 
of governance focuses on a key set of actors, 
usually a small hierarchical group close to the 
leader. Governance systems are composed of 
three elements: structures, processes, and stra-
tegic axes (see Section 3.3).
 To progress with their own consolidation, 
the PFs need both formal mechanisms and a 
leadership that can foster a process of con-
tinuous learning that draws strength from past 
experiences while giving the organization the 
tools to cope with the dynamics of a changing 
environment. For the PFs, a strengthening of 
governance functions will bring greater orga-
nizational maturity (see Section 6.3).
 The PFs and COFUPRO see themselves 
as farmers’ representatives; however, it is a 
nontraditional representation in the sense that 
the farmers on the boards have not been elected 
by a constituency, but rather they have been 
invited by the board to join. This practice is 
common for many boards. At the same time, 
the foundations are recognized as legitimate 
representatives by SAGARPA, state govern-
ments, and research institutes. In other words, 
the legitimacy of the PFs is bestowed by the 
public sector and certain private actors rather 
than by election by farmers. The public sector’s 
recognition is based on the perception that the 
PFs are in a position to contribute their in-
dependent perspectives to the design and imple-
mentation of agricultural policies. In addition, 
the institutional culture of the PFs presupposes 
that they are autonomous from the public sector 
and that their main motivation is the interests of 
the farmers they represent. As discussed below, 
the definition of these interests has never been 
explicit, which has led some stakeholders to 
criticize the behavior of the PFs.
6.2.1 Governance of the PFs
The creation of the PFs was intended to create 
a structure that would (1) represent farmers;
(2) ensure an equitable distribution of resources
based on a diversity of demands; (3) follow 
SAGARPA’s rules; (4) be flexible enough to 
make decisions based on the social environ-
ment’s demands; and (5) integrate independent 
but interdependent activities, seeking integra-
tion through mutual accommodation (PF and 
COFUPRO 2001).
 Following the categories described in 
Section 3.3.1, the organizational structure of 
the foundations and COFUPRO has evolved 
from mutual adjustment in the early period 
when rules were ill defined to a more rigid 
structure based on standardization of work 
processes and rules. Today’s structure follows 
an organic model in which committees, work 
groups, and interfunctional teams are integrat-
ed. Each of these arrangements is minimally 
structured and is flexible enough to respond to 
emerging demands. Nonetheless, with nearly 
200 employees, the set of PFs makes up an 
organization of considerable size. This design 
has great advantages, but it requires that those 
in charge of the various governance func-
tions have skills in negotiation, harmonization, 
strategic thinking, leadership, and recognition 
from the community.
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 Another characteristic of the foundations’ 
and COFUPRO’s present organizational struc-
ture is that they have taken a leading role in 
networks that integrate various agents from 
the innovation system, including public ser-
vants, research institutions, and private actors 
(Figure 6.1).
 Figure 6.2 represents the current organiza-
tional structure of a PF. Each PF’s government 
functions are the responsibility of the assembly 
of associates, which is made up of farmers and 
recognized agribusiness people. The assembly 
elects its new members and designates the 
board. There is no uniformity among the PFs 
regarding the criteria for deciding who is to be 
invited to join the board. The boards’ first mem-
bers did not represent any organization in par-
ticular. Although farmers participated on behalf 
of themselves, the civil servants represented 
their organizations. At present the PFs are invit-
ing the presidents of the system-product state 
councils to participate on the boards; in some 
foundations, representatives of rural unions also 
participate. Although these practices raise the 
diversity of farmers on the board, it is not clear 
to what extent the state councils are representa-
tive of farmers’ interests.
 Since the creation of the PFs, the stat-
utes have stipulated that government functions 
should be honorary (that is, unpaid), whereas 
operational jobs were to be remunerated. That 
government functions are purely voluntary
means that they typically attract only business-
people with significant resources and a rela-
tively small time commitment to their own 
enterprises (such as retired individuals). With 
the inclusion of representatives of other farmer 
organizations on the boards, however, mem-
bers increasingly have to devote time to their 
firms and all the other organizations they 
participate in. This leaves them with relatively 
little time for the PF boards and makes it dif-
ficult to uphold the cultural ideal of PF presi-
dents and board members being dedicated to 
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Figure 6.1   Example of a network centered on a Produce Foundation
Source: Based on interviews and documentation from COFUPRO (2001).
Note: CGIAR, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research; SAGARPA, Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, 
Rural Development, Fisheries, and Food; SEDAGRO, Secretary of Rural Development and Agriculture.
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Figure 6.2   Organizational structure of a Produce Foundation
Source: Consejo Estatal de Ciencia y Tecnología de Puebla and Fundación Produce Puebla (2004).
their foundations and of the division of labor 
between president and manager.
 That the presidents are always wealthy 
farmers does not imply that they have an elitist 
perspective: the fieldwork for this study made 
it clear that many presidents have a strong 
sense of duty and commitment to agriculture 
and poverty alleviation. In other cases, though, 
the president failed to dedicate to the PF the 
time it needed and delegated running the orga-
nization to the manager. The problem with 
delegation is that the structure and culture of 
the PFs indicate that the responsibility lies with 
the president: it is he or she who is respon-
sible for the PF’s assets, and the president is 
expected to exercise authority. A PF manager 
does not have the same hierarchical rank as the 
president, and a communication gap is created 
with other foundations and with the state and 
federal representatives when the manager is 
delegated too much responsibility.
 The presidential term of office was estab-
lished as 2 or 3 years with the possibility of one 
re-election. This rule is common to nearly all 
PFs. In general, boards meet at least six times 
per year.
 The diversity of foundations resulted in 
different types of power structures, because 
there are various formulas for negotiation and 
cooperation between farmers and the state 
public sector. Despite the diversity, there was 
never a balance of power between the two 
big blocks of actors in the foundation boards: 
the public-sector representatives (INIFAP, 
SAGARPA, and the state government) and 
the farmers. Formally the role of most public-
sector representatives is to see that operational 
rules are not violated. Transfer of power took 
place in all PFs but at differing paces and with 
varying intensities that reflect the capacity of 
some PFs and COFUPRO to generate policy 
proposals and administer public funds. The 
transition entailed changes in the sources of 
power (see Section 3.3.2). Initially the power 
of public representatives originated in their 
positions (legitimate power), whereas that of 
the innovative farmers was based on the identi-
fication of useful traits (referential power) and 
sometimes skills (expert power). Among the 
managers, power originated in skills; over the 
years, though, it mutated partially to legitimate 
power (defined by their position in the PFs as a 
whole). Skills are still recognized as an impor-
tant trait.
 The relationship between governors and 
those presidents who have little power can be 
characterized as Club culture, in which author-
ity is legitimized by the leader’s personal traits 
and by the devotion and emotions awakened 
among his or her followers. In some states, 
loyalty is also linked to the command of 
public-sector resources, especially the capacity 
for distributing favors or creating problems. In 
these structures, the administrative apparatus 
is made up of the most loyal disciples and sub-
ordinates, and choices are made based on the 
leader’s confidence in these subordinates.
 The PFs that achieved more independence 
from the public sector developed faster, fulfill 
their missions more effectively, and more 
assiduously explore new ways to promote 
innovation. These characteristics are due to 
a greater capacity for institutional innova-
tion, based on the presence of more innova-
tive individuals, a greater commitment by the 
farmers to the board, and more professional 
management. In those PFs that did not become 
politically independent, resource allocation 
is mainly dictated by the state governor or 
INIFAP’s state director.
 The more developed PFs share the follow-
ing characteristics: (1) an administration that is 
autonomous yet close to the public sector; (2) 
organized, active farmers who insist that their 
demands be met; (3) a socially responsible pres-
ident committed to the foundation’s mission; (4) 
a president who thinks strategically and is eager 
to explore; (5) a president elected by the farm-
ers; and (6) a professional management com-
mitted to improving operational procedures.
 There is, in general, little clarity regarding 
some functions of the president and the man-
ager. Because they are the highest executive 
authorities, some presidents have managed their 
PFs with the same logic they used to run their 
own companies. For example, they have taken 
upon themselves the definition of the strategic 
lines of work, allowing the board of directors 
little participation, or they have appointed man-
agers on the basis of loyalty rather than profes-
sional capacity. Sometimes these practices have 
led to abrupt changes in the operation of the PF 
after a change of authorities.
 The interviewees for this study generally 
agreed that the president need not know about 
STI policy. The presidents’ and managers’ 
lack of training in these areas, together with 
the fact that most managers are specialized 
in operational topics, weakens the capacity of 
the PFs to explore different means of fostering 
innovation. But this area is precisely where the 
PFs could make their greatest contributions. 
Traditionally the capacity for innovation in 
these areas was concentrated in COFUPRO 
and a small number of PFs. The independence 
of the individual foundations complicates the 
diffusion of best practices (see Section 6.3).
 In addition, some presidents confuse the 
role of the PF manager with that of a private 
company. A PF manager is supposed to be 
responsible for the fulfillment of technical 
agreements with other foundations (generally
overseen by COFUPRO). The manager is 
also supposed to be well versed in the field 
of agriculture and able to communicate with 
researchers and the administrators of research 
institutions. As mentioned before, though, 
in some cases managers are selected not for 
their technical ability but for their loyalty to 
the president. It is not unknown for incoming 
presidents to replace managers so as to be sure 
of their loyalty, even though the replaced man-
ager may be professionally competent.
 The managers’ strong dependence on their 
presidents puts them in a weak position vis-
à-vis the bureaucratic hierarchy of the public 
sector. It is highly unlikely that a manager 
would be able to directly call a rural develop-
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ment secretary or the state’s SAGARPA del-
egate. That role belongs to the president, even 
when the business at hand is technical and falls 
within the manager’s area of expertise.
 The lack of definition of the manager’s 
function in terms of technical skills has led to 
a situation whereby in some PFs the president 
is directly involved in operations, but in oth-
ers the running of the foundation has been left 
entirely to the manager. The almost exclusive 
dependence of managers on presidents is a hin-
drance to the diffusion of agreed practices, the 
exploration of new methods of interaction with 
researchers, and the trial of new administrative 
routines.
 The functions of presidents and managers 
are in general highly unstructured. This is part-
ly due to the capacity for self-examination (see 
Section 5.3) that has led some foundations to 
explore new methods for fomenting innovation 
and partly to the strongly president-centered 
culture (see Section 6.1). It is difficult to struc-
ture tasks that are not well understood and that 
change rapidly or essentially depend on loy-
alty rather than technical skill. The literature 
on personnel rotation has shown that changes 
affect company performance when (1) outgo-
ing staff are exceptionally effective and (2) 
the organizations or positions they leave have 
weak structures or restrictions (Coriat 2000). 
Some PFs fall into this category, as was dem-
onstrated by the difficulty in replacing some 
managers. At the same time, a tighter structur-
ing of the PFs could reduce their capacity for 
innovation, given that it requires more adher-
ence to proven routines and less exploration of 
alternatives (see Section 2.1). The challenge 
faced by each PF and by COFUPRO is how to 
strengthen structures while leaving space for 
creativity.
6.2.2 COFUPRO’s Structure
Like the foundations, COFUPRO has estab-
lished a network of formal and informal, 
direct and indirect relations with a wide spec-
trum of institutions and actors (Figure 6.3). 
COFUPRO’s highest body is the assembly, 
made up of the presidents of the 32 PFs and 
representatives of SAGARPA, CONACYT, 
and INIFAP; the board of directors is formed 
by 10 presidents who are chosen by the assem-
bly and proposed by COFUPRO’s president.
 The government function lies with the 
president, the vice presidents, and the executive 
secretary. Around these positions the farmer, 
academic, research, and SAGARPA commit-
tees are positioned. The president is expected 
to play various roles: know what is going on 
in the foundations, take charge of political 
relations, legitimize COFUPRO’s position, 
and project his or her expert and referential 
opinion. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the farmers are not always adequately trained 
to fulfill all these functions (see Sections 5.5 
and 6.1).
 COFUPRO’s presidents are elected by the 
presidents of the PFs. As often happens in this 
type of association, there is intense lobbying 
before the elections. COFUPRO presidents hold 
office for 3 years and can be re-elected once. 
The presidential transition lasts for 5 months.
 COFUPRO’s presidential candidates must 
be presidents or ex-presidents of a PF. This 
requirement is a way of training the new presi-
dent and guaranteeing continuity of the organi-
zational culture. The implicit requirements are 
that a president should have a sense of duty, 
not be seeking personal gain, be a successful 
farmer, and be well connected with the politi-
cal establishment (in other words, the candi-
date should have referential power; see Section 
3.3.2). These last two conditions confirm and 
legitimize the president’s prestige.
 As for the president, the institutional culture 
indicates that the executive secretary should be 
respected by the PF presidents and managers, 
academics, and SAGARPA for being a good 
executive and should support the development 
of research, extension, and innovation pro-
grams and policy proposals.
84   CHAPTER 6
INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PFs   85
COFUPRO
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Public Research Centers
Public universities
Private technological
universities
State technical schools
FIRA, FOCIR
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Sources of domestic
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Policymakers 
Figure 6.3   The COFUPRO network
Source: Based on interviews and COFUPRO (2001).
Note: CATIE, Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center; CGIAR, Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research; COFUPRO, National Coordinator for the Produce Foundations; CONACYT, National Council for 
Science and Technology; CORPOICA, Colombian Corporation for Agricultural Research; EMBRAPA, Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; FIRA, Agriculture-Related Trusts 
of the Central Bank of Mexico; FMDR, Mexican Foundation for Rural Development; FOCIR, Trust for the Capitalization 
and Investment of the Rural Sector; IICA, Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture; SAGARPA, Secretary 
of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries, and Food; SEDAGRO, Secretary of Rural Development and 
Agriculture.
 Although in the past the scientific paradigm 
was provided by a single individual, today a 
solid, stable team is needed. COFUPRO and 
some of the PFs have recognized the limita-
tions of the linear view of science (see Section 
2.3) and are exploring new mechanisms to pro-
mote innovation in agriculture. But even at the 
international level there are still no universally 
accepted programs to find such mechanisms. 
Furthermore, given the complexities of innova-
tion processes, recipes cannot just be mechani-
cally imported without adapting them to the 
specific conditions of the target group. The 
development and follow up of these options 
can only be undertaken by trained professionals 
who coordinate their exploration with the PFs.
 In the present circumstances, the most 
important requirements for COFUPRO’s execu-
tive secretary are to be a good negotiator and be 
able to help the managers arrive at a consensus. 
Moreover, his or her good character and repu-
tation as an expert bring recognition from the 
PFs as a whole. In this situation, it is important 
to explicitly discuss the job requirements for the 
position of executive secretary, especially the 
notion that he or she should lead the collective 
thinking toward a new view of science and how 
to interact with decisionmakers (especially in 
SAGARPA and the states). It is also necessary 
to discuss the distribution of power between 
COFUPRO and the PFs, as discussed below.
6.2.3 Relationship between 
COFUPRO and the PFs
The relationship between COFUPRO and the 
PFs is one of both permanent struggle and col-
laboration. Though COFUPRO has no formal 
power over the individual foundations, in the 
past access to SAGARPA gave COFUPRO 
considerable leverage. If a PF did not follow 
the rules, the SAGARPA delegate in the state 
could halt the disbursement of funds or talk to 
the state governor. This informal mechanism is 
not efficient, because it depends on individuals 
rather than institutions, it can disappear at any 
moment, and it does not contribute to the cre-
ation of a sense of belonging to the set of PFs.
 At the same time, the decentralized structure 
has two important advantages: (1) the PFs have 
a significant local presence that lets them be an 
effective channel of communication between 
farmers and the states and (2) it is a decentral-
ized structure for exploration. The problems are 
(1) heavy dependence on the governor; (2) lack 
of an efficient mechanism to systematize and 
learn from the experiences of the PFs, which 
lowers the value of exploration; (3) a system 
that is too atomized and therefore inefficient; 
and (4) high operating and transaction costs.
 With few exceptions, the qualifications of 
the managers and presidents of the individual 
PFs and the resources they command do not 
enable each of them to develop a fruitful vision 
of the role of research in supporting innovation 
and to effectively explore new instruments 
to foster innovation. This task should be the 
responsibility of a central organization, with 
specialized professionals and good connec-
tions with the individual PFs and with foreign 
and domestic research organizations.
 The managers of the 32 PFs have orga-
nized themselves into eight stable work groups 
coordinated by COFUPRO. Each team is made 
up of four managers and prepares proposals on 
specific topics related to COFUPRO’s various 
work areas. The teams meet prior to the nation-
al managers’ meeting to prepare their propos-
als; the team leader is responsible for present-
ing these proposals for discussion and garner-
ing a consensus so they can be implemented 
at all PFs. National managers’ meetings take 
place every 2 months.
 When a PF explored new research or exten-
sion programs, operating rules were at times 
somewhat restrictive. In such cases, as long as 
the PF could justify the program, SAGARPA 
was flexible regarding unfulfilled rules. But 
these mechanisms worked only on an informal 
basis and were lost in 2006 when a new federal 
administration took office. It would be con-
venient to explicitly incorporate the possible 
exploration of new operational mechanisms 
into the operating rules.
6.3 Characterizing the 
Learning Mechanisms of the 
PFs and COFUPRO
Learning is a process of repetition and experi-
mentation that enables better and faster execu-
tion of tasks as well as the identification of 
new opportunities. An organization’s learning 
capacity is a function of both individual factors 
(the creativity of individuals in the organiza-
tion, for instance) and collective factors (the 
capacity to change and the organizational cul-
ture). Organizational capabilities must be built 
up gradually: they cannot be easily bought or 
copied (see Section 3.1).
 The PFs as a whole and COFUPRO each 
have specific but interdependent spheres of 
action. The PFs were created to operate in the 
states, whereas COFUPRO is charged with 
coordinating the actions of the set of PFs and 
operating at the national level. The interdepen-
dence creates a close relationship in terms of 
learning: COFUPRO’s learning depends not 
only on its own activities but also on what 
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the individual PFs learn. The following analy-
sis concentrates principally on COFUPRO’s 
sphere of action.
6.3.1 Objectives, Sources, 
and Localization of Learning
COFUPRO is an organization oriented toward 
facilitating the foundations’ learning, sup-
porting SAGARPA and state governments 
with original data, and facilitating interactions 
among various actors in the agricultural sec-
tor with the objective of strengthening their 
innovative capabilities. COFUPRO’s spheres 
of activity are the analysis of scientific and 
technology policy together with the linkage 
between farmers and research institutions at 
the national level. Given this profile, there are 
four major learning objectives:
•  identifying the information needs of pro-
ducers;
•  identifying existing research capacity and 
researcher behaviors;
•  identifying how relations among sector 
agents (the academic community, includ-
ing institutions, researchers, and research 
groups; farmers; and government) influ-
ence the learning capacities of actors; and
•  improving and homogenizing organiza-
tional aspects of the PFs as a group, includ-
ing operations, relations between the PFs 
and COFUPRO, and decisionmaking.
 These objectives are dynamic: they are con-
tinually adapted for various reasons, particular-
ly the actions themselves of COFUPRO and the 
PFs. In this sense, to the extent that COFUPRO 
and the PFs learn about and act on a problem, 
they change the nature of the problems they 
will face next time. To keep this process active, 
COFUPRO and the PFs not only have to learn 
in one particular moment but they also have to 
develop their dynamic learning capacity.
 Responding to these objectives, COFUPRO 
has combined internal and external learning 
and knowledge sources. The main internal 
sources were the operational and training expe-
riences of the PFs themselves. Several external 
sources stand out: ISNAR, Chile’s Fundación 
de Innovación Agraria, FAO’s evaluations, and 
the experiences of other domestic and foreign 
organizations. At first, the external sources 
contributed important elements to the collective 
learning, but as the processes became institu-
tionalized, the internal sources became more 
relevant. Training of the presidents and manag-
ers was particularly important. The process was 
essentially Mexican, in the sense that the PFs 
learned how to identify their knowledge needs 
and how to look for and adapt external informa-
tion. Foreign agents (for example, multilateral 
organizations or international research centers) 
only influenced the process indirectly by pro-
viding important pieces of information.
 COFUPRO’s main learning activities are
•  identifying the research needs of farmers 
and agrifood chains,
•  organizing RFPs,
•  administering projects,
•  interacting with foundations, and
•  interacting with other agents (academia, 
government, farmers) in the agricultural 
innovation system.
The relative importance of these activities 
changed over time. At first, the most important 
activities were the RFPs and project administra-
tion. Between 2000 and 2003, identification of 
research needs was crucial, but its demands on 
human and financial resources were consider-
able. Today’s key activities are the interactions 
among foundations and with external agents.
6.3.2 Learning Mechanisms
Although six learning mechanisms were iden-
tified in the fieldwork, two stand out as having 
been crucial: identification of farmer needs and 
the RFPs. But there is a key weakness that also 
stands out: the PFs document few of their own 
INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PFs   87
processes and activities, especially those not 
concerned with formal meetings.
Identification of demands. Because in 
this report COFUPRO’s terminology has been 
adopted, these activities are called demand-
identification methodologies. But, in fact, they 
were mechanisms to link different actors in the 
innovation system. From the first meetings to 
the present day, four different methods have 
been used.
 The first attempts to identify demands in 
1996–97 were very informal, which is why 
they do not constitute a method as such (see 
Section 5.3.5). The members of various boards 
talked among themselves and identified prob-
lems they considered to be relevant. Between 
1997 and 2001, by means of the regional 
research systems, an alliance was established 
with CONACYT. The CONACYT methodol-
ogy was based on a cost–benefit analysis of the 
different demands identified. The most impor-
tant lesson learned was the inadequacy of this 
second method.
 Most of the lessons learned came from 
the third method, which was an adaptation 
of a methodology developed by ISNAR and 
improved in an exercise implemented in 2002 
and 2003 (see Section 5.4.1). This method is 
essentially based on the organization of forums 
with different actors from the innovation sys-
tem. In other words, the technology “supply” 
and “demand” are put together to identify that 
research with the highest possible potential. 
The exercise resulted in the identification of 
the most important chains at the state and 
national levels as well as the definition of 
research priorities.
 This mechanism required a great effort in 
terms of time and money, so it was decided 
not to use it to update the priorities. Instead, 
the fourth method was implemented: inno-
vation units were established for the main 
chains. A small number of recognized actors 
from each chain participate in these units to 
monitor worldwide scientific and technologi-
cal developments for the purpose of identify-
ing emergent problems. The latest assessment 
is that these units have failed, because they 
have not developed close links with agents in 
the chains; in other words, they are traditional 
expert opinions.
 These different demand-identification 
methods used over the years reflect a change 
in the vision of science from a supply-driven 
model to one that is demand-driven. None-
theless, this separation between supply and 
demand still reflects a linear vision of science 
and does not solve the essential problem of 
the lack of interaction between researchers 
and other actors in the innovation system (see 
Section 2.3).
 Beyond the identified priorities them-
selves, most of the lessons learned through the 
exercise were only identified by an evaluation 
of the PFs conducted in 2004 (Ekboir 2004). 
In other words, most of the lessons were tacit 
knowledge that the PFs were not aware they 
had. An obvious lesson from the 2004 evalu-
ation is that the 2002–03 exercise was useful 
but too expensive. This result leaves the PFs 
without a clear methodology for defining pri-
orities and without the capabilities to develop 
a new one. Another lesson identified by the 
consultancy was that the exercise was more 
important for opening channels of communi-
cation among agents in the innovation system 
than for the priorities themselves. The reason 
is that the priorities have been ephemeral and 
difficult to update, whereas the communication 
channels have induced important and lasting 
behavioral changes in several agents, the PFs 
included (see Section 6.4).
Evolution of the RFP. An RFP is an open 
invitation issued by a funding agency to some 
actors to submit project proposals. The RFPs 
evolved as COFUPRO and the PFs became 
more independent of public research institu-
tions and attained a better understanding of 
research and extension processes. During the 
first 2 years of their existence, barely one-third 
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of the PFs used RFPs to allocate funds. The 
topics were generally very broad and therefore 
allowed researchers to continue with their 
own lines of research, regardless of farm-
ers’ needs. After the demand-identification 
exercise, RFP themes became more focused. 
Nonetheless the PFs continued to find that 
many researchers were unwilling to address 
the farmers’ needs and tried to continue with 
their traditional research lines.
 In 1997 and 1998, with the support of 
CONACYT’s regional funds, the PFs of 
Nayarit, Jalisco, Michoacán, and Colima began 
to explore the possibility of undertaking joint 
projects. This process was repeated in Sonora 
and four other northern states. These exercises 
led to the implementation of regional projects. 
In 2000 these were extended to all the states. 
This activity was a key forerunner for the cre-
ation of the regional projects coordinated by 
COFUPRO (see Section 5.5).
 During this period much effort was dedicat-
ed to analyzing the pertinence of the proposals, 
but the analysis of scientific quality was weak. 
There were also problems with the analysis of 
extension projects and project control, because 
only spending (and not research quality) was 
controlled directly by the PFs (Ekboir 2004). 
Starting in 2005, some PFs began to accept the 
research institution’s control over expenditures 
and focused their efforts on quality control of 
the final reports. Although this stress on the 
quality of results is an important improvement, 
there is still a need to incorporate incentives for 
researchers to interact more productively with 
farmers.
 As the regional projects were consolidated, 
the idea that it was necessary to institutional-
ize a division of labor between the PFs and 
COFUPRO started to gain strength. It was there-
fore decided that COFUPRO would finance 
projects of regional or national importance, 
while the PFs would restrict themselves to fund-
ing local validation and extension projects.
 Over the years an RFP cycle has been 
developed, which is documented in the proce-
dure manuals of the PFs: (1) identification of 
research and extension needs; (2) fine tuning of 
terms of reference; (3) diffusion of the RFPs; 
(4) analysis of concept notes; (5) requests for 
complete project proposals; (6) analysis by the 
technical committee; (7) requests for technical 
and financial revisions; (8) communication of 
results; (9) signing of agreement; (10) trans-
fer of resources; and (11) project follow up 
(annual in situ visits and bi-annual reports).
 Once the deficiencies of the RFPs were 
recognized, an important change was intro-
duced in 2006: the RFPs were issued only for 
clearly defined projects, emphasizing controls 
on execution times and expected results (see 
Section 5.5). Emphasis was also placed on sup-
porting interinstitutional projects.
 The lessons learned from administering 
these RFPs were used in the SAGARPA-
CONACYT Sectoral Fund (see Section 5.4).
Although the participation of COFUPRO in
the work group (made up of COFUPRO, 
CONACYT, SAGARPA, and SNITT) and 
in the Sectoral Fund committee has enabled 
an improvement in the fund’s work, it is still 
organized on the basis of a mechanistic view 
of the research, extension, and innovation 
processes.
 Despite the great effort to identify research 
needs, the FAO evaluations found little con-
gruence between needs and projects funded. 
The recommendation was that efforts should 
be made to eliminate this discrepancy (Muñoz 
2005). Complexity theories offer an alternative 
explanation of this divergence, suggesting that 
the discrepancy could be due to the difficulties 
of correctly identifying the main and emerging 
trends that drive the dynamics of the process 
(see the subsection “Defining Strategies in 
Complex Systems” in Section 2.1.2). Instead, 
then, of forcing researchers to follow the pri-
orities, the discrepancies can be viewed as a 
way of exploring possibilities and thus making 
the RFPs more flexible.
 The administration of the RFPs has now 
reached a high level of maturity, and there 
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is no need to continue investing significant 
amounts of resources in its improvement. 
Instead, it is necessary to strengthen the capac-
ity for the exploration of new alternatives of 
interaction with research institutions and to 
define new mechanisms for extension and sup-
port for innovation.
 Although the PFs have made a considerable 
effort to improve the execution of research proj-
ects, less progress has been made with extension 
projects. It is generally agreed that traditional 
extension methods are not very effective (see 
Section 2.3.4), but the PFs have not found mech-
anisms to improve the effectiveness of these 
projects. However, some PFs have, on an indi-
vidual basis, experimented with new extension 
methods. It is necessary to create mechanisms 
to facilitate the interchange of experiences and 
training in new extension approaches.
Meetings and visits among PFs. 
COFUPRO and the PFs have developed 
mechanisms to identify and socialize best 
practices. Examples are managers’ meetings, 
visits between foundations, and coordination 
of state and regional projects. Throughout the 
existence of the PFs, meetings have been a 
major learning mechanism. In the early years, 
planning and mission-identification exercises 
included both new PF presidents and their 
predecessors. These were a potent way of 
socializing knowledge and developing a com-
mon work methodology (see Section 5.3). At 
the same time, through meetings and training 
sessions organized by COFUPRO, some man-
agers with similar interests got in contact. This 
group played an important part in the institu-
tionalization process observed in recent years. 
Periodic national meetings were also essential 
to the process of learning about the structuring 
of RFPs and socializing that knowledge.
 Another mechanism that has enabled the 
socialization of knowledge is the participa-
tion of ex-presidents on the boards. This par-
ticipation enriches the meetings and helps to 
perpetuate knowledge acquired by previous 
directors.
 From the beginning, exchange visits have 
been a mechanism for learning, socialization 
of practice, and generation of a common cul-
ture (see Section 5.3.4). There are two prob-
lems with this practice: (1) the interchange of 
experiences is restricted to only those founda-
tions that are willing to learn and (2) it is not 
a systematic mechanism for the exploration of 
best practices.
Training. The first training exercises in-
volved the presidents, but in recent years 
training has been concentrated almost exclu-
sively on the PF managers and on operational 
matters. This emphasis has left a significant 
vacuum in the capabilities of the PFs, because 
there has been no development of a systemic 
capacity to analyze methods to promote agri-
cultural innovation.1
 COFUPRO has strongly emphasized the 
training of managers with various different 
courses. It is not clear, however, to what extent 
there has been adequate definition of what 
type of training is needed by the management 
team. Some interviewees indicated that there 
was less need for high-level general manage-
ment courses than for a more specialized 
training tailored to the specifics of research, 
extension, and the promotion of agricultural 
innovation, including the development of the 
ability to interact with researchers and farm-
ers. Moreover, managers have not been trained 
in recent advances in research, extension, and 
innovation management.
 The use of training as an instrument of 
change was also apparent in interactions with 
researchers. Various courses were offered to 
them, including several on research proposal 
preparation and the log frame. The log frame is 
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1A few exceptional PF presidents and managers have developed some incipient capabilities in this subject.
a methodology to prepare projects based on a 
clear definition of ends, means, results, and con-
ditions to fulfill for project completion, as well as 
potential problems (see footnote 15 on page 67). 
To date, some 2,000 researchers have partici-
pated in these courses. The log frame facilitates 
project evaluation, identification of potential 
products, and management improvements. 
Although this method has been developed for 
clearly defined projects, some research institu-
tions and donors have used it for research proj-
ects. The log frame has not been formally evalu-
ated, but the literature on innovation systems 
indicates that it is too structured to foster more 
than minimally incremental innovation (Davila, 
Epstein, and Shelton 2006). Beyond the advan-
tages for the PFs of a standardized presentation, 
however, it is not clear what benefit the log 
frame brings to science administration, because 
it reflects a mechanistic view of the research 
process (Ekboir 2003). Moreover, no system-
atic efforts were made to enable researchers 
to incorporate new mechanisms for interaction 
with other actors in the innovation system.
Hiring or interacting with key indi-
viduals. From the start, hiring or interacting 
with key individuals has been one of the most 
important learning mechanisms for the PFs, 
contributing to the development of the capac-
ity to identify and assimilate new ideas and 
practices. A case that illustrates this learning 
mechanism was the hiring of Jesús Moncada 
as COFUPRO’s first executive secretary. He 
brought with him knowledge of the agricultur-
al sector as well as domestic and international 
contacts. This practice has been repeated in 
several PFs that have appointed ex-researchers 
or INIFAP managers to managerial posts. 
These professionals brought knowledge not 
only of the sector and its agents, but also of 
practices that have succeeded or failed in other 
organizations. Interaction with international 
consultants, as in the case of William Janssen, 
helped in learning international best practices.
 It should be stressed, however, that the util-
ity of interacting with outside experts depends 
on the internal capacity to assimilate their 
knowledge (see Section 3.1). This capacity has 
to be built gradually into the structures to pre-
vent its loss with personnel changes, which is 
why training managers (who generally outstay 
their presidents) and constructing spaces for 
collective thought are so important.
Experiences of other organizations and 
informal networks. Since their inception, 
the PFs have sought interactions with domestic 
and foreign organizations able to contribute 
their experiences. Kondo and Labastida made 
their first international visit to the Chilean 
Fundación de Innovación Agraria (see Section 
5.2). Visits to similar organizations in other 
countries followed.
 Some of the farmers in the PFs are active 
members of other associations, which expose 
them to other organizational models. This 
exposure has helped the PFs incorporate new 
practices: for example, Gonzalo Torres par-
ticipated in the pig farmers union, where each 
member paid a fixed per capita quota. This 
experience helped him convince the PFs to 
contribute to COFUPRO. Marta Xochitl Flores 
Estrada contributed her experience as manager 
of an ejido; Armando Paredes, his business 
experience; and Carlos Baranzini had as much 
experience with business as he had with farm 
management.2
 The PF managers also contributed the 
experience they gained in other organizations. 
For example, Francisco Maldonado, former 
Michoacán manager, had banking experience, 
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2The ejidos are a kind of collective farm where the land is collectively owned by all ejido members, but each member manages 
his or her own plot independently. Until 1992, ejidos could not sell or rent their land. A constitutional amendment in that year 
allowed for the privatization of the ejidos.
which helped him diagnose the lack of clear 
procedures and prescribe remedies. Mauricio 
Mora from Puebla had research experience. 
Raúl Romo contributed his knowledge of sec-
toral policy in a state where agriculture was 
booming.3 These examples clearly show that 
an organization’s learning capacity depends 
on its people and an environment that allows 
experimentation and change. Typically when 
policies and programs are designed, great 
efforts are devoted to analyze the organiza-
tional structures, but it is usually overlooked 
that without capable people and incentives for 
risk taking, failure is almost certain.
 Another source of knowledge about simi-
lar organizations has been the participation in 
the SAGARPA-CONACYT Sectoral Fund. 
This participation has had various effects: (1) 
by allowing access to the experiences of other 
Sectoral Funds, external learning was com-
bined with in-house practical experience; (2) 
COFUPRO knowledge was transferred to other 
sectors; and (3) COFUPRO raised its profile 
outside the agricultural sector (see Section 5.5). 
COFUPRO is a member of the fund’s work-
group and committee (the fund’s highest admin-
istrative organs) and is responsible for framing 
the terms of reference for the RFPs. To do this, 
it uses its data on research demands.
 COFUPRO has participated actively 
in the Sectoral Fund, a fact recognized by 
CONACYT. COFUPRO has fulfilled its com-
mitment in terms of resource contributions, 
proposed improvements, and promoted effi-
cient and opportune functioning. COFUPRO 
had learned that to avoid duplications in project 
financing, it was essential to cross-reference 
the RFP databases of all PFs. The Sectoral 
Fund adopted this practice, cross-referencing 
the databases for the PFs, the SAGARPA-
CONACYT Sectoral Fund, and the basic sci-
ence Sectoral Fund.
 The improved use of information allowed a 
detailed analysis of which resources were sup-
porting what, a better focus of the Sectoral Fund, 
and a clear justification for the themes included 
and excluded from the RFPs. Nevertheless, the 
Sectoral Fund’s RFPs have not evolved in the 
same way as those of the PFs and still reflect a 
mechanistic view of research.
 COFUPRO also learned from the Sectoral 
Fund. For example, researchers used to indi-
cate to which institution they belonged. Now 
they must present an institutional endorsement 
when submitting the project, so that the institu-
tion and the researcher are jointly responsible 
for producing the results.
 Another area of learning was project follow 
up. The Sectoral Fund still faces problems sim-
ilar to those observed in the RFPs of the PFs: 
while the projects are being executed, controls 
are merely bureaucratic; there is no follow-up 
once projects are finished; and the information 
generated is not widely disseminated. Finally, 
the FAO evaluations were an important source 
of learning (see Section 5.5), but their contri-
bution to the institutional learning has weak-
ened as the methodology has failed to evolve 
and look for new areas of improvement.
6.3.3 Levels of Learning
Different levels and intensities of learning were 
observed. At the individual level, learning was 
initially focused on the PF presidents, followed 
by the managers. At the collective level, learn-
ing occurred in groups of managers. There was 
also learning at the organizational level, which, 
though not lacking some intensity, does face 
some obstacles. This learning is reflected in the 
more effective procedures adopted by the PFs 
as a whole for selecting projects, administer-
ing funds, and defining priorities. Learning is 
hampered, however, by strict rules of opera-
tion, inflexible supervision by SAGARPA, and 
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3For reasons of space, we have omitted mentioning many people who made important contributions to the foundations. Those 
mentioned are not the only ones who deserve recognition—they simply exemplify the importance of individuals in the insti-
tutional consolidation process.
lax governance mechanisms. Incipient learning 
processes at the innovation network level have 
been recently observed in some PFs.
 One of the most serious problems for orga-
nizational learning is that the knowledge is 
located in individuals or groups (see Sections 
3.1.2 and 6.2). Factors that limit organizational 
learning are as follows:
•  The PFs have institutionalized certain 
methods and practices, but there is no stan-
dard procedures manual.
•  There are varying degrees of adoption of 
good practices, as some PFs resist their 
adoption. COFUPRO operates by consen-
sus: it has no formal mechanisms to pressure 
the foundations to fulfill agreements and 
adopt what it considers to be good practices.
There are no rewards for those that do co-
operate, nor is it documented how success is 
associated with good practices.
•  Some boards are renewed gradually where-
as others change suddenly. The change-
over process does not in general allow 
preservation of the knowledge generated 
by the outgoing members.
•  How to disseminate information is a lesson 
that has not been learned.
•  There is little documentation of the learn-
ing process.
6.3.4 Capabilities Built
The PFs were able to build various capabili-
ties that helped them improve the resource-
allocation processes they administer. The big-
gest problem they face now is that, to continue 
improving, they need to develop new compe-
tencies. The capabilities already developed are 
described in this section.
Capacity to identify, assimilate, and
improve new concepts and practices.
The PFs and COFUPRO have often sought 
new concepts and practices, as exemplified 
by the identification of research demands and 
changes to the RFPs. Some individual founda-
tions have experimented with new extension 
mechanisms. The problem the PFs face now is 
that in several relevant areas they have reached 
the international frontiers of knowledge, and 
as a group they lack centralized evaluation 
mechanisms, which limits the diffusion of suc-
cessful experiences.
Capacity to influence research institu-
tions. The PFs and COFUPRO are develop-
ing ways to influence the transformation of 
research institutions through participation in 
their councils, the definition of research pri-
orities, and interactions with the researchers 
themselves. These interactions are helping the 
research institutions to be more sensitive to the 
needs of farmers (see Section 6.4). To develop 
such methods, COFUPRO has had to deepen 
its understanding of the nature of research and 
the new trends in science administration.
Capacity to learn how to learn. 
COFUPRO and several PFs are developing 
the ability to learn how to learn. They identify 
what they do not know and what they need 
to learn, search for help, and invest human 
and financial resources in learning. A clear 
example is the evolution in the methodology 
used to identify research needs (see Sections 
5.3.5, 5.4.1, and 5.5). Nevertheless, learning is 
to a great extent still only present at the level 
of the individuals (especially the managers), 
and there are barriers to its socialization (for 
example, lack of suitable routines or manage-
ment styles) that limit the consolidation of the 
capacity to learn how to learn.
Limited capacity to generate an alter-
native vision of science and innova-
tion. The future of the PFs and COFUPRO 
depends on their capacity to generate a modern 
vision of science and innovation that strength-
ens their ability to innovate in all areas they 
oversee. An especially important responsibility 
is identifying emerging trends, whether they 
be trends in markets, scientific organization, 
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methods of fostering innovation, or mecha-
nisms for helping actors in the agricultural 
innovation system to actively position them-
selves in the face of these trends.
 Traditionally, the vision of science held by 
the PFs was defined by a few people linked to 
COFUPRO (see Section 6.2.2). To deal with 
the highly complex issues COFPRO will face 
in moving from mostly managing the RFP to 
fostering innovation, the organization will have 
to develop its capacity to develop this vision.
6.3.5 Bias in the Learning Strategy
Learning may be intentional or an unantici-
pated result of actions taken with other ends 
in mind. If learning is to contribute to the con-
struction of organizational capabilities, inten-
tionality is required, that is, a learning strategy 
must be defined. This strategy should include 
two simultaneously active components: (1) 
operational (related to the acquisition, assimi-
lation, and improvement of knowledge) and 
(2) strategic (related to innovation).
 In its first years, COFUPRO implemented 
a learning strategy that simultaneously includ-
ed the two components: the exercises to define 
the mission and vision and the adaptation of 
ISNAR’s methodology illustrate this behavior. 
Subsequently the organization focused more 
on the operational component, and there were 
no clear efforts associated with the develop-
ment of a new vision of research and innova-
tion. In other words, there is no evidence of a 
discussion of where the foundations are, where 
they are going, and how they will get there.
6.3.6 Learning by Exploring
The PFs explored activities not contemplated 
in their original mandate. In fact, the activities 
most valued by the foundations were pro-
tracted processes in which the PFs catalyzed 
the emergence of innovation networks; these 
activities were not financed by the competitive 
funds (Muñoz 2005). These processes were ill 
defined in the sense that only the final goals 
were defined at the beginning, but there were 
no deadlines or intermediate milestones. This 
does not imply, however, that the processes 
were not monitored—in fact, what was moni-
tored was the evolution and not predefined 
outputs. In these processes, the foundations 
used their resources to finance small, spe-
cific actions that removed hurdles as they 
emerged. Some examples of these processes 
are described in this section.
Analysis and consolidation of inno-
vation networks in Michoacán. The
2004 FAO evaluation introduced the idea of 
innovation networks, that is, the notion that 
farmers innovate by interacting with different 
types of agents in the agricultural sector. In 
2005 the University of Chapingo was contract-
ed to conduct a study of innovation networks; 
the methods of Social Network Analysis were 
used to map technical, commercial, and social 
information flows among commercial lemon 
farmers in two of the state’s valleys. The study 
continued with a technical and accounting 
analysis of lemon farms. From this informa-
tion, each farmer was informed of how his 
or her productivity fared relative to the other 
farmers in the sample. If a farmer wanted to 
know about another farmer’s methods (for 
example, how another farmer generated higher 
yields with a similar investment), the farm-
ers were introduced to each other. The basic 
assumption of this project was that the farmers 
had a great deal of information, but the chan-
nels to share it did not exist. In the last stage, 
experts were hired to instruct the farmers and 
technicians on specific subjects related to their 
crops (plant nutrition, for example).
 From this experience a course on manage-
ment of innovation networks was developed. 
To date, eight innovation networks have been 
studied and 28 technicians have been trained 
in data collection and analysis of social net-
works and their strengthening. The objective 
was that technicians would eventually shift 
from being mere specialists in a product to 
become promoters of rural development. The 
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project was jointly financed by the Michoacán 
PF and PRODESCA. Interestingly, the project 
was interrupted when the researchers could 
not make the transition from conducting an 
academic study and teaching extension agents 
how to use research tools to actually working 
with the farmers to strengthen existing social 
networks.
Heirs to the Land in Michoacán. The 
Heirs to the Land project seeks to link young 
people of the state’s countryside to rural pro-
duction and environmental conservation. 
Specifically, the project seeks to generate 
environmental management processes, partici-
pative research, and micro-enterprise develop-
ment in different communities in the state.
 In each community, the project begins 
with a participatory diagnosis of strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats related 
to the environment, productive systems, and 
social participation. Children, young people, 
and external facilitators participate in these 
diagnostic exercises, in which the young par-
ticipants use secondary sources of information, 
fieldtrips, and interviews with key actors from 
their communities. These activities end with 
the participants documenting their experiences 
and receiving training in the analysis of differ-
ent production systems, preparation of busi-
ness plans, and the importance of conserving 
natural resources. The training includes visits 
to projects-in-progress and hands-on work-
shops on sustainable projects (for example, 
composting). An important objective of the 
project is the preservation of family histories 
and traditional knowledge.
Northwest Technical Consortium in 
Nuevo Leon. The Northwest Technical 
Consortium (CTN) is a regional organization 
created in 1997 with the participation of the 
Universities of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and 
Coahuila, INIFAP, the Agriculture-Related 
Trusts of the Central Bank of Mexico (FIRA), 
cattle ranchers associations, SAGARPA, and 
the governments of the three abovementioned 
states.
 The number of researchers and technicians 
who participate in the CTN varies, with about 
10 or 12 collaborating permanently and anoth-
er 30 participating sporadically. The CTN pri-
marily focuses on technology transfer, farmer 
training, and provision of services rather than 
on research. It caters to medium-sized cattle 
ranchers.
 Most of the projects submitted by the CTN 
to the foundation involve adapting and trans-
ferring technologies from domestic and foreign 
institutions. Most of the CTN’s research is in 
the form of individual projects financed by the 
universities and CONACYT. The Nuevo Leon 
PF primarily supports extension events. In 
practice, the CTN works as a facilitator linking 
researchers and university students with farm-
ers. The main problems the CTN confronts are 
(1) lack of incentives for hiring technicians and 
researchers, (2) shortage of financial resources, 
and (3) aging researchers.
 The CTN Promotional Committee is a 
laboratory that offers services and undertakes 
research in the areas of animal health, diag-
nosis, geographic engineering, digitalization, 
and wildlife. The Promotional Committee has 
agreements with INIFAP and the University 
of Nuevo Leon. The CTN submits projects to 
CONACYT and to the Mixed Funds.
GGAVATT in Nuevo Leon. The GGAVATT 
in the state mainly operate among goat and pig 
farmers. These groups receive resources from 
the Alliance for the Countryside and do not 
have a formal relationship with the Nuevo 
Leon PF. Nevertheless the interactions that 
occur in these groups between farmers and 
researchers have allowed the identification of 
potential problems and the development of 
projects submitted to the PF. They have also 
facilitated the PF’s establishment of techno-
logical validation plots and contributed to 
the adaptation and diffusion of technologies 
among farmers.
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Papaya maradol in Puebla. In 2002 
the Puebla PF, FIRA, the 32nd Agricultural 
Technological Institute of Tecomatlán, and the 
Institute for Fundamental Research in Tropical 
Agriculture, Havana, signed an agreement for 
the transfer of technology for the production 
and postharvest management of papaya mar-
adol (a variety of papaya).
 After conciliating antagonistic interests, 
several producers of papaya maradol orga-
nized themselves with a collective vision of 
establishing irrigated cultivation of papaya 
maradol and transferring the technology for 
farming, postharvesting, transformation, and 
commercialization of the fruit. The project 
covers nine localities in the Puebla Mixtec 
region. Two of the most important problems 
in the organization were political differences 
among the municipalities and a culture devel-
oped by farmers of organizing to receive 
public subsidies. With the support offered by 
the Puebla PF, it was agreed that the technical-
commercial organization was to be separate 
from the political organizations. After decades 
of patronage, many farmers organize them-
selves only to receive support from the govern-
ment. Initially several farmers in the project 
looked for this type of support, but left as their 
expectations were not fulfilled. Today only
those who understood the advantages of 
receiving training, support for technological 
missions, and information from highly quali-
fied technicians remain. Currently the project 
covers 120 ha, has trained 107 farmers and 
43 technicians, and has significantly increased 
profitability per hectare.
Jamaica production and processing in
Puebla. In 2001, the Puebla PF started to 
work with Jamaica farmers in the Mixtec 
region.4 The project’s initial objective was 
to foster the production and processing of 
Jamaica flowers for fresh consumption and for 
its extracts, marketing them in the domestic 
market. With time, the objective expanded to 
include the manufacturing of the flowers into 
industrial products (concentrates and extracts, 
bottled water, jam, and liquor) and organic 
cultivation.
 The Puebla PF is contributing to organize 
the Jamaica industry in the state, in particu-
lar, strengthening its managerial capabilities. 
To this end, the farmers established a com-
pany that hired four young professionals: an 
agronomist as field manager, a biochemist as 
manager of the processing plant, a business-
trained sales manager, and a general manager. 
These four professionals are in charge of 
supervising the processing and marketing of 
the flowers, while the farmers serve on the 
board of directors.
 Two additional projects related to Jamaica 
were organized for the farmers’ wives and 
children. The former were taught to cook 
meals with the plant, and the children were 
taught to feed the seeds to hens for egg produc-
tion. The Puebla PF financed the investment in 
hens. The Jamaica project is 5 years old, and 
some decisionmakers believe that it is time for 
the PF to abandon it.
Industrial firm CAIVO in Puebla. 
CAIVO is a private firm that was created with 
an investment of more than 15 million pesos 
(equivalent to about US$1.35 million). The 
business includes a slaughterhouse authorized 
to export to the United States, preparation 
of lamb fine cuts, and the sale of vacuum-
packed lamb barbacoa and mixote (traditional 
Mexican foods) targeted at the Hispanic market 
in the United States. At the moment CAIVO 
has 450 sheepherder partners, of which 80 
operate independently and 370 are organized 
in four small farmer societies. To sell through 
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CAIVO, farmers have to buy shares in it. The 
current price of a share is 50,000 pesos (equiv-
alent to US$4,500), and each share grants the 
right to slaughter 200 sheep a year.
 The project began in 2002, when the Puebla 
PF supported the project “Prospective Analysis 
of the Sheep Agro-Food Chain in the State of 
Puebla.” Based on this project, it was decided 
to set up a high-tech slaughterhouse specializ-
ing in sheep. The PF’s main contribution was 
to help in the organization of the lamb farmers 
and in the preparation of a business plan.
 CAIVO operates a mobile technology 
transfer unit that specializes in raising and 
fattening lambs; the unit was financed by the 
foundation. The PF also financed a laboratory 
for the slaughterhouse and supported com-
mercial promotion. The financial support that 
the PF offers to CAIVO is not significant, 
but it helps organize the farmers and supports 
research, training, and technological missions. 
For example, the Puebla PF contracted two 
Canadian specialists to instruct operators in 
new techniques of meat cutting.
6.3.7 Impact of Cultural Duality 
on Learning Processes and 
Capacity Building
As discussed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, although 
there is a set of shared values in the PFs and 
COFUPRO, there are also two subcultures: 
one associated with the managers and the other 
with the presidents. These subcultures influ-
ence how individuals learn, how they socialize 
that learning, and how the organization absorbs 
what is learned.
 The managers’ culture is focused on techni-
cal activities and is structured according to an 
organic model in which each manager partici-
pates in a workgroup responsible for improv-
ing specific types of activities. These activities 
result in learning processes that are socialized 
in the group and generate the conditions for 
organizational learning and gradual acceptance 
at the level of COFUPRO. Transmission of the 
culture to new members, generation of new 
routines, and socialization of learning depend 
on the culture-bearing managers staying in 
their posts.
 In contrast, the presidential culture is 
focused on building external relations useful 
to the foundations. To do this, the presidents 
mainly use informal channels based on their 
proximity to power. Given the nature of their 
activities, their learning occurs basically at 
the individual level and is hard to socialize. 
Because the skills to develop these relations 
are a function of their personal reputations 
as farmers rather than belonging to the foun-
dation, this culture cannot be passed to man-
agers but is also nontransferable to future 
presidents.
6.4 Impact of the PFs
It is not possible to unequivocally identify 
all effects of the PFs, because they were only 
one element of a set of actors participating in 
a process of change triggered by the federal 
government. This section analyzes some of 
the identifiable influences the PFs had on the 
agricultural research and innovation systems, 
including some qualitative assessment of their 
impact on poverty. It should, however, be 
emphasized that the evidence is partial and 
the processes complex, so it is not possible to 
identify and quantify all effects or allocate the 
effects among the different causes.5
 It is also difficult to identify the effects 
on the extension system, because its changes 
were more profound than those experienced 
by the research system. After the dissolution 
of the public extension institutions, various 
private and civil society agents organized lim-
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ited extension activities. But these experiences 
have not been analyzed in depth. The most 
notable effort to set up extension mechanisms 
was PRODESCA, the program that sought to 
foster the emergence of a market for technical 
services. The FAO evaluations and the field-
work conducted during this research indicate 
that this program has had numerous opera-
tional problems. The PFs are also exploring 
mechanisms to disseminate technical informa-
tion to farmers and foster innovation; some of 
the mechanisms explored are very innovative, 
as the one that uses Social Network Analysis 
to improve information flows among farmers 
(see Section 6.3.6). Although the PFs devote a 
significant share of their resources to extension 
activities, there is no centralized mechanism 
to either evaluate them or learn from the dif-
ferent tools they use. This deficiency has been 
recognized by the PFs, and they have launched 
an initiative to overcome it (see Chapter 8).
 As explained in Section 5.2, the PFs were 
created to induce changes in the agricultural 
research system to make it more responsive 
to the needs of farmers. The nature of these 
changes (and consequently the influence of the 
PFs) fluctuated with changes in personnel, les-
sons learned, and changes in the political sys-
tem. Transformation of the research system was 
triggered by the crisis of confidence in INIFAP 
in the early 1990s. At that time, a relatively 
limited reform of the institute was attempted. 
This effort essentially consisted of establishing 
new ways of interacting with farmers (through 
the PFs) and securing new resources for opera-
tional funds (see Section 5.1).
 Beginning in 2000, an attempt was made 
to accelerate INIFAP’s renovation by trans-
forming it from an organization completely 
dependent on SAGARPA to a Public Research 
Center. Nevertheless the pace of change was 
slow because of the difficulties of transforming
an institution without adequate tools—especially
shrinking budgets and inflexible incentives and 
hiring policies. As a response to the sluggishness 
of change, in 2003 SAGARPA commissioned 
the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on 
Agriculture to carry out an evaluation of INIFAP 
by an international team.6 Implementation of the 
commission’s recommendations began in 2004, 
but progress continues slowly for the above-
mentioned reasons.
 In 2003, the Colegio de Posgraduados hired 
Wageningen University to evaluate all its activ-
ities, especially its research and programs for 
graduate studies. The difference between this 
evaluation and the abovementioned one is that 
INIFAP’s was commissioned by SAGARPA, 
whereas the Colegio’s was contracted by the 
evaluated institution itself. Reform of the other 
agricultural research institutions (including 
most of the universities) is being implemented 
even more slowly. Because universities are iso-
lated from external influences by their autono-
mous regimes, changes follow the internal 
dynamics of each institution.
 Before the creation of the PFs, INIFAP 
followed SAGARPA’s directives; internally, 
the researchers reported to the institutional 
hierarchy. The PFs weakened these lines of 
authority as they awarded resources directly 
to the researchers. Owners of their own funds, 
researchers dedicated less time to resource-
starved institutional projects. In this way, the 
PFs started to influence the research agenda. 
The changes to this agenda were in general 
limited by the difficulty in getting the research-
ers to adequately respond to the relatively 
broad RFPs (see Sections 5.5 and 6.3.2). The 
lack of response was what motivated the 
change in the mechanisms used for the RFPs.
 Another significant consequence of the 
first interactions with the PFs was that the 
researchers now had a direct channel of com-
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munication with stakeholders in their state’s 
agriculture, which further weakened the cen-
tralism of the national research institutions. 
This process became even more pronounced 
with the strengthening of INIFAP’s regional 
offices.
 Recognizing local political interests and 
the needs of research institutions, the PFs often 
gave preference to state researchers when eval-
uating proposals, even though they were often 
not the best in their field. The preference for 
local researchers was more pronounced in the 
early years of the PFs; as the weaknesses of the 
local teams became more apparent, some PFs 
began inviting out-of-state researchers to take 
part in the RFPs. Foreign professionals were 
also contracted for specific research projects. 
Nevertheless, in spite of some isolated cases 
in northeastern Mexico, these contracts are 
still not a commonly used tool to strengthen 
domestic teams. Although the influx of out-
of-state researchers has somewhat improved 
the research financed by the PFs, it has not 
strengthened state research institutions.
 The PFs organized several courses on the 
preparation of research proposals and the use of 
the log frame, but these courses did not improve 
the quality of proposals. The reason is that 
quality depends essentially on the researcher’s 
capability, and the latter does not depend on 
mastering formal instruments for project prepa-
ration but rather on the researcher’s excellence, 
his or her interactions with the international 
academic community, institutional cultures, 
and the incentives offered.
 Neither did the mechanisms used for selec-
tion of proposals at the state level help to 
strengthen the research system. Each PF set up 
its own technical committee; its members were 
often selected as representatives of their state 
institutions rather than for their professional 
quality. In addition, the smaller size of the state 
research systems did not facilitate transparency 
(Ekboir 2004).7 These factors damaged the 
credibility of the proposal selection mecha-
nisms at the state level.
 Despite these problems, the quality of the 
projects as a whole improved, because the 
PFs gradually identified the best researchers 
and used this information for decisionmak-
ing. It should, however, be stressed that 
this improvement is not a consequence of 
the competitive grants, but rather of the use 
of reputations in the selection of proposals. 
These reputations are built through stable 
interactions between the PFs and research-
ers. Basically, any stable, repetitive mecha-
nism that allows reputations to be established 
would have the same effect.
 An important impact on the research sys-
tem was the opening up of finance sources 
for institutions that traditionally had problems 
accessing research funding. Major beneficia-
ries were the Colegio de Posgraduados and the 
Universidad Autónoma de Chapingo. The state 
universities also benefited, though their com-
petitiveness was limited by their weak research 
capabilities.8
 The PFs had effects unforeseen at their 
creation. As mentioned in Sections 5.3 and 
5.4, COFUPRO’s presidents had good access 
to the secretary of agriculture and submitted 
proposals for agricultural policies and the 
transformation of the research system. The 
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PFs also introduced the idea that innovations 
are developed and diffused by networks. 
SAGARPA adopted this idea in 2006 for the 
evaluation of the Subprogram for Research 
and Technology Transfer (SITT); INIFAP 
is also beginning to set up internal research 
networks by products, but without a clear 
vision of how the networks should link with 
external stakeholders, what their potential is 
to promote innovation, or what actions are 
most effective to further this aim. The prob-
lem is that strengthening agricultural innova-
tion networks is a relatively new instrument 
internationally, so there are few experiences 
from which Mexico can learn.9
 Members of COFUPRO and the PFs are 
on the board of directors of INIFAP, the 
Colegio de Posgraduados, and other research 
and teaching institutions. They are often the 
only nongovernment representatives on these 
boards, and their participation is important, 
because their nonpublic status gives them more 
freedom than other board members have to 
question the public-sector representatives.
 The presence of COFUPRO in these gov-
erning bodies reflects a new dynamic in the 
research system. At the beginning of the 
1990s, INIFAP was the de facto coordina-
tor of the agricultural research system and 
as such was influential in the running of the 
PFs. Today COFUPRO occupies this central 
position (distributing operating funds and gen-
erating data useful for the prioritization of pro-
grams and policies) and has a strong influence 
on the management of research institutions. It 
should be noted, though, that COFUPRO does 
not play as pivotal a role as did INIFAP up 
until the 1990s, because other institutions also 
finance agriculture-related research projects.
 The forums in which research needs are 
determined and the technical committees in 
which proposals are evaluated put many re-
searchers in contact with farmers and researchers
from other institutions. New patterns of inter-
action among actors in the innovation system 
emerged from these contacts. During the field 
work, several researchers commented that, 
based on these relations, their own priority 
setting and research methods have changed. 
These changes, however, resulted from the 
researchers’ personal motivation and not from 
changes in the institutional cultures. To have 
a bigger impact, the PFs will have to explore 
new interventions to transform the research 
system (see Chapter 8).
 COFUPRO was an active partner in the 
SAGARPA-CONACYT Sectoral Fund until 
2006, when COFUPRO withdrew from the 
fund, because it believed that the fund was 
too bureaucratic and was not generating 
useful information. CONACYT’s policy in 
all Sectoral Funds has been to let the part-
ners define the priorities. In the case of the 
SAGARPA fund, the priorities were mainly 
defined by COFUPRO, which also made sure 
there were no overlaps between the RFPs of 
the states and the Sectoral Fund. COFUPRO 
was also an active member of the fund’s 
evaluation commission. There was concern 
among certain actors that the needs identified 
by COFUPRO might not represent all sector 
needs, particularly those of small farmers or 
products not included in the prioritized chains. 
Currently COFUPRO participates in the fund’s 
technical committee, but since 2008 the opera-
tional rules do not allow it to make financial 
contributions to the fund.
 COFUPRO was influential in the Sectoral 
Fund because it demonstrated a commitment 
to permanent improvement that is not repli-
cated in other funds, and it contributed a meth-
odology to identify demands that satisfied 
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the other partners. The technical committee’s 
working group met monthly at alternating 
venues; the meetings were active and forced 
participants to make decisions. COFUPRO 
does not participate in any other agriculture-
related Sectoral Funds, nor do the PFs partici-
pate in their states’ Mixed Funds, suggesting a 
lack of coordination with nontraditional actors 
linked to the sector.
 The two biggest gaps in the ongoing trans-
formation of the innovation system in gen-
eral and the PFs in particular are the lack of a 
debate about what the agricultural innovation 
policies should be and which extension mecha-
nisms are best for the needs of different types 
of farmers.
6.5 Role of PFs in Poverty 
Alleviation
Agriculture can contribute to poverty allevia-
tion in two ways: the expansion of commercial 
agriculture creates employment and reduces 
food prices, and some small farmers can 
become commercial farmers in higher value 
markets (see Section 3.4). Although the PFs 
can contribute to poverty alleviation in both 
ways, its main contribution may result from 
the exploration of new instruments to help 
small farmers enter more profitable value 
chains and to increase researchers’ participa-
tion in innovation processes (see Section 6.4).
 Until now, the PFs have mainly supported 
commercial farmers, but there are indications 
that this focus is changing. Several projects 
have already had important economic impacts 
on commercial agriculture, but their effects 
on poverty have not been evaluated. The most 
innovative PFs have also implemented some 
projects that helped small farmers integrate 
into commercial value chains. These projects, 
however, were few and only involved a limited 
number of farmers. Three important deficien-
cies of these projects have been identified. 
First, the PFs have not developed methods to 
identify innovative farmers (see Section 3.4); 
participation in the projects was initially broad, 
but eventually only farmers with the stron-
gest commercial and innovative capabilities 
remained. The consequences of this ex post 
selection were that many of those who failed 
felt frustrated, there was a great deal of ten-
sion in the groups during the process of culling 
people who did not participate in the collective 
effort, and resources were wasted in dealing 
with these failures.
 Second, the PFs have not been able to 
learn how to scale up successful local projects 
or how to replicate them. And third, the les-
sons learned by the individuals who managed 
the projects were not shared with other PFs, 
hampering collective learning. In other words, 
the lessons learned by individuals did not 
become shared knowledge. This deficiency 
has been noticed by some foundations, and the 
creation of a specialized structure to facilitate 
learning has been discussed. The structure 
would combine decentralized experimentation 
with centralized learning. Thus it would take 
advantage of the creativity of the individual 
PFs and establish a small team of experts in 
innovation systems to assess the experiments, 
suggest new instruments to be tried using pilot 
projects, and disseminate the lessons learned 
among all PFs.
 The PFs are also actively inducing their 
presidents and managers to commit to poverty 
alleviation. In a recent survey of presidents and 
managers, the majority of respondents men-
tioned that people in these positions should 
have a very strong sense of duty and a com-
mitment to poverty alleviation. When asked to 
identify one successful project funded by their 
PFs, they all mentioned multiyear complex 
projects that involved several actors (examples 
of such projects can be found in Section 6.3.6). 
Interestingly, nobody mentioned projects that 
had been financed through the traditional 
RFPs, even though some projects had impor-
tant outcomes. Despite their commitment, few 
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presidents or managers had a clear idea of how 
to implement pro-poor programs.
 It is expected that the PFs will accord 
poverty alleviation higher priority in the 
future, because the interactions between the 
presidents and managers from different PFs 
work as a filter that marginalizes people who 
do not share these values, especially among 
the presidents. The PFs are also planning to 
set up a program to build the capabilities of 
presidents and managers to manage agricul-
tural innovation programs; the program will 
include a discussion of poverty alleviation. 
Finally, the PFs are engaging researchers to 
participate in projects that target poverty, 
effectively inducing them to change their 
research routines and facilitating farmers’ 
access to scientific information.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions
 The study of the nature of innovative capa-
bilities in private firms has attracted the atten-
tion of researchers since the late 1980. In 
contrast, the nature of innovative capabilities 
among small farmers, urban poor, NGOs, and 
the public sector has barely been analyzed. 
This report contributes to filling this gap by 
answering two questions: How can an orga-
nization managing public funds for research 
and extension sustain organizational innova-
tion over extended periods? And how can it 
learn and adapt to maximize its impact on the 
agricultural innovation system? This report also 
briefly explores how innovation programs can 
be used in poverty-alleviation strategies. The 
answers were researched by assessing the insti-
tutional dynamics of the Mexican PFs, a highly 
innovative civil society organization that man-
ages public funds for research, extension, and 
innovation.
 The main finding was that the innovative-
ness of the PFs emerged from the interaction 
among internal and external factors. The exter-
nal factors were expanding profitable markets 
for agricultural products; a dynamic private 
sector searching for new technical, commer-
cial, and organizational innovations to take 
advantage of these emerging opportunities; and 
a public sector that allowed the PFs to evolve 
mostly in response to their internal dynamics 
and the needs of farmers. The internal factors 
were the presence of highly innovative and 
committed individuals who questioned their 
own capabilities, a decentralized governance 
structure that allowed experimentation by indi-
vidual PFs, and a centralized structure that fos-
tered collective learning. These factors resulted 
in strong collective learning capabilities, espe-
cially the ability to identify knowledge gaps, 
define strategies to fill them, and use the new 
knowledge to explore new activities and orga-
nizational structures. The learning capabilities 
were not distributed evenly over all PFs but 
instead were concentrated in a few of them.
103
The complexity of agriculture in developing countries has increased in recent decades. New products, markets, and actors have emerged, creating new opportunities for innovation. Responding to these opportunities, the goals of development policies shifted from increas-
ing local food production and addressing market failures to creating competitive advantages, 
increasing agriculture’s sustainability, and reducing the growing inequality that resulted from 
globalization. A crucial factor in addressing these issues is how to create the individual and col-
lective capabilities all actors in the agricultural innovation system need to help farmers integrate 
into dynamic markets (as entrepreneurs or employees).
 The study of the evolution of the PFs 
yields important lessons for the management 
of research and innovation in developing coun-
tries. First, because of the complexity of inno-
vation processes, science, extension, and inno-
vation policies should be flexible and evolve as 
new information becomes available and new 
capabilities are acquired. The flexibility should 
be implemented at all levels. In the Mexican 
case, the federal and state governments allowed 
the PFs to change, although it was not in the 
Mexican political tradition to do so. Some PFs 
developed new capabilities by implementing 
actions that were not in their initial mandate. 
The flexibility should also be reflected in 
changes in the goals and instruments of poli-
cies. Initially the PFs were mandated to finance 
research and extension, but they started to 
focus on innovation as the limitations of the 
original mandate became apparent. In a similar 
way, new financing mechanisms were tried 
when the researchers and technical advisers 
did not respond as expected to competitive 
grants. The flexibility was not chaotic (in 
the sense that the PFs were restricted in 
their exploration) but was managed through 
an active dialogue between COFUPRO and 
SAGARPA.
 Second, innovative abilities have a much 
skewed distribution. In the PF less than 10 
percent of presidents and managers were inno-
vative. Similar distributions have been found 
in other research areas such as education and 
psychology. The uneven distribution should 
be explicitly considered in the appointment 
of project managers and in the design of pro-
grams seeking to increase poor households’ 
agricultural income.
 Third, the development of innovative capa-
bilities depends on strong and sustained com-
mitment by the authorities (whether in the pub-
lic sector or in a private firm). The innovative 
presidents and managers made major personal 
efforts to explore alternatives and share their 
lessons with other PFs. The state and federal 
authorities initially tolerated the changes and 
later encouraged them. Interestingly, they did 
not attempt to strengthen capabilities in the 
public sector.
 Fourth, the policies should not be left to 
evolve randomly but should be managed by 
balancing the exploration of new instruments 
with the exploitation of those that have shown 
their efficacy. Balancing these two strate-
gies requires an effective search mechanism 
that should combine decentralized exploration 
with centralized learning. Overreliance on 
centralized exploration can miss important 
opportunities, whereas decentralized learning 
alone hampers the sharing of useful informa-
tion; decentralized exploration can be com-
plemented with directed searches when the 
opportunities or needs are clear. The directed 
searches should not attempt to establish major 
programs from the start but rather implement 
pilot projects to test the assumptions used to 
design the program. Only after the pilot pro-
grams have shown their effectiveness should 
they be scaled up. Action research to test 
different types of interactions in the innova-
tion networks should be the basic approach to 
design the pilot programs.
 Exploration should not be restricted to 
financing traditional research. It should also 
include the analysis of the joint dynamics of 
innovation and poverty and the identification of 
new ways to foster the emergence of innovation 
networks and involve new actors in innova-
tion processes. A final important element in 
the search strategy is a monitoring system to 
guide the exploration. The two most important 
factors that determine the system’s efficacy are 
the flexibility of the monitoring system and the 
set of indicators to be monitored. A key feature 
of complex systems is that interventions often 
have unexpected results. A monitoring system 
that constrains itself to a predetermined set of 
indicators would miss those results. In the case 
of the PFs, the evaluations conducted by FAO 
focused on the alignment between the identified 
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demands and the projects financed. This narrow 
criterion missed the most important impacts on 
the innovation and research systems.
 The indicators should provide timely and 
accurate information on the evolution of the 
process. For example, measuring the benefits 
or the rate of return of research projects does 
not provide information useful for managing 
research, because (1) the impacts do not result 
just from research but from the interaction of 
several factors, including alternative technolo-
gies, other sources of information, markets, 
policies, and the strategies implemented by 
competitors; (2) quantitative ex post impacts 
do not provide information on the factors that 
contributed to the outcome; and (3) even if 
those factors could be identified, it is unlikely 
that they will have the same influence in the 
future. The new literature on management 
based on complexity theories indicates that 
when the processes are complex and the cau-
sality between the inputs and outputs is not 
simple and clear, monitoring should not focus 
on outcomes but on the process and the contri-
butions made by each actor.
 The set of independent PFs became an 
effective exploration structure. However, they 
did not develop an effective learning mecha-
nism. COFUPRO served as a means to central-
ize and diffuse the lessons learned by the indi-
vidual PFs, but it was up to the latter to decide 
whether to share the lessons they learned and 
use the instruments developed by other PFs.
 Fifth, individuals play a major role in the 
success or failure of innovation processes and 
policies. Traditionally, policymakers have 
paid a great deal of attention to the design 
of the organizations that will implement the 
programs and the rules they must follow. 
The selection of capable individuals to run 
the organizations, however, has received 
less attention. Program directors are usu-
ally selected not for their capabilities but 
for their allegiance to the decisionmakers. 
The Mexican experience clearly showed the 
importance of individuals who challenged 
the boundaries and explored new activities. 
Selection of capable individuals is a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for success. 
A continuous training program to build their 
human and social capital is necessary to 
maintain innovativeness in the long run. The 
analysis of the PFs also showed that capable 
and committed individuals are crucial for the 
success of poverty-alleviation programs.
 Sixth, the programs should have effective 
governance structures in which innovators can 
influence decisions. For example, although 
farmers have participated on the boards of 
many public agricultural research institutes, 
few have had real impact on how these institu-
tions operate.
 Finally, innovation is more than just applied 
research. To effectively participate in innova-
tion processes, public research and exten-
sion institutions must adopt a new conceptual 
framework in which they recognize that they 
are not the central actors but play an impor-
tant supporting role. Adoption of this new 
framework leads to new operational routines 
in which researchers integrate into innovation 
networks.
 The experience of the PFs clearly showed 
the importance of capable individuals and 
flexible structures for the implementation of 
effective policies in rapidly changing environ-
ments. This focus clearly contrasts with the 
traditional approaches that emphasized care-
ful planning and rigid execution. This new 
approach imposes major demands on the public 
sectors of developing countries, which usually 
have weak public institutions and organiza-
tional cultures that hamper innovation. These 
two factors are also important for the design 
and implementation of poverty-alleviation 
programs. Because contractual arrangements 
between the funders and the operating agent 
are usually rigid and agents on the ground do 
not have the time and resources to reflect on 
their actions, these programs generally do not 
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change once implementation starts. Given the 
complexity of poverty, however, it is most 
likely that the original assumptions used in 
designing the program will not be completely 
valid as the program progresses. This rigid-
ity should be avoided, allowing flexibility in 
the implementation and setting specialized 
units to experiment across several projects, 
similar to the one that has been created by key 
humanitarian organizations.1
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1This unit is called the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). This 
network, which is based in the United Kingdom, incorporates many key organizations and experts from across the humanitar-
ian sector. ALNAP includes members from donor, NGO, Red Cross/Crescent, UN, and independent and/or academic organi-
zations and is dedicated to improving humanitarian performance through increased learning and accountability. As a result, 
the network is able to use the broad range of experience and expertise within its membership to produce tools and analyses rel-
evant and accessible to the humanitarian sector as a whole. Further information on ALNAP is available at www.alnap.org.
CHAPTER 8
Epilogue
 In addition to the funding issues, a new 
relationship developed between SAGARPA 
and COFUPRO. The interactions are now less 
dependent on the personal relationship between 
the secretary and COFUPRO’s president; in 
other words, it is both more distant than before 
and more institutionalized. The lack of support 
from SAGARPA has deprived COFUPRO of 
an important tool to foster collective learning.
 At the same time, the relations between 
some presidents and managers with policy-
makers at the federal and state levels have 
intensified, increasing the latter’s contributions 
to the design and implementation of agricultural 
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Our original report was submitted to COFUPRO in August 2006. During the second half of that year, Mexico’s new president consolidated its power after a highly contested election 
and a narrow win. The troubled political transition in several secretaries of the federal 
government, including Agriculture, lasted for most of 2007. Late that year, SAGARPA substan-
tially changed the rules that governed the PF operations, eliminating the guaranteed funding for 
the PFs and forcing them to compete with other organizations willing to implement research and 
extension projects. The result was a more discretional use of resources by SAGARPA. The foun-
dations contribution to COFUPRO was also eliminated from the regulations, forcing COFUPRO 
to seek alternative funding. These changes jolted the PFs, because they threatened the latter’s 
existence, especially that of the weaker PFs. After strong lobbying efforts and the involvement 
of several presidents, governors, and other actors in the agricultural innovation system, the opera-
tional rules were changed again in 2008. This time, the PFs were recognized as the administrators 
of the funds for agricultural research and extension. The PFs could not convince SAGARPA to 
reinstate the mandatory contribution to COFUPRO, however. To finance itself, COFUPRO had 
to seek special funding from SAGARPA for a project to monitor the PFs. The result has been a 
weakening of the relationship between COFUPRO and the PFs. If this trend continues, COFUPRO 
may change from a learning and lobbying tool of the PFs into an instrument used by SAGARPA 
to control the PFs. The PFs are conscious of this threat and are currently seeking new mechanisms 
to fund COFUPRO. The decentralized decisionmaking process is hampering agreement on a per-
manent solution, however.
policies. COFUPRO has also increased its col-
laboration with other stakeholders in the agricul-
tural sector, including the National Association 
of Secretaries of Rural Development and the 
National Association of Managers of Applied 
Research and Technological Development, 
CONACYT, and farmers’ associations.
 These changes have introduced new 
dynamics to the PFs and COFUPRO, but it is 
still too early to know how these changes will 
unfold. Despite this uncertainty, COFUPRO 
has started to implement some of the recom-
mendations made in our original report with 
the explicit objective of strengthening the 
innovative capabilities of the PFs. Among the 
most important actions being implemented are 
the following:
•  Creation of a training program for manag-
ers that will include formal and informal 
actions. Negotiations are under way with 
UAM to create a set of courses on man-
agement of agricultural research and inno-
vation. After completion of the courses, 
students will be allowed to write a thesis 
and receive a master’s degree. A tutoring 
program will also be created, in which the 
best managers will advise newly appointed 
managers, and managers will be encour-
aged to visit other PFs to see firsthand how 
they operate.
•  Creation of a training program for presi-
dents and board members. This program 
will also include formal and informal 
instruments.
•  Creation of a commission to analyze the gov-
ernance of the set of PFs and COFUPRO. 
This commission used our original report 
and several workshops to prepare recom-
mendations on how to improve the interac-
tions among the different actors that par-
ticipate in the PFs and how to strengthen 
collective learning. The PFs are starting to 
implement the recommendations.
•  Creation of a specialized team to advise the 
PFs on institutional innovation and on how 
to manage agricultural innovation.
•  Establishment of a research project to assess 
learning by the individual foundations and 
the impact the PFs are having on the research 
and innovation systems. The project is 
financed by the Sectoral Fund operated by 
SAGARPA and CONACYT. It will collect 
information on the projects the PFs operate 
(or finance with funds other than those from 
the Alliance for the Countryside), on how 
researchers have changed their working rou-
tines in response to the different activities of 
the PFs, and on the interactions researchers 
are having with other actors in the agricul-
tural innovation system.
•  Assessment of innovative practices. 
COFURPO organized a workshop with 
managers to identify innovative practices 
they developed in their foundations. This 
exercise is a first step toward the creation of 
a structure to foster centralized learning.
•  Creation of new spaces for the interac-
tion among researchers and farmers. A 
few foundations are experimenting with 
new methods to foster the integration of 
INIFAP researchers into innovation net-
works, including new incentives and finan-
cial arrangements.
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APPENDIX A
Organizations Discussed in This Report
CIAT is one of the 15 international agricultural 
research centers that belong to the CGIAR. 
It is based in Cali, Colombia.
COFUPRO is an office created by the PFs as a 
whole that (1) represents them in dealings 
with the federal government, (2) coordi-
nates collective learning, and (3) facilitates 
the creation of an institutional culture.
CONACYT is the national research council. 
Its main activity is the administration of 
public funds for research and innovation.
CREAs are small groups of farmers that orga-
nize themselves to validate and diffuse 
technologies. The individual groups are 
organized in a national association. CREAs 
operate in Argentina.
CTN is a consortium of universities, research 
institutes, financing institutions, and 
farmers’ organizations from northwest-
ern Mexico. CTN finances and conducts 
research and extension activities.
FAO is part of the United Nations. It leads 
efforts to eradicate hunger and is a neu-
tral forum where member states meet to 
debate agreements and policies. It also 
provides technical cooperation to member 
states.
FIRA is a trust fund created by the Mexican 
government in the central bank of Mexico 
to finance investments, capacity building, 
technical assistance, and technology trans-
fer in the agricultural, livestock, forestry, 
and fisheries sectors.
GGAVATT are small groups of farmers assist-
ed by a technician that validate cattle pro-
duction technologies and then share their 
findings with similar groups.
ICAMEX is a research center financed by the 
State of Mexico that works on agriculture, 
livestock, forestry, and aquaculture.
IICA is an international technical cooperation 
organization that is part of the Organization 
of American States.
INIFAP is the national research institute special-
ized in agricultural, livestock, and forestry.
ISNAR was a center that belonged to the 
CGIAR system. In 2004, some of its activi-
ties were absorbed by IFPRI.
PFs are civil society organizations that manage 
public funds to finance research, extension, 
and innovation projects.
PIEAs are farmers’ associations that finance 
agricultural research. They usually special-
ize in crops, livestock, or forestry. Most 
PIEAs exist only on paper and do not 
mobilize resources.
PRODESCA is a federal program that finances 
the provision of technical advice to farmers.
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See the list of acronyms near the front of the report for expansion and English translations of the organizations listed here. Unless otherwise stated, these organizations are based in Mexico.
SAGARPA is the federal ministry of agricul-
ture, livestock, forestry, and fisheries.
SITT is a program jointly financed by 
SAGARPA and state governments that 
finances research, extension, and inno-
vation projects. SITT is operated by the 
PFs.
SNITT is the national system for the transfer of 
research and technology. It is a formal struc-
ture mandated with coordinating all public 
research and extension institutions. Private 
institutions may participate voluntarily.
UAM and UNAM are Mexican public univer-
sities.
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Other secretaries
from the federal
government
SAGARPA
CONACYT
INIFAP
Colegio de Posgraduados
National universities
(UAM, UNAM)
State universities
Agricultural universities
(Chapingo, Narro)
Other research centers
Providers of technical services
Users of funds
COFUPRO
Produce Foundations
Administration of funds
Sources of funds
and policymakers
FAO
IICA
International centers
Technical support
State governments
PIEAs
Private firms
FIRA
SNITT
Figure A.1   Relationships among the main institutions discussed in this report
Note: COFUPRO, National Coordinator for the Produce Foundations; CONACYT, National Council for Science and 
Technology; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; FIRA, Agriculture-Related Trusts of the Central 
Bank of Mexico; IICA, Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture; INIFAP, National Institute for Forestry, 
Agricultural and Livestock Research; PIEA, Foundation for Agricultural Research and Experimentation; SAGARPA, 
Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries, and Food; SNITT, National Research and Technology 
Transfer System; UAM, Autonomous Metropolitan University; UNAM, National Autonomous University of Mexico.
APPENDIX B
Alliance for the Countryside
 The Alliance has three main programs: 
farming support, livestock support, and rural 
development. Additionally, the Alliance has 
several subprograms: plant and animal health; 
research and technology transfer; food safety; 
aquaculture and fishing; the national informa-
tion system for sustainable rural development; 
and the stabilization, support, and reorganiza-
tion program for coffee cultivation.
 The Alliance’s public funds come from the 
federal and state governments; farmers con-
tribute in different ways according to the rules 
of each program. The farming and livestock 
support programs finance a share of farmers’ 
investments in physical capital, and the farmers 
themselves provide the rest. The research and 
technology transfer subprogram is administered 
by each state’s PF, which asks research institu-
tions, technical advisers, and farmer groups 
to submit proposals for projects they want to 
implement in the state.
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The program known as Alliance for the Countryside (Alianza para el Campo) began opera-tions in 1996. Its objective was to support the modernization of agriculture to enable it to better compete in the North American Free Trade Agreement. The Alliance is a set of 
agreements between the federal government on the one side and state governments and farmers on 
the other. An agreement was signed in each state.
APPENDIX C
Recommendations for Strengthening the 
Innovative Capabilities of the PFs
 This appendix presents recommendations 
for strengthening the operations of the PFs. 
Effects on agricultural productivity and com-
petitiveness, natural resource management, 
and poverty were not investigated, as they are 
beyond the scope of the present study.
C.1 Governance
C.1.1 Relationship with Other 
Actors in the Agricultural Innovation 
System, including SAGARPA and 
State Governments
•  It is recommended that each foundation 
establish or strengthen its interaction with 
other administrators of research funds (for 
example, the state science and technology 
councils), with the aim of consolidating its 
legitimacy, improving the effectiveness of 
its actions, and catalyzing local debate on 
the role of science in state development.
 The PFs always had direct access to the 
official circles in which agricultural policy is 
formulated, whether in SAGARPA or in most 
states. These circles valued the information the 
PFs generated, the channels of communication 
they opened with apolitical commercial farm-
ers, and their flexibility in the administration 
of funds. COFUPRO’s contributions to the 
SAGARPA-CONACYT Sectoral Fund also 
consolidated the relationship with CONACYT.
The PFs were an important institutional innovation in the Mexican agricultural sector. Nevertheless, there are indications that the model followed by the PFs during its 10-year life may be losing creative potential because of the solidification of their structures and the 
maturing of the areas in which their impact has been greatest (identification of research demands, 
opening communications channels among innovation system actors, and improving efficiency in 
the RFP process as well as in project administration and follow up). In the past, the capacity to 
contribute ideas and structures for the implementation of scientific and technology policies was 
derived from the learning mechanisms and from the governance structures developed by each PF 
and by the whole set. The PFs will be able to maintain their creative dynamics by developing new 
learning capabilities, especially in the design and implementation of innovation policies and pro-
grams, in support of the transformation of research institutions, and in the emergence of effective 
extension structures (see Section 3.2).
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 Both federal and state authorities and the 
hierarchies in the public agricultural research 
institutions recognized the PFs and COFUPRO 
as the voice of apolitical commercial farmers. 
It is important that the PFs recognize that their 
acceptance stems in part from their legitima-
tion by the authorities and from a group of 
researchers. The legitimacy that comes from 
participation in power structures is similar to 
that of CONACYT, which is not representative 
but is well known by the academic community. 
The recognition legitimized the PFs but at the 
same time caused certain actors that were not 
included in its structures to question its repre-
sentation and behavior.
 To boost legitimacy, the PFs will have to 
continue contributing to the formulation of 
agricultural policy and collaborating with other 
actors in the research system. Their interactions 
with COFUPRO and CONACYT contributed 
to this process, but the PFs have not interacted 
with the same intensity with the state science 
and technology councils, the Mixed Funds, or 
those universities that have not traditionally 
been part of the agricultural research process but 
which could contribute to the objectives of the 
PF (for example, UNAM or UAM). Although 
the lack of interaction probably has its origins in 
institutional inertia on both sides, the PFs need 
to recognize that they are part of a system that is 
broader than just agricultural research and that 
they should consequently strengthen their ties 
with the system as a whole.
•  It is recommended that COFUPRO gener-
ate an internal dialogue on the sources of 
the legitimacy of the PFs among farmers 
and civil society, beyond their access to 
state and federal authorities and to research 
institution administrators.
 As they consolidated, the PFs increased 
their representation by including in their boards 
representatives of farmers’ organizations and 
of some state-level system-product councils 
(see Section 6.4). Although this action has 
certainly made the boards more representative, 
it is not clear how representative they really 
are, given that their members are appointed by 
the boards themselves according to rules that 
are not always explicit. Neither is it clear how 
representative the product-systems are.
 It must be recognized that representation 
is in no way essential for the foundations; it 
is enough that they be seen as legitimate (see 
above).1 There are various measures the PFs 
can implement to bolster their legitimacy: 
more transparent selection of new council 
members, stronger collaboration with other 
agents in the national innovation system 
(beyond the traditional agricultural stakehold-
ers), stronger contribution to the design and 
implementation of policies and programs to 
support innovation, and increased involve-
ment in the transformation of the research 
system.
 In the face of a crisis, the legitimacy that 
the academic community, together with new 
actors in and outside the agricultural sector 
could bestow, may well be an instrument key 
to the survival of the PFs, in the same way 
that the voices that defended INIFAP and the 
Colegio de Posgraduados in 2004 included 
farmers, other agriculture sector agents, and 
the scientific and technological community as 
a whole.2
•  It is recommended that mechanisms to 
explore new instruments to foster agricul-
tural innovation be incorporated into the 
operating rules of the PFs.
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1For example, the boards of the international agricultural research centers are not representative, but they are legitimate as far
as donors, governments, and research institutions are concerned. This legitimacy is based on the recognition gained by each 
council member.
2The 2004 federal budget proposal sent to the congress did not include resources for a number of public offices, including two 
major agricultural research organizations. Agricultural stakeholders strongly lobbied the congress and monies were allocated.
 The PFs have tested new mechanisms to 
foster research and extension. These trials 
often contradicted the operational rules defined 
by SAGARPA. Such conflicts will reappear as 
long as the PFs continue exploring. The prob-
lem is not the exploration itself but the inflex-
ibility of the rules. As mentioned in Section 
2.1.2 (in the subsection “Defining Strategies in 
Complex Systems”), subjecting agents operat-
ing in evolving, ill-known complex processes 
to inflexible rules is a major impediment to 
innovation, because the latter do not allow 
decisionmakers to take advantage of emerging 
opportunities. One way of solving this con-
tradiction is to allow the use of a fraction of 
the resources of the PFs to explore alternative 
innovation support mechanisms, even through 
noncompetitive mechanisms.
C.1.2 Defining the Target Group 
of the PFs
•  It is recommended that a debate be promot-
ed within the PFs, with other key actors in 
the agricultural innovation system (includ-
ing farmer organizations and research and 
academic institutions renowned in the areas 
of rural development and innovation poli-
cy), and with the federal government about 
which farmers the PFs are currently target-
ing and whether this target is appropriate.
 The PF founders thought that these orga-
nizations would represent farmers. However, 
there was no clear discussion of which farmers 
would be represented. The result, as happens 
in most countries, is that the PFs ended up 
representing and supporting mainly commer-
cial farmers, because the poor farmers have 
great difficulty in articulating their needs. The 
reasons for these difficulties are (1) lack of 
human and social capital, especially the weak-
ness of apolitical producers’ associations and 
(2) the diversity of their needs, most of which 
are nontechnological in nature.
 Some stakeholders in the agricultural sec-
tor have criticized the PFs for this orientation. 
It is not the clear, however, that the PFs should 
widen the focus of their actions. Support for 
small farmers, particularly poor ones, requires 
specific capabilities that the PFs do not have 
and can only acquire by investing heavily 
in additional staff and training. Furthermore, 
there is still no global consensus on what are 
the best means to support poor farmers. The 
difficulty of working with small farmers is 
evidenced by persistent worldwide poverty 
despite the billions of dollars spent annually 
on poverty-reduction programs and by the 
difficulty of expanding successful local expe-
riences. In Mexico, the Ministry for Social 
Development, the state governments, and a 
number of NGOs are already working with 
poor rural households, and they are probably 
better trained for this than are the PFs.
 If it is accepted that the foundations ought 
to support small farmers who are potential 
entrepreneurs, then the foundations will have
to establish new alliances with NGOs and 
public-sector entities that work with these 
farmers. More crucially, however, they will 
have to develop the capacity to incorporate 
new methods of differentiating these par-
ticular farmers from those small farmers who 
do not have entrepreneurial capabilities. How 
to do this is still under debate in the inter-
national community, and no consensus has 
been reached yet. The literature on innovative
capabilities in individuals (Renzulli 2003; 
Shavinina and Seeratan 2003) has shown that 
there are no exact methods for identifying 
people capable of innovating. In other words, 
identifying among all small farmers potential 
entrepreneurs will require methodologies that 
have not yet been developed.
 Before expanding their activities in this 
direction, it is advisable to debate with a broad 
range of stakeholders the wisdom of such 
an expansion and the human and financial 
resources it would entail. Within the PFs, these 
activities would have to be the responsibility of 
a unit specialized in the analysis of new inter-
vention mechanisms (see below).
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C.1.3 Structure and Role of COFUPRO 
and the PFs
•  It is recommended that a dialogue be estab-
lished to redefine the relationship between 
COFUPRO and the PFs. In particular, it is 
recommended that COFUPRO have lim-
ited formal control over PF managers.
 Relations between individual PFs and 
COFUPRO have been changing, with a gradu-
al shift of power from the PFs to COFUPRO. 
However, there are no formal mechanisms by 
which COFUPRO can press individual PFs to 
avoid practices that are considered unaccept-
able by the PFs as a whole. This completely 
decentralized system reduces the effectiveness 
of COFUPRO, each PF, and the PFs as a set. 
Although it is not desirable that the PFs be 
totally dependent on COFUPRO, the present 
structure is not efficient, because it forces 
COFUPRO’s president and executive secre-
tary to invest too much time in lobbying (see 
Sections 5.5, 6.1.3, and 6.2.3). Currently the 
individual PFs accept the need for COFUPRO 
to coordinate and promote certain programs 
while the PFs themselves maintain a high 
degree of autonomy.
•  It is recommended that the functions and 
duties of the president of each PF and of 
COFUPRO be explicitly defined. With this 
end in mind, it is helpful to be acquainted 
with the governance structures of other 
foundations that also finance research 
and extension activities (for example, the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation or the 
Rockefeller Foundation).
 As mentioned in Sections 5.5, 6.1.2, 6.2, 
and 6.3, the main task of the PF presidents is 
to interact with the state’s political powers. 
Some presidents, though, feel that they should 
in addition manage the PF as if it were their 
own business. In most cases, the presidents 
feel that final responsibility for the functioning 
of the PF lies with them. In practice, however, 
the lines of action for the set of PFs are defined 
in the COFUPRO assembly and the interac-
tion of the managers with COFUPRO. This 
confusion has various causes, including the 
presidential responsibility for the PF’s assets, 
the president’s power over the manager, and 
the organizational culture.
 The biggest research-financing interna-
tional foundations (for example, the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the Ford Foundation) have 
more differentiated management structures in 
which the board and its president are only 
responsible for defining the overall operational 
strategy, supervising a professional manage-
ment team, and hiring the upper administra-
tive echelons. The professionals are selected 
not only for their administrative capacity but 
also for their experience in specific fields of 
research (for example, natural resource man-
agement or plant breeding). With this back-
ground, managers and professionals are able 
to evaluate the quality and relevance of the 
project proposals they review.
•  It is recommended that the abilities that PF 
presidents and managers should possess be 
explicitly defined.
 As explained in Sections 6.1.2, 6.2, and 6.3, 
PF presidents and managers are expected to 
fulfill various requirements, some of which are 
implicit. For the presidents, the most important 
requirements are that they possess significant 
social capital, have good access to the state 
governor, and use these contacts for the PF’s 
benefit. For the managers, the requirements 
are that they be loyal to the PF presidents, 
fulfill their obligations to other managers, sup-
port COFUPRO, be able to interact with local 
research institutions, and be good managers. 
When there is a conflict between loyalty to the 
president and professional capacity, it is gener-
ally resolved in favor of loyalty. Besides these 
qualifications, though, there are other abilities 
that PF authorities should possess, for instance, 
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a basic acquaintance with management of 
research and extension.
 Another problem with the capabilities 
managers should develop is that these are 
defined in terms of the individual PF’s needs. 
Nevertheless, the managers also play an impor-
tant role in COFUPRO and the set of PFs. As 
was mentioned above, selecting managers so 
that, as a group, they cover a wide range of 
capabilities would contribute to the benefit of 
all PFs. But this criteria would imply a further 
reduction in the control PF presidents have 
over their managers. This problem is essen-
tially one of collective action: each PF needs 
to sacrifice some of its own independence to 
benefit from joint actions. The success of these 
actions is a function of the incentive structure 
to induce participation, the ability of the set to 
enforce agreements, and the costs and benefits 
each PF incurs by participating.
 Lack of a clear presidential job description 
complicates selection, because each assembly 
member places a different value on the implicit 
and explicit job requirements. Similarly, the 
lack of clarity regarding desired qualifications 
for the manager and his or her subordinate 
hierarchy complicates professionalization of 
these individuals.
•  It is recommended that PF managers be 
selected by a committee consisting of the 
PF president, the treasurer, and a represen-
tative of COFUPRO. Furthermore, man-
agers should be hired for pre-established, 
renewable periods longer than the presi-
dent’s term.
 The absolute formal dependence of the 
managers on the presidents, together with a 
partial functional dependence on COFUPRO, 
creates various disfunctionalities, among which 
stand out the difficulties of training managers 
and of inculcating best practices. The weaken-
ing of the link between president and manager 
and the hiring of the latter for a period longer 
than the presidential term would contribute to 
a more professional management. At the same 
time, maintaining the dependence of the man-
ager on the PF (not necessarily on the presi-
dent) will allow both the maintenance of links 
to state agriculture and the preservation of the 
decentralized structure that has contributed to 
the success of the PFs.
•  It is recommended that a professional 
managerial career be created, which would 
be an incentive for the retention of staff 
trained by the PFs.
 Learning in the PFs has been mainly con-
centrated on the managers, with the exception 
of a few presidents. But the exclusive depen-
dence of managers on the presidents compli-
cates the learning process for three reasons. 
First, because some presidents place a higher 
value on loyalty than on professional skills, 
when they take office, they change the man-
ager. Thus the learning and experience of the 
departing manager are lost. Second, the incom-
ing manager sometimes lacks the professional 
profile needed to be productively incorporated 
into the set of managers. Third, a significant 
portion of the learning process takes place in 
the course of interactions with other manag-
ers and with COFUPRO, but the managers at 
times have insufficient commitment to actions 
taken outside their own PFs. The creation of a 
professional career in which contributions to 
the set of PFs are recognized would encourage 
managers to remain in the job while fostering 
collective action.
 The professional career should have two 
components: an adequate set of incentives 
and a training program. The incentive set 
should reward activities valued by the PFs. In 
practice, an incentive system is an agreement 
between the manager and the PF (or the set 
of PFs) that explicitly states the targets for the 
managers’ increased efficiency and the PF’s 
commitments to help the manager attain these 
targets. The targets should include criteria to 
measure the manager’s actions and profession-
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alism and specify the bonus or other compen-
sation to reward the manager’s contributions to 
the PF’s success in attaining its goals.
 The elaboration of a professional develop-
ment program for managers should have two 
stages. First, the manager’s job profile must 
be analyzed to define what capabilities are 
needed. Second, it is necessary to identify the 
current competencies of each of the existing 
managers. The development program should 
be elaborated on the bases of the discrepancies 
between what the managers need and what 
they actually have. The program should be car-
ried out in coordination with an institution of 
higher education so that, should the manager 
so desire, an academic degree can be obtained 
(see below).
 Training needs can be defined using a 
qualification matrix, a synoptic representation 
of the qualifications effectively available in 
management teams. The first step is the defi-
nition of the abilities a manager should have; 
this definition can be arrived at in a workshop 
involving the whole set or a subset of manag-
ers and outside facilitators. Each column of the 
matrix identifies a qualification, and the man-
agers’ names are placed in the rows. The team 
in charge of defining the training program 
marks for each manager his or her mastering of 
each of the qualifications. The matrix columns 
show the weaknesses or strengths of the man-
agement group in one of the competencies; 
the matrix rows indicate a manager’s degree 
of versatility and mastery of his or her func-
tion. The columns show training needs for the 
managers as a group and the rows, individual 
manager needs. With the matrix data, a com-
prehensive development plan can be formu-
lated, specifically adapted to each person and 
to the evolving needs of COFUPRO.
C.2 Learning Mechanisms
From their inception, some PFs have had a crit-
ical attitude toward the traditional research and 
extension approaches, the mechanisms the PFs 
themselves used to define priorities, and the 
routines developed to manage resources. This 
critical attitude led them to develop learning 
mechanisms in two key areas: improvement of 
administrative mechanisms and definition of 
research priorities. There is a third critical area, 
though, in which the PFs have not developed 
effective learning tools: new instruments to 
support research, extension, and innovation.
 Among the contributions of the PFs to agri-
cultural policy formulation, the exercise to pri-
oritize agricultural chains and identify research 
demands stands out. The data generated by 
this activity had a great impact, because it was 
the only participative planning exercise for 
the agricultural sector that covered the whole 
country. Given the lack of other sources of 
information, federal and state governments 
used these priorities as the basis for their poli-
cies. In addition to generating information, the 
process was important because it opened chan-
nels of dialogue among actors who had previ-
ously been dissociated.
 It will, however, be difficult for the PFs 
in the short run to generate other data of such 
impact. Communication channels among the 
actors are now well established, and as a result 
several agents have modified their patterns of 
interaction with others. When the identifica-
tion of research demands was completed, it was
judged to have been too expensive and com-
plex to repeat, and an alternate data-updating 
mechanism was created: innovation units in 
each productive chain. These units used a 
smaller database and a methodology that was 
less participative than the original.
 Two additional problems with the product-
centered planning mechanism are that it reduces 
the flexibility of the PFs and hampers sup-
porting emerging products. A parameter that 
SAGARPA has used to evaluate the founda-
tions is the alignment of funded projects with 
identified demands. However, emergent prod-
ucts do not figure among the priorities, because 
by their very nature they are not yet important. 
In other words, the evaluation mechanism based 
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on identified demands penalizes the more inno-
vative PFs.
 An area in which the PFs can make a 
significant contribution is in the design and 
implementation of new mechanisms to foster 
innovation, including support for the transfor-
mation of research institutions and the creation 
of effective extension mechanisms. Several 
PFs have implemented different extension 
mechanisms. These experiences are an explo-
ration mechanism that has not yet been suf-
ficiently exploited. In contrast, the PFs have 
not progressed with new ways of organiz-
ing research and innovation. In this and the 
next sections, we explore alternative ways of 
strengthening research and extension capa-
bilities. Making a major contribution to the 
design of rural innovation programs will help 
to consolidate the legitimacy of the PFs in the 
agricultural sector, over and above the recogni-
tion they receive from the authorities. To make 
this contribution, though, the PFs will have to 
strengthen their analytical skills.
 The two essential elements of the learning 
mechanisms developed by some of the PFs and 
COFUPRO were (1) the contributions of a few 
highly creative individuals and (2) the capac-
ity for identifying knowledge gaps and finding 
external help to fill them. It should be stressed 
that the learning effort was very uneven; some 
PFs have experimented actively, whereas oth-
ers have maintained a passive attitude.
 Since its creation, COFUPRO has played a
fundamental role in the development of learning
mechanisms for the set of PFs, especially train-
ing, interfoundation exchange visits, interactions
of a group of presidents and managers, exercise
of self-evaluation, and contact with outsiders
who brought key knowledge of research admin-
istration (especially Willem Janssen of ISNAR 
and José Laborde, a SAGARPA adviser).
 The main instruments COFUPRO used 
to support learning by the PFs were the stra-
tegic planning exercises and the research-
demand identification exercises. COFUPRO 
also played a fundamental part in some activi-
ties common to all PFs, such as the develop-
ment of the research-demand identification 
methodology and the development of the online 
RFP.
•  It is recommended that formal training 
mechanisms for the managers be estab-
lished, for example, a graduate degree–
granting academic program in the admin-
istration and financing of research, exten-
sion, and innovation.
 The managers’ capabilities are very uneven. 
The lack of formal, structured training mecha-
nisms does not permit either the consolidation 
of a minimum ability base or the strengthen-
ing of the PF’s culture. External certification 
of managers could help to rectify the present 
deficiencies in administrative capabilities. This 
certification could be structured around a core 
of short courses that includes such subjects as 
business administration, administration of STI, 
and researcher–farmer interaction techniques. 
The courses could be structured in such a way 
that those managers who so wished could 
obtain a master’s degree, which would require 
forming an alliance with an institution of higher 
education able to award academic degrees.
 To reduce per-student costs and widen 
the target group, the courses could be orga-
nized by COFUPRO and jointly financed with 
CONACYT. By so doing the program would 
also meet the needs of the Sectoral and Mixed 
Funds and the state science and technology 
councils. An additional advantage of these alli-
ances is that the participation of students from 
different institutions helps to create horizontal 
links, increasing the efficiency of the system 
and the legitimacy of the PFs.
 Competitively awarded funding to support 
research and innovation is to be found in near-
ly all Latin American countries. The master’s 
program could also be opened to students from 
other Spanish-speaking countries.
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•  It is recommended that informal training 
mechanisms be created for PF managers 
and employees.
 Formal training programs cannot transmit 
the tacit knowledge that managers acquire on 
the job. Thus an informal training program 
should also be established that could include 
extended training visits to PFs using best prac-
tices and distance learning courses (using, for 
example, the Internet).
•  It is recommended that the training of 
presidents and managers be strengthened 
in the analysis, design, and implementa-
tion of research, extension, and innovation 
programs.
 The PFs have developed a culture in which 
presidents do not need to know about scien-
tific and technology policy, because these 
matters can be delegated to the managers (see 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2). This premise weak-
ens COFUPRO’s potential contribution to 
the design of research, extension, and innova-
tion policies, because COFUPRO’s interaction 
with the political hierarchy is centered on the 
presidents. The managers generally interact 
with the technical echelons.
 Managers also do not receive any formal 
training in these areas; the acquisition of this 
type of knowledge is left up to the curiosity 
of each individual. However, as explained in 
Section 6.4, the area in which the PFs could 
make their greatest contribution is in the design 
and implementation of research and innovation 
programs. Training managers in these topics 
could take place within the framework of the 
above-recommended diploma courses.
 Training the presidents in these subjects 
could take place in the form of a short course 
at the start of the presidential term followed 
by subsequent training sessions at COFUPRO 
events. At the moment, COFUPRO and some 
foundations already organize isolated training 
events; their impact would be enhanced by a 
more structured and organic character.
•  It is recommended that a think-tank be cre-
ated for the analysis of new mechanisms to 
foster research, extension, and innovation. 
The think-tank would serve to systematize 
and strengthen the learning process for the 
set of PFs and would also enable balancing 
immediate and long-term needs.
 Since their beginning, the PFs have 
explored alternatives to improve their activi-
ties. On various occasions, exploration was 
based on external support that brought spe-
cialized knowledge that the PFs did not have 
(for example, from ISNAR and the Mexican 
Foundation for Total Quality). But institutional 
capabilities in these areas were not developed; 
rather, the exploration was concentrated in cer-
tain key individuals and in a few foundations.
 COFUPRO’s learning was focused on the 
consolidation of administrative procedures for 
the RFPs. This strategy is reaching its lim-
its, because progress in the consolidation of 
a structure reduces creativity (see Section 
2.3) and the challenges and opportunities that 
the PFs face today are more complex than 
those they initially faced. Limitations that the 
organizational structures impose on individual 
creativity have been recognized in the manage-
ment literature, which recommends the cre-
ation of a specialized structure outside the rou-
tines of the mother organization (Christensen 
and Raynor 2003). This solution is also recom-
mended for the PFs: create a formal think-tank 
to analyze scientific and technological policies 
and explore new programs to support research 
and innovation.
 Another reason that learning mechanisms 
need to be strengthened is that several PFs 
recognize the limitations of the linear vision of 
science and have begun to look for new ways 
to foster innovation. There is, however, no 
worldwide consensus on what the most effec-
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tive programs to support agricultural innova-
tion are. In other words, the PFs are pushing up 
against the international frontier of knowledge 
in these areas. To continue using this concep-
tual framework, the PFs will have to develop 
their own analytical capabilities, because they 
will not be able to rely on others, as they did in 
the past.
 Finally, the PFs and the managers devel-
oped solid capabilities for administering RFPs 
and projects. In contrast, most presidents 
became specialized in making contacts at the 
political level and with other presidents. Thus 
the foundations lack spaces specialized in the 
exploration of new instruments to support 
innovation.
 The creation of a think-tank should be 
handled with care. The dependence of the PFs 
on key individuals, together with an ill-defined 
organizational structure, leaves them vulner-
able to the departure of these key individuals. 
However, consolidated structures can reduce 
the creativity of individual PFs. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2 and Section 6.3, success depends 
on maintaining a balance between exploration 
and exploitation through the manipulation of 
variation (independent testing by the PFs) with 
an effective selection system (central analysis 
of individual experiences).
 This think-tank should have a minimum 
structure (one or two trained professionals and 
an innovative farmer) and a budget that is small 
but allows the team to operate. The farmer 
would be responsible for guaranteeing smooth 
communications with the set of PFs and with 
other agents in the innovation system; the pro-
fessionals would bring specialized knowledge 
and contacts with outside experts. To ensure 
close interactions with existing structures, the 
space could be a technical committee reporting 
to the president of COFUPRO. This committee 
would identify and systematize the innova-
tions from each PF, organize monitoring of 
the experiences, help to diffuse the most effec-
tive innovations among the PFs, and propose 
innovations for the PFs to test. A small budget 
would force the professionals to negotiate proj-
ects with the PFs and with other actors in the 
innovation system.
•  It is recommended that external experts be 
consulted to define a knowledge-adminis-
tration strategy (in the broad sense of the 
term) for the set of PFs.
 Since their establishment, the PFs have 
made important efforts to build databases 
(especially of technologies and projects). These 
efforts have been characterized by the PFs as 
“knowledge management.” But this effort is 
too restrictive an interpretation of the concept.
 The specialized literature has defined 
knowledge management as the set of deci-
sions and systematic actions relating to all 
aspects of individual and collective knowl-
edge. Knowledge management is perceived as 
a system that balances four knowledge dimen-
sions: content, process, culture, and infrastruc-
ture (see Section 2.3.3). Content refers to the 
knowledge that can be managed. Processes 
include identification of needs, retrieval and 
utilization, creation or acquisition, collection, 
documentation and storage, and transference 
or socialization of knowledge. Culture refers to 
the organization’s practices, form, frequency of 
activities, and attitudes toward those activities 
that affect the nature of the learning process at 
the individual, group, and organizational levels. 
Infrastructure refers to the establishment of 
a technical platform to share knowledge; the
platform should include a material dimension
(such as hardware and software) and a human 
dimension (such as the personnel to support the
system’s use and application of the knowledge-
administration processes). Restricting knowl-
edge management to databases amounts to re-
ducing the system to infrastructure.
•  It is recommended that a culture (and its 
attendant capabilities) be developed to 
document the activities that the PFs are 
exploring.
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 Both COFUPRO and the PFs document 
only a fraction of the actions and processes 
they implement. For example, some foun-
dations are testing different mechanisms to 
encourage innovation, but these experiences 
are not systematically documented, analyzed, 
and socialized. Documenting experiences is 
important for three reasons. First, it facili-
tates institutional learning by codifying tacit 
knowledge. Second, it helps to disseminate the 
actions of the PFs and contributes to their legit-
imation in the eyes of researchers, farmers, and 
other actors in the innovation system. Third, 
writing about a process forces the writer to 
think about it, contributing to the consolidation 
of knowledge. Systematization of these experi-
ences could be an activity shared between the 
above-proposed think-tank and PF managers.
C.3 Relationship with Research 
and Extension Institutions
•  It is recommended that COFUPRO pro-
mote a dialogue on the future of the agri-
cultural research system. This dialogue 
should include, apart from other actors, 
SAGARPA, the secretary of the treasury, 
and CONACYT.
 The PFs are presently operating in a system 
in which some research institutions are being 
profoundly transformed, others are changing 
more gradually, and the extension mechanisms 
are still unarticulated. A major obstacle in 
transforming the research system is the dif-
ficulty in hiring new researchers. Although the 
solution to this problem is beyond the scope 
of the PFs, they can contribute by promoting a 
wide dialogue that explicitly includes authori-
ties from the Ministry of the Treasury. The 
dialogue should be centered on the future of 
the agricultural research system, the human 
and financial resources necessary for the trans-
formation and consolidation of this system, 
and mechanisms to bring about change. The 
debate could perhaps be organized by SNITT 
with support from the PFs, although at present 
SNITT does not have the structure to do it.
•  It is recommended that pilot projects to 
explore alternative ways of contracting 
research and innovation activities be imple-
mented to strengthen the best teams, facili-
tate the emergence of new high-quality 
research teams, and promote interdisciplin-
ary projects.
 Two types of support for research insti-
tutions should be tested. First, a portion of 
resources should be allocated to projects sub-
mitted by actors from the innovation system in 
a noncompetitive process. For these projects, 
a brief presentation will be needed, and then 
a group of managers should work with the 
presenters of the project to structure it in a way 
that would contribute to the objectives of the 
PFs. This mechanism could make the opera-
tion of the PFs more flexible, allowing identi-
fication of emerging products or processes that 
are not included in the prioritized chains (see 
Section 6.3). For this mechanism to be effec-
tive, individuals in the PFs who collaborate 
with researchers in project design must have 
a solid background in the disciplines in which 
they are operating. The Rockefeller and Ford 
Foundations use a similar method to select 
projects to finance. If the procedure proves to 
be successful, it could indicate new training 
areas for managers.
 Second, the PFs could help to strengthen 
research capabilities through direct support of 
the strongest research teams and new mecha-
nisms to foster the emergence of new teams of 
excellence. As explained in Sections 2.2 and 
2.3, formal research contributes to innovation 
when (1) researchers establish close links with 
farmers (thereby assuring that the research is 
pertinent and the farmers can use the results) 
and (2) the research is of high quality (because 
otherwise it is not research). It is important, 
though, to recognize that quality is not neces-
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sarily correlated with publication in indexed 
journals but rather with the creation of original 
information that is useful for actors in the inno-
vation system.
 To strengthen existing teams, the PFs 
could offer the best researchers 5-year con-
tracts, without the requirement of present-
ing research projects. The contract should 
permit supplementing salaries, require hiring 
young researchers, allow the employment of 
research assistants, and in some cases facili-
tate investments in equipment. The two key 
conditions of these contracts should be that 
(1) researchers work closely with innovative 
farmers (to ensure relevance) and (2) research-
ers’ programs be periodically evaluated by a 
team that includes recognized foreign profes-
sionals (to ensure quality). The periodicity of 
the evaluations cannot be too short (less than 
3 years), because the reviews are expensive, 
the researcher has to invest time in preparing 
materials for the evaluators, and it is necessary 
to allow sufficient time for the researcher to 
obtain results.
 Similar contracts could be offered to emer-
gent researchers, with the condition that they 
be affiliated to a recognized research insti-
tution. A more modest trajectory could be 
required of these researchers. While the first 
contract is in force (the consolidation period), 
quality requirements would be the same as for 
recognized researchers, but less productivity 
would be required, because these researchers 
need a grace period while they establish their 
lines of work.
 These mechanisms should not be used 
to finance a graduate education, given that 
CONACYT has a scholarship program. To 
implement these procedures, it may be neces-
sary to modify the operational rules of SITT, 
because awards would not be by open com-
petition. Given that the effectiveness of these 
arrangements is not known, it is important to 
first experiment with pilot projects involving 
the think-tank and outside specialists, while the 
traditional RFPs are continued.
•  It is recommended that more projects be 
supported in which recognized foreign 
researchers participate, as a means to cre-
ate stable interactions between local and 
foreign researchers.
 A complementary mechanism to strengthen 
research capabilities is by financing projects 
that include foreign researchers. The growing 
complexity of research and innovation activi-
ties forces individual actors to join international 
innovation networks (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3). 
Researchers who do not frequently interact with 
foreign colleagues from centers of excellence 
rapidly find themselves out of date.
 The PFs are already supporting projects 
in which foreign researchers participate. It is 
recommended that these projects be further 
encouraged. Moreover, in priority areas in 
which there is no domestic capacity, first-rank 
foreign centers should be contracted, making 
sure that the contract stipulates development of 
local capacity.
•  It is recommended that new mechanisms 
be explored to define priorities for the PFs 
as a whole.
 COFUPRO coordinated the definition of 
research priorities in 2002 and 2003. After 
this process there were no further attempts 
to define priorities in a coordinated fashion, 
although COFUPRO’s innovation units have 
updated information for various chains. At 
present each PF defines its priorities in its own 
way, sometimes annually. The result is that 
priorities vary across states, but more impor-
tantly, across time, hampering the consolida-
tion of research programs.
 Another problem with the methods used 
to define research priorities is that they do not 
always allow the participation of the research-
ers themselves. As mentioned in Section 2.2, 
innovation systems evolve through the inter-
actions of supply and demand. A demand-
oriented system is short-sighted and cannot 
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identify emergent opportunities that only re-
searchers know of.3
 Priorities should be defined with a mecha-
nism that is efficient in the sense that it is not 
excessively expensive, allows the participation 
of a broad range of innovative actors, and per-
mits identification of emergent opportunities. 
To identify an adequate mechanism, it is possi-
ble to evaluate what individual PFs have done 
and what is used in other countries (particu-
larly those that belong to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development) and 
by public research institutes from developed 
countries (such as the Agricultural Research 
Service of the United States Department of 
Agriculture or Agrifood Canada). These insti-
tutions should be analyzed, because they are 
technological centers that support farmers 
rather than pure research institutions. Also 
recommended is the evaluation of new plan-
ning mechanisms for complex systems that 
have been proposed in the literature in the past 
decade (see Section 2.1.2).
•  It is recommended that the state techni-
cal committees be replaced by regional or 
national technical committees that should 
also incorporate foreign researchers.
 At present each PF has its own technical 
committee to evaluate proposals. Committee 
members are often chosen for their affilia-
tion to a particular institution and not for their 
technical capacity. Given the small size of the 
state research systems, it is difficult for each 
state to establish a highly qualified techni-
cal committee. The creation of regional or 
national committees by broad subject areas 
could contribute to solving this problem.4 To 
create regional committees, it is possible to use 
the committees COFUPRO has already estab-
lished. Foreign researchers should be invited to 
participate, thus increasing transparency in the 
evaluations.
•  It is recommended that the PFs develop 
capabilities for the analysis of innovation 
mechanisms, especially to foster the emer-
gence and consolidation of networks and 
the development of entrepreneurial skills in 
small farmers. It is also recommended that 
a system of experimentation coordinated 
by COPUFRO be established to test new 
extension methods.
 Currently Mexico does not have agricul-
tural extension programs of recognized effec-
tiveness in all states and productive chains. 
The reason is that different types of farmers 
have different needs and capabilities. The 
diversity of the PFs and their local roots could 
be an important factor in identifying adequate 
extension mechanisms for specific groups of 
farmers and specific conditions. To identify 
these mechanisms, the PFs need to profession-
alize their managers so that they can develop 
capabilities in the analysis of research and 
extension programs. In addition, COFUPRO 
must play the role of facilitator in the diffusion 
of experiences among the PFs.
 The literature on innovation suggests that 
extension mechanisms should not be restricted 
to technical topics; they should instead empha-
size the facilitation of collective action and 
the integration of innovation networks (see 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3). At present, there are 
no recognized procedures for promoting the 
emergence and consolidation of innovation 
networks in agriculture, especially networks 
that include small farmers. Some PFs have 
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system can convert this potential to useful innovations when used by social or productive agents. Several developed countries 
define research priorities every 5 years through Delphi surveys that include only researchers. In the more than 40 years that 
the system has been used, approximately 85 percent of the priorities turned out to be correct.
4For example, national technical committees for specific topics (such as crops, cattle rearing, or forestry) can be created.
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experimented with different ways of promot-
ing these networks, but there is no systematic, 
coordinated effort.
•  It is recommended that COFUPRO promote 
a debate on the SAGARPA-CONACYT 
Sectoral Fund, in particular its vision of 
science and mode of operation.
 The RFP structure of the SAGARPA-
CONACYT Sectoral Fund and the information 
required in the application documents reflect a 
simplistic and mechanistic vision of research. 
For example, it is necessary to provide the 
titles of articles to be published before start-
ing the research. If researchers are really able 
to provide this information, the research is on 
the point of being concluded or is not really 
contributing anything new and therefore is not 
research. If they intend to conduct groundbreak-
ing research, researchers simply supply spuri-
ous documentation for these article titles, so 
the information is not useful. Another example 
of this mechanistic vision is the requirement to 
specify the expected quantitative, qualitative, 
scientific, economic, social, and environmental 
impacts. As explained in Sections 2.1 and 2.3, 
research processes are by nature uncertain. 
Effects can only be predicted with a degree 
of certainty when projects are either not new 
or merely incremental. In effect, selection 
criteria that are based on expected outcomes 
only conspire against the most innovative 
research. In the case of innovative projects, the 
ex ante effects can only be specified in very 
broad terms, which is why the information is 
not useful for decisionmaking. A last example 
is the excessive detail that is requested in the 
budget justification, whereas the analysis of 
mechanisms of interaction among researchers 
and other actors in the innovation system is 
neglected.
 In sum, project selection is in part based on 
information that is irrelevant to the real evalu-
ation of the research potential. In contrast, 
information that is truly relevant (mechanisms 
of interaction with other actors in the innova-
tion system, research quality, or information 
that would permit the identification of conflicts 
of interest with the reviewers) is either not 
requested or requested in insufficient detail. 
An additional problem with this mechanism 
is that it forces researchers to waste a great 
deal of time generating information that is 
irrelevant. A study should be made of mecha-
nisms used by the administrators of other funds 
(competitive or noncompetitive, domestic and 
abroad) to address these problems.
APPENDIX D
Topics Covered in the Interviews
D.1 History of the PFs and 
COFUPRO
•  The process that led to the creation of the 
PFs and identification of different stages
•  Expectations of decisionmakers regarding 
the role the PFs would play in the agricul-
tural research system
•  Identification of the initial dynamics of the 
PFs
•  The process that led to the creation of 
COFUPRO and its subsequent evolution
•  Reactions of the different actors in the 
innovation and research systems to the 
creation of the PFs
•  The evolving relations between the PFs 
and COFUPRO on the one hand, and the 
federal and state governments on the other
•  Identification of the main problems faced 
by the PFs and COFUPRO and of the strat-
egies they followed to solve them
D.2 Organizational Culture 
and Governance
•  Main assumptions in the emergence of an 
organizational culture
•  The current roles of SAGARPA, farmers 
(including presidents and managers), and 
state governments in the governing bodies 
of COFUPRO and the PFs
•  Implicit and explicit rules for the designa-
tion of COFUPRO’s presidents and execu-
tive secretaries
•  Implicit and explicit rules for the designa-
tion of PF presidents and managers
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•  Evolution of the procedures for priority set-
ting and resource allocation in the PFs and 
COFUPRO
•  Identification of leadership styles in 
COFUPRO, in particular, analysis of the 
power-sharing arrangements between the 
president and the executive secretary
•  Identification of the conflicts that exist 
or existed in COFUPRO or between 
COFUPRO and the PFs, and of the strate-
gies to solve them 
•  Financing mechanisms
D.3 Learning Activities
•  Evolution of the RFPs and of the interac-
tion with research institutions
•  Evolution of priority-setting methods
•  Evolution of internal and external methods 
to evaluate COFUPRO and the PFs
•  Creation of a language common to all PFs
•  Identification of different instruments tried 
by COFUPRO and the PFs
•  Strategies to document positive experi-
ences and to learn from them
•  Training of authorities, employees, and 
farmers in COFUPRO and the PFs
•  Control of projects financed by COFUPRO 
and the PFs
•  Strategies to learn about the dynamics of 
innovation systems and identify instru-
ments to foster innovation
•  Strategies to learn about STI policies 
(including extension)
D.4 Impact on the Research and 
Innovation Systems
•  Evolution of the interactions between 
COFUPRO and the PFs on the one side, 
and research institutions, policymakers, 
and researchers on the other
•  Evolution of the interaction between 
COFUPRO and CONACYT, especially 
regarding priority setting and resource 
allocation
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•  Influence of COFUPRO and the PFs on 
research institutions
•  Influence of COFUPRO and the PFs on 
individual researchers, especially on their 
working routines
•  Influence of COFUPRO and the PFs on 
extension programs
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About this Report
Dynamic agricultural innovation systems are essential for reducing poverty. The Mexican Produce Foundations (PFs) are among the most flexible and adaptive institutions that support research, extension, and innovation activities in the developing world, and they have 
had major and diverse impacts on the Mexican agricultural innovation and research systems. Why 
have the PFs been so successful, relative to other, similar organizations? This report investigates their 
path to success. Drawing on a diverse literature on innovation systems, complexity theories, and 
organizational cultures and governance, the authors explore how these institutions have sustained 
organizational innovation over time and affected the Mexican agricultural innovation system. This 
study will be valuable for researchers, policymakers, and others interested in improving the design 
and implementation of research and innovation systems in developing countries.
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